Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission v. Stiely
| Decision Date | 24 April 1968 |
| Citation | 241 A.2d 74,429 Pa. 614 |
| Parties | PENNSYLVANIA PUBLIC UTILITY COMMISSION, Appellant, v. Wellington STIELY. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Robert E. Woodside, R. J. Woodside, Harrisburg, for appellee.
Harold S. Shertz, Philadelphia, for Pennsylvania Motor Truck Assn., amicus curiae; Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Philadephia, of counsel.
Before BELL, C.J., and MUSMANNO, COHEN, JONES, EAGEN, O'BRIEN and ROBERTS, JJ.
The Public Utility Commission, on its own motion, instituted a complaint against Wellington Stiely, charging the unauthorized operation of a motor vehicle as a common or contract carrier. The Pennsylvania Motor Truck Association was granted leave to intervene and the matter was submitted on briefs and oral argument, there being no factual disputes. The Commission sustained the complaint and issued a cease and desist order against Stiely. An appeal to the Superior Court resulted in a reversal of the Order of the Commission and a dismissal of the complaint. Stiely v. Pa. P.U.C., 209 Pa.Super. 440, 229 A.2d 14 (1967). On the Commission's petition for reconsideration of our previous denial of its petition for the allowance of an appeal, we granted allocatur.
The facts of the case are brief and simple. Stiely admitted that he transported, by dump truck, 19,300 pounds of coarse, aggregate stone, for compensation, from the Faylor Lime and Stone Co., Washington Township Dauphin County, to the premises of Gratz Fair, Inc., Borough of Gratz, Dauphin County. Stiely further admits that he is neither certificated as a common carrier nor the holder of a contract carrier's permit. The parties are agreed that the hauled material was to be used in the construction of a road on private property owned and operated by Gratz Fair, Inc.
As stated by the Superior Court, 'The controlling issue before us involves an interpretation of definitions set forth in the Public Utility Law. Subsections (6) and (7) of Section 2 of the Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1053, as amended, 66 P.S. § 1102, read in pertinent part as follows:
'(6) 'Common Carrier by Motor Vehicle' means any common carrier who or which holds out or undertakes the transportation of passengers or property, or both, or any class of passengers or property, between points within this Commonwealth by motor vehicle for compensation * * * but shall not include * * * (d) any person or corporation who or which uses, or furnishes for use, dump trucks for the transportation of ashes, rubbish, excavated and road construction materials' .
'(7) 'Contract Carrier by Motor Vehicle' means any person or corporation who or which provides or furnishes transportation of passengers or property, or both, or any class of passengers or property, between points within this Commonwealth by motor vehicle for compensation * * * but shall not include * * * (e) any person or corporation who or which uses, or furnishes for use, dump trucks for the transportation of ashes, rubbish, excavated or road construction materials'.'
The Commission adopts the position that the exemption or exception provided by the Act is limited to the transportation of materials used in the construction of Public roads, and then only if the transportation is to the actual site of the public road construction project. We are in agreement with the Superior Court's rejection of this narrow interpretation. The opinion of the Superior Court correctly decides the question and we observe no proper cause for further amplification. The language of the statute is plain and unambiguous and there is no need to resort to any rules of construction to find a meaning not contained in that language.
The Commission also argues that if the view which we adopt is correct, the Act is unconstitutional as special legislation. Stiely contends that the constitutionality question was not raised below and is, therefore, not properly before us. A reading of the Commission's order, however, shows clearly that one of the reasons for its conclusion was the possibility that any other conclusion would create constitutional problems. We therefore conclude that the question was raised and considered below and requires resolution here.
The Commission, without saying so, apparently reached the conclusion that an exclusion of dump trucks hauling road construction materials to public road job sites was the limit of reasonable classification permissible under the Constitution. It contends that an exemption for a restricted class of vehicles for the transportation of a restricted class of materials to a restricted class of projects is constitutionally permissible, if its interpretation of the scope of the exemption is adopted, only because a public purpose, the construction and repair of public roads, is involved. The argument is that the view of the Superior Court, which we adopt, renders the exemption unconstitutional.
Where one seeks to overturn an Act of Assembly on constitutional grounds, he carries a heavy burden of overcoming the strong presumption of constitutionality. L.J.W. Realty Corp. v. Philadelphia, 390 Pa. 197, 134 A.2d 878 (1957). Moreover, legislative enactments will not be declared constitutionally infirm unless they clearly, palpably and plainly violate the constitution and in such fashion as to leave us without doubt or hesitation. Milk Control Commission v. Battista, 413 Pa. 652, 198 A.2d 840 (1964); Daly v. Hemphill, 411 Pa. 263, 191 A.2d 835. A determination of what is a reasonable classification is a practical one based on experience. Bargain City U.S.A., Inc. v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A.2d 439 (1962).
We conclude that the heavy burden has not been met. The same considerations which make the exemption reasonable with respect to public roads, apply with equal force to all roads. Ashes, rubbish, excavated or road construction materials are all usually hauled over short distances, whether for public or private use or purposes. Private individuals and companies, as well as municipal subdivisions are likely to be dealing with numerous small operators in the transportation of such freight. The General Assembly could, based on experience, reasonably conclude that regulation of carriers of the enumerated items was not necessary to the integrated transportation system which the Public Utility Code contemplates. In view of the fact that in the vast majority of cases the exempted items are transported in dump trucks, the Legislature could properly limit the exemption to that class of vehicles.
We conclude that the classification is reasonable--even though not limited to public roads. If anything, we believe that such a limitation would raise constitutional problems not present in the broader interpretation of the exemption which we have reached.
Order affirmed.
DISSENTING OPINION
The majority proceeds upon the assumption that the meaning of the word 'road' in the statute at issue can be decided as if this Court has never had occasion in the past to pass upon the meaning of this word. Although arguably unambiguous on its face, in other cases we have clearly held that the word 'road' in fact means Public road; in these cases the word was equally unambiguous yet we decided that the Legislature intended a different meaning, i.e., public road.
Of greatest aid in the resolution of this issue is the cannon of statutory construction '(t)hat when a court of last resort has construed the language used in a law, the Legislature in subsequent laws on the same subject matter intend(s) the same construction to be placed upon such language.' Statutory Construction Act, Act of May 28, 1937, P.L. 1019, § 52, 46 P.S. § 552(4). In Respublica v. Arnold, 3 Yeates 417 (Pa. 1802), defendant was indicted for a nuisance created by obstructing a water course in such a manner that a highway overflowed. Construing the word 'road' as employed in the indictment, the Court examined various statutes in which road appeared and concluded: Id. at 421. (Emphasis in original.) The Arnold interpretation was expressly reaffirmed in Phillips v. Connellsville and State Line Ry. Co., 247 Pa. 560, 93 A. 603 (1915), a case concerning the proper interpretation of statutory language which required that a railroad, when constructing its facilities over any 'established road or way' do so in a manner as not to impede passage of persons or property. 1 I can find nothing in the Public Utility Law which in any way derogates from the conclusion that the Legislature did draft the 'road construction materials' exception against a background of case law which dictated that the word 'road' was in fact the equivalent of 'public road' and therefore would hold that the Commission's contention must prevail. 2
Furthermore, although there has been no Pennsylvania litigation concerning the interpretation of 'road construction materials,' 3 the Oklahoma Supreme Court adopted as the proper interpretation of a similar exception for the transportation of 'road material' in the Oklahoma statute a reading which accords with our view. See Collins-Dietz-Morris Co. v. State Corporation Commission, 154 Okl. 121, 128, 7 P.2d 123, 131, 80 A.L.R. 561 (1931): "Road material,' as used in the act, refers to materials intended to be used for the construction, maintenance and repair of Public highways, and the language used does not apply to materials that could be used for the construction, maintenance, or repair of Public highways but which, in fact, are intended to be used for other purposes.' 4 (Emphasis supplied.)
The opinion below of ...
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