Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Martin

• Decision Date: 11 November 1901
• Citation: 111 F. 586
• Parties: PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. v. MARTIN.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

111 F. 586

PENNSYLVANIA R. CO. v. MARTIN.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

November 11, 1901

Alan H Strong, for plaintiff in error.

C. H Beasley, for defendant in error.

Before ACHESON and DALLAS, Circuit Judges, and KIRKPATRICK, District judge.

DALLAS Circuit Judge.

The plaintiff (below) sued to recover damages for personal hurt which (as he claimed and we may assume) was inflicted upon him by a piece of iron, part of a brake shoe, which was projected from one of the cars of a rapidly moving train of the defendant (below) and struck the plaintiff, who was walking alongside the track. It has been properly conceded that, if the case should have been submitted to the jury at all, the instructions which accompanied its submission would not have been open to criticism; but the learned trial judge was asked to direct a verdict for the defendant, and his refusal to do so is here assigned for error. Consequently the question now for decision is, was there any evidence to sustain the verdict, which was in fact, and by allowance of the court, rendered for the plaintiff? Or, to state it with more particularity, was there any evidence to support the findings which were in law essential to warrant that verdict, viz. (1) that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, and (2) that that duty, if owing, had not been discharged?

1. The plaintiff was employed in the Equitable Pottery, from a gate of which there was a path upon the defendant's right of way, running alongside the rails for a considerable distance to a station platform, and thence over that platform to a public street in the city of Trenton, called 'Lalor Street,' which adjoined the station and crossed the track at, or nearly at, right angles therewith. This path had for a long time, without objection by the railroad company, been used by the employes of the pottery in going to and from their work. The plaintiff was walking upon it at the time of the accident, and, if he had then been going to his home, he would have been, though not a trespasser, a licensee simply, to whom the defendant would not have been liable, except for wanton or intentional injury. But there was evidence that this path had been also used, with the company's acquiescence, as a way to and from its station, by persons taking or leaving trains at that point; and the plaintiff testified that upon the occasion in question he was going to the station to await the arrival of a passenger by a train which was due thee about an hour later. He said:

'I was going there to meet a friend of mine on some business. * * * I did not make any appointment with him, but I wanted to see him on particular business. * * * I wanted to see Mr. Ristow for the purpose of getting some prices of saggers by him.'

This testimony was adduced to maintain the plaintiff's theory that he was upon the defendant's property, not by sufferance merely, but by its implied invitation, and that therefore the company's relation to him was such as entitled him to the exercise of care upon its part. We, however, are of opinion that, assuming the truthfulness of the testimony, the facts shown by it do not admit of the inference which the jury was permitted to deduce from them. The learned judge in his charge said:

'Now, then, if you come to the conclusion that he was on his way across the land of the defendant by the implied invitation of the defendant, for a purpose connected with the business of the railroad company, then you have to consider a still further question (the question of negligence).'

We agree that, if there had been any evidence from which the conclusion that the plaintiff was on the defendant's land by its implied invitation could have been legitimately reached, this instruction would have been unobjectionable; but, as we have said, we are of opinion that such conclusion was legally impossible upon any view which could reasonably be taken of the facts shown, and therefore we think that the peremptory instruction which was requested ought to have been given. Had the plaintiff been upon the platform, at or about the time for the arrival of a train, for the purpose of meeting a passenger to arrive by that train, it may be that his motive or reason for desiring such meeting would not have been a material subject of inquiry. In Gillis v. Railroad Co., 59 Pa. 143, 98 Am.Dec. 321, it was said:

'Had it been the hour for the arrival or departure of a train, and he had gone there to welcome a coming or speed a parting guest, it might very well be contended that he was there by authority of the defendants, as much as if he was actually a passenger.'

But assuming, without now deciding, that one who goes to a railroad...