Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Adams

• Decision Date: 03 July 1867
• Citation: 55 Pa. 499
• Parties: The Pennsylvania Railroad Company <I>versus</I> Adams.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 499

55 Pa. 499

The Pennsylvania Railroad Company versus Adams.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 28, 1867.

July 3, 1867.

May 28th 1867.

Before THOMPSON, READ and AGNEW, JJ. WOODWARD, C. J., and STRONG, J., absent

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Juniata county.

W. H. Miller, for plaintiffs in error, cited Penna. Railroad v. Zebe, 9 Casey 329, 330; Act of April 26th 1855, Purd. 754, Pamph. L. 309; Railroad Co. v. Kelly, 7 Casey 380; Railroad Co. v. Vandever, 12 Id. 303; 9 & 10 Vict. c. 13; Blake v. The Midland Railway Co., 10 Law & Eq. 427; Dalton v. The South Eastern Railway Co., 4 Jur. N. S. 227.

J. Alexander, for defendants in error, cited Dalton v. The South Eastern Railway Co., 4 C. B. N. S. 296, 4 Jur. 227; The Railroad Co. v. Robison, 8 Wright 175; Penna. Railroad v. Henderson, 1 P. F. Smith 324.

T. Cuyler, in reply, for plaintiffs in error, cited North Penna. Railroad Co. v. Robison, 8 Wright 176; Stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, 86 English Stat. at Large 531.

The opinion of the court was delivered, July 3d 1867, by THOMPSON, J.

The important question of this case is, whether the plaintiffs, the father and mother of the deceased, who lost his life by the culpable negligence of the defendants' servants while transporting him as a passenger on the line of their road, can recover damages on account of his death under the provisions of the Acts of Assembly of the 15th April 1851 and 26th April 1855, he being at the time six or seven and twenty years of age. The negligence on part of the servants of the company was admitted, but the right of the plaintiffs to recover denied, on the ground that, the deceased being over age at the time, and not liable or subject to the control of his father, the latter had no right to his services, and consequently could sustain no injury by a deprivation thereof. The learned judge was of a different opinion, and so charged in answer to the defendants' 1st point. We shall consider this assignment of error first.

This point is res nova with us, and is now for the first time distinctly before us for adjudication. At common law, no private suit or action lay to compensate any one, parent or child, husband or wife, brother or sister, for a loss occasioned by the negligent or violent destruction of life. The right is altogether of statutory origin, and I believe began in England with the passage of the statute of 9 & 10 Victoria, cap. 93, on 26th August 1846, from whence, by similar enactments, at least so far as the right is concerned, it has become very generally adopted in the United States.

The first enactment in this state is that above mentioned of the 15th April 1851, in which the action is given to the widow of "any such deceased," or if there be no widow, to the personal representatives of the deceased. It is unnecessary to say how far and in whose favor this peculiar phraseology of the act carried the right of suit, for by the Act of 26th April 1855 it is declared that, "the persons entitled to recover damages for any injury causing death shall be the husband, widow, children or parents of the deceased, and no other." "Parents" and "children," in the section, seem to be words used with an intention to indicate the family relation in point of fact as the foundation of the right of action in such a case without regard to age, for the act fixes no period at which parents may not sue for the loss occasioned by the death of a child, the result of negligence or violence. Under age, the law presumes the relation to exist, and that stands for proof until the contrary appears. Over age, no doubt but the relation must be shown to exist in point of fact. That being done, the right to sustain the action is established. That we think was very clearly shown in the case in hand. The deceased, although over age, was unmarried and had always lived with and labored for his parents. His earnings were devoted to their use, even to the small amount of bounty-money received by him in his first enlistment in the service, and his intention to continue to aid in their support while they lived, was evidenced by repeated declarations as well as acts. This was the state and condition of the relation between these parents and their son when he was killed. The arguments against the sufficiency of this relation as the foundation of a recovery for the pecuniary loss is, that there was no obligation on the son to continue the services. That is true; but the same arguments would apply with a like force to the claim of a widow for the prospective support of her husband. He might have died from other causes within a week, had he not been killed by the accident which resulted in his death. The continuance of the relation as the foundation for the claim for compensation is in both instances uncertain, and never can be rendered certain. Yet the injury designed to be...