Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. White

• Citation: 88 Pa. 327
• Parties: Pennsylvania Railroad Co. <I>versus</I> White.
• Decision Date: 03 February 1879
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

88 Pa. 327

Pennsylvania Railroad Co. versus White.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 13, 1879.

February 3, 1879.

January 13th 1879.

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, WOODWARD, TRUNKEY and STERRETT, JJ.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 4, of Philadelphia county: Of January Term 1878, No. 138.

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Chapman Biddle, for plaintiff in error.—There was no evidence that deceased had seen the sign "Penn Valley Station," and it was error to state it as a fact in the charge to the jury: Sartwell v. Wilcox, 8 Harris 123. A passenger is bound to inform himself of the regulations of the company governing the conduct of its trains, where are the stopping stations and where he has the right to alight from the train, and if deceased alighted at a point which was not a regular stopping-place, he did it at his own peril, and it was negligence per se: Dietrich v. Railroad Co., 21 P. F. Smith 436; Railroad Co. v. Zebe, 9 Casey 326; Sullivan v. Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Co., 6 Id. 234. There was no necessity for deceased to leave as he did, and the court erred in its qualification of defendant's second point. Calling out the name of the next station and the stopping of the train were not an invitation to alight: Railroad Co. v. Aspell, 11 Harris 151; Lewis v. London, Chatham & Dover Railway, L. R. 9 Q. B. 70. It was error to state to the jury, that if deceased had reason to presume that he had reached the end of his journey, he had a right to rely upon the rule of the company forbidding another train from passing the station at the same time. The rule required that the local train should stop, and deceased was bound to know this regulation, or at least, to stop, look and listen before crossing the track, and in not doing so, he was guilty of negligence, per se: Nagle v. Allegheny Valley Railroad, ante, 35.

R. P. White, for defendants in error.

[SHARSWOOD, C. J. — What was the alleged negligence of the Railroad Company?]

Mr. White. — Notifying passengers that the next station is "Penn Valley," and when the train stops opposite a station with that name thereon, and a passenger alights, he is killed by a passing train.

[SHARSWOOD, C. J. — I thought the brakeman only said, "the next station will be Penn Valley."]

Mr. White. — So he did.

[SHARSWOOD, C. J. — Then it is a different thing from saying, the next place we will stop at will be Penn Valley. The train might stop a number of times before reaching that point.]

Mr. White. — It would be different if the train had been stopped in an open field; but where the train did stop was directly in front of a place marked as "Penn Valley Station;" there was no evidence on which to submit the question whether White saw this sign. It was displayed at the landing-place for the purpose of being seen. He could not have looked in that direction without seeing it, and he stood on the platform facing it till the car stopped, and then went towards it. He could not have avoided seeing it, and his actions indicated that he did see it and obeyed the intimation it conveyed, that there he was to alight.

The words of the court could not be misconstrued. No one pretended that White lived long enough to tell what he had seen or heard, and the jury knew and could not help knowing that the court was speaking of the inferences to be drawn from the admitted facts of the case.

The announcement of the station and the stoppage of the train, were at least evidence of a request to alight, and the question of negligence was properly left to the jury: Rose v. N. E. Railway Co., L. R. 2 Ex. Div. 248 (1876-1877); Bridges v. North London Railway Co., L. R. 7 H. L. 213.

Mr. Justice STERRETT delivered the opinion of the court, February 3d 1879.

The facts and circumstances of this case, as disclosed by the testimony, would not have justified the court below in deciding, as matter of law, either that the deceased was chargeable with contributory negligence, or that there was not sufficient evidence of negligence, on the part of the employees of the company defendant, to go to the jury. These were controverted questions of fact which it was the province of the jury to determine, and it would have been error to have withdrawn them from their consideration.

Negligence has been defined to be "the absence of care according to the circumstances," and is always a question for the jury when there is reasonable doubt as to the facts, or as to the inferences to be drawn from them. When the measure of duty is ordinary and reasonable care, and the degree of care varies according to circumstances, the question of negligence is necessarily for the jury. There are, however, certain duties of a precise and determinate nature, the neglect of which the law declares negligence per se. Thus it has been repeatedly held that it is the duty of a person about to cross a railroad track to stop, look and listen, and the failure to do is negligence: Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Beale, 23 P. F. Smith 504; Nagle v. Allegheny Valley Railroad Co., ante, 35. But this rule is not always applicable to passengers leaving a train and crossing the track to reach the depot at the point of destination. There are duties which spring from the relations existing between the carrier and its passengers. It is the duty of the company to provide for the safe receiving and discharging of passengers. It is bound to exercise the strictest vigilance not...