Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Allen

• Decision Date: 07 January 1867
• Citation: 53 Pa. 276
• Parties: The Pennsylvania Railroad Company <I>versus</I> Allen.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

53 Pa. 276

The Pennsylvania Railroad Company versus Allen.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 7, 1867.

ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Erie county.

J. R. Thompson and J. C. & F. F. Marshall, for plaintiffs in error, cited Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Kelly, 7 Casey 379.

J. Sill, Spencer & Marvin and J. H. Walker, for defendant in error, cited 2 Ch. Pl. 648, 710, 711, 851; 2 Greenl. § 267; Theobald v. Railway Ass. Co., 26 E. L. & Eq. 432; Serger v. Barkhamstead, 22 Conn. 290; Masters v. Warren, 27 Id. 293; Canning v. Williamstown, 1 Cush. 451; Linsley v. Bushnell, 15 Conn. 225; Cowden v. Wright, 24 Wend. 428; Morse v. Aub. & Syr. Railroad, 10 Barb. 621; Curtiss v. Roch. & Syr. Railroad, 20 Id. 283; Caldwell v. Murphy, Duer 233; Ransom v. N. Y. & E. Railroad, 1 Smith 415; Pennsylvania Railroad v. Kelly, 7 Casey 372.

The opinion of the court was delivered, January 7th 1867, by STRONG, J.

The argument addressed to us on behalf of the plaintiffs in error, is one which has often been urged, but always unsuccessfully. It is said the plaintiff below is entitled to no more than compensation measured by the pecuniary value of the injury he had sustained; that pain and personal suffering have no pecuniary value; that there is no standard by which they can be estimated; and that if a jury are allowed to take them into consideration in assessing damages, they must guess both at the intensity of the pain and at the sum which would be a compensation for it.

Hence, it is urged that inquiries into these subjects are too refined for a jury, or for any human tribunal, and that compensation ought to be allowed for nothing that cannot be measured by some defined rule. It must be admitted, that it is easier to answer this by authorities than it is by reasoning. The theory of a jury trial undoubtedly is, that it accomplishes certain results by certain rules. Ordinarily, it measures damages according to some known and recognised standard. That standard is, in most cases, a common and acknowledged measure adopted as a lesson of human experience. But where there is, and can be, no such experience, or none that can be known, damages might as well be determined by the casting of dice as by the verdict of a jury. It is conceded, they must be estimated in money. But what is the pecuniary worth of a pain? If it must be determined, it is either nothing, or it is variable according to the conjecture of those who are required to estimate it; and they must guess not only its intensity, but its value in dollars and cents. It would seem that judicial tribunals ought not to be under the necessity of deciding anything so indeterminable. Damages, if recoverable at all, ought to be such as can be measured by some comprehensible rule — some rule that can be applied to human affairs.

Notwithstanding all this, however, it is undoubtedly true, that in some actions for personal injuries, juries in estimating the damages are to take into consideration the personal suffering caused by the wrong. So are the decisions. In cases of libel or slander, of wilful torts to the person, and in cases of negligence other than those that are breaches of contract, in cases of negligence which causes a personal injury, it has often been held that a jury may take into consideration the bodily and mental pain attendant on the injury. It must be admitted that it is no more possible to determine the pecuniary value of pain, in this class of cases, than in such a one as we now have before us. But such actions are not remedies sought for broken contracts. The wrongs complained of bear a nearer resemblance to a public offence. In assessing damages in such actions, juries are always allowed a larger license than in actions on contracts, and with some reason. In this state, at least, it seems to be the doctrine, that the...