Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Langdon

• Decision Date: 05 January 1880
• Parties: Pennsylvania Railroad Co. <I>versus</I> Langdon.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 21

92 Pa. 21

Pennsylvania Railroad Co. versus Langdon.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

November 4, 1879.

January 5, 1880.

November 4th 1879.

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON and TRUNKEY, JJ. STERRETT and GREEN, JJ., absent

Error to the Court of Common Pleas, No. 1, of Allegheny county: Of October and November Term 1879, No. 37.

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Hampton and Dalzell, for plaintiff in error.—Langdon was an employee of the road. He daily travelled over it. The notice forbidding persons riding in the baggage-car was posted in the passenger and baggage-cars. Langdon must have known this rule, as well from the notice as from his employment. He likewise declared he would not have been hurt if he had not been in the baggage-car. The notice required the trainmen to enforce an observance of this rule, and the conductor could not give his assent to his riding in that car. The conductor could not bind the company by assenting to Langdon being in the car, either by express permission or an implied one coming from having seen him on several occasions in it. Railroad companies have the right to make reasonable regulations for the transaction of their business. This case differs from O'Donnell v. Allegheny Valley Railroad Company, 9 P. F. Smith 239, for in that case the plaintiff, with others, had been for some time daily riding on the baggage-car. As between Langdon and the conductor there could be no waiver of the rule. Langdon was in the baggage-car simply to engage in conversation with the baggage-agent, not for any purpose of his employment or for want of room. There was no evidence that Langdon or any other persons were in the habit of travelling in the baggage-car. That he was in it at long intervals does not show an implied assent to ride there when he pleased. If the court exacts of a company strict compliance with its rules, a passenger must, in good faith, observe the rules made for his safety. To charge the conductor with the knowledge of acts amounting to an implied assent, it must be shown that such acts were customary and of such frequent occurrence, that the rule was abrogated by his assent to these acts.

There can be no recovery to exceed $5000 in any case for damages for injuries resulting in death, if the Act of April 4th 1868, Purd. Dig. 1094, is still in force. It is claimed that it has been repealed by sect. 21, art. 3, of the new constitution.

But so far as the Pennsylvania Railroad Company is concerned, we deny the power either of the constitutional convention or the legislature to repeal the Act of 1868. It was provided in that act as follows (sect. 4.): "And upon the acceptance of the provisions hereof, by any carrier or corporation, the same shall become a part of its act of incorporation."

The Pennsylvania Railroad Company accepted said act, as appeared by the certificate offered in evidence. The Act of Assembly of 1868 thus became a part of the company's charter. To all intents and purposes the company had the same right under it as if it had been written in the body of its original charter. Had it been there it can hardly be contended that there exists any power to eradicate it against the consent of the corporation. This court has declared "that charters of private corporations are left exactly as the new constitution found them, and so must remain until the companies holding them shall enter into a new contract with the state, by accepting the benefit of some future legislation." Hays et al. v. Commonwealth, 1 Norris 518.

Barton & Sons, for defendants in error.—Langdon was not an employee of the Western Pennsylvania Railroad, he was simply an ordinary passenger. The question is not what knowledge either he or the conductor had, but did the conductor assent, either expressly or impliedly to his non-observance of the rules: O'Donnell v. The Allegheny Valley Railroad, supra; Creed v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 5 Norris 139.

It appeared the conductor knew Langdon occasionally rode in the baggage-car, and that he never forbade him to do so; that he saw him get on the train the day of the accident, knew he was on the train, and that he was not in any of the other coaches; that he did not go to him to punch his ticket, because he had already punched it for the down trip when he came up in the morning; that he was through with his active duties, and was sitting in the second car — plenty of time, if Langdon was not where he ought to be, to have gone to him and directed him to his seat. Take all these facts together, and have we not abundant evidence of the consent and assent of this conductor to his being exactly where was?

Can it be the law that because a passenger violates some rule of the company by stopping on a platform to speak to an acquaintance, or by going into the baggage-car to talk to an employee, and that while so doing he is suddenly deprived of his life by the gross carelessness and criminal negligence, shown in this case, of the officers of the road, that he forfeits all compensation, and they are relieved from liability for their acts?

Mr. Justice PAXSON delivered the opinion of the court, January 5th 1880.

There are certain facts in this case which are not disputed. Stephen Langdon, the deceased, to recover damages for whose death this action was brought, was an employee of the company defendant, but was not engaged upon the Western Pennsylvania Railroad when the accident occurred. His position was that of night inspector of locomotives at the outer depot of the Pennsylvania Railroad, in the city of Pittsburgh. The depot had been burned by the rioters the day before the accident occurred. He lived upon the line of the Western Pennsylvania Railroad, a few miles out of the city, and was in the habit of riding to and from his home daily on said road. He travelled upon a commutation ticket, such as is usually sold to passengers. At the time of the accident, he was riding in the baggage-car, in violation of the rules of the company. Said rules were conspicuously posted in the baggage-car. The particular rule in question is as follows: "They (the trainmen) must see that passengers are properly seated, and will not allow them to stand on the platforms of the cars, nor ride in the baggage nor mail-cars. Conductors and brakemen are instructed to strictly enforce this rule, and it is expected that passengers will cheerfully comply, as the rule is one intended for their own safety, it being particularly dangerous for passengers to be on platforms as trains approach stations." Whilst Langdon was sitting in the baggage-car, and after the train had left Sharpsburg, it collided with the mail-train, injuring him so severely that his death occurred within a few hours thereafter. Had he been in the smoking-car, or in any of the passenger-cars he would not have been injured. After the accident he stated to some of the witnesses, that if he had not gone into the baggage-car he would not have been hurt.

The right of a railroad company to make reasonable rules for its own protection, and for the safety and convenience of passengers, has been repeatedly recognised. Sullivan v. Phila. Railroad Co., 6 Casey 234; Powell v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 3 Id. 414; West Chester & Phila. Railroad Co. v. Miles, 5 P. F. Smith 209; Pitts. & Conn. Railroad Co. v. McClurg, 6 Id. 294; Central Railroad Co. v. Green, 5 Norris 421; O'Donnell v. Allegheny Valley Railroad Co., 9 P. F. Smith 239. Such companies are held, and very properly, to a strict measure of responsibility in cases of injuries to passengers. It is not unreasonable that they should have the right to require passengers to observe such proper regulations, as are essential to their own safety. With all the care such corporations can exercise in the perfection of their road-bed and machinery, and in the selection of their servants, accidents involving injuries and loss of life, will frequently occur. This must continue to be the case so long as iron and wood are destructible, and dependence is placed upon the fidelity, the vigilance, and the judgment of servants. A misplaced switch or an inaccurately worded telegram, may send a train to destruction. In such and other like cases, the company is liable to the party injured. The practical impossibility of avoiding all accidents by rail furnishes no good reason why such corporations shall not respond in damages for the injuries caused by the negligence of their servants, when and so often as the same occurs. Such being the measure of their responsibility, may they protect themselves so far as to require passengers to conform to reasonable rules intended to lessen the chances of their being injured? We know of no well-considered case which holds that they may not do so, nor has any sufficient reason been shown why they should not. In doing so, they at least seek to guard the lives of their passengers.

The baggage-car is a known place of danger. In this respect it differs from the cow-catcher and the platform only in degree. It is placed ahead of the passenger-cars and next to or near the locomotive. In cases of collision, it is the first car to give way to the shock, and frequently is the only one seriously injured. It is treated as dangerous by the rules of all well-regulated companies, and the rule of the defendant company emphatically declared it to be so. An infant or an idiot might be excused for riding in such a position, by reason of his lack of mental capacity, but an intelligent man, accustomed to railroad travel, must be presumed to know its danger. It is patent and the same under all circumstances.

Can a passenger who voluntarily leaves his proper place in the passenger-car, in violation of the rules of the company, to ride in the baggage-car, or other known place of danger, and who is injured in consequence of such violation, recover damages for such injury? We are not speaking of a possible accident, the result of a brief...