Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Canal Commissioners
| Citation | 21 Pa. 9 |
| Parties | Pennsylvania Railroad Company <I>versus</I> The Canal Commissioners. |
| Decision Date | 29 December 1852 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania |
It was inter alia contended that the Pennsylvania Railroad Company was included in the term individuals, used in the Act of 1834, giving authority to individuals to place cars on the Columbia Railroad, and, under such regulations as may be adopted, attach their cars to the locomotive cars belonging to the Commonwealth, for the purposes of transportation. That the term individuals was used in the sense of persons, and that as an artificial person the company would be entitled to place its cars upon the Columbia Railroad, and by attachment to the motive engine of the state. For the meaning of the term individual, reference was made to Richardson's Dictionary, and to Kyd on Corporations.
It was further said, that under the authority of the Act of 13th March, 1847, authorizing the companies of two connecting railroads, with the consent of each other, to run their cars on both roads, and by their contract with the Lancaster and Harrisburg Railroad Company, whose road connected with the state road at Dillersville near Lancaster, the Pennsylvania Railroad became connected with the Philadelphia and Columbia Railroad, and had the right to have its cars pass over the latter road. But that if the Act of 1847 did not apply to the roads of the Commonwealth, that such right existed under the provisions of the Act of 23d April, 1852, before recited. That from the permission to hold land at the eastern terminus of the state road, was to be inferred the understanding of the state that the legitimate business of the Pennsylvania Railroad was to carry freight and passengers over the whole road from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh. That the fact that the cars of the said company were so run at the time of the passage of the Act of 1852, was known to the legislature, and was to be considered in the construction of the Act, it being declared in the Act that the land acquired was to be for such objects "as may be necessary or convenient for the transaction of the proper business of said company, authorized by their Act of incorporation;" and in the previous part of the section it being declared to be for the erection thereon of offices, &c., and for such other objects "as appertain to the legitimate business of the company, authorized by their Act of incorporation, of transporting passengers and tonnage over their road and the Columbia Railroad."
It was further said that a mandamus would not issue where a discretionary power existed; but it was contended that there was no discretionary power vested in the Canal Commissioners to make such a contract as the one in question in this case; one made without public notice — for a period beyond their official term — with transporters of merchandise on the public works (which the other contracting parties were alleged to be); to make the state a common carrier; to exclude individuals or any parties from the public works; to prevent the Pennsylvania Railroad Company from attending to their legitimate business "of transporting passengers over it." That the said contract was inconsistent with the policy declared by the legislature in the general Railroad Act of 19th February, 1849, the 18th section of which enacts, that upon the completion of any railroad authorized by the act, it "shall be esteemed a public highway for the conveyance of passengers and the transportation of freight." That the Canal Commissioners cannot make regulations as to the state railroads which were inconsistent with the laws, and that this contract was inconsistent with public law, and was void.
As to the subject of jurisdiction, it was said that the meetings of the Board of Canal Commissioners need not necessarily be held at Harrisburg; but by the Act of 11th April, 1825, may be held "at such times and places as shall be determined by their own adjournments, or by a call from their president, and as shall be most conducive to the public good." Reference made to 2 Pa. Rep. 517, Commonwealth v. Mitchell et al.; Commonwealth v. Clarke, 9 Ser. & R. 59.
Campbell, Stanton, and Champneys, were on part of the defendants.
Objection was taken to the presentation of the application to the Court when sitting in the Western District, it being alleged that the office of the Canal Commissioners was located in the Middle district of the Supreme Court. That the practice of the Court had been not to adjudicate in cases of mandamus except in the appropriate district of the Court. Reference was made to 1 Yeates 46; Id. 155; Id. 476; 2 Bin. 262; 3 Id. 363; 4 Bin. 117; 1 Ser. & R. 382; 8 Id. 211; 11 Id. 73; 4 Watts 154; 1 Whar. 1; 2 Rawle 369; 6 Bin. 5; 9 Ser. & R. 59; 5 Harris 9. That the only object of the Act of 1852, extending the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, was to extend its original jurisdiction in Equity in the cases enumerated in the 13th section of the Act of 1836, and had no reference to the common law remedy by mandamus.
It was said that it had not been shown that the Pennsylvania Railroad Company had by any provision in its charter authority to place passenger cars on the Philadelphia and Columbia Railroad. That on the contrary, they could not run a car on the Harrisburg and Lancaster Railroad without the consent of that company. A corporation has only the powers vested in it by law: 1 Kyd on Corporations 65; 2 Cranch 127; 7 Id. 299; 8 Wheaton 338. It is to be limited to the powers granted to it. 2 Kent 298; 4 Peters 152; 5 Id. 641; 1 Sumner 47; 13 Peters 521; 3 Kelly 31; 25 Maine 493; 6 W. & Ser. 101; 9 Id. 9; 7 Manning & Granger 870; 6 Paige 223; 20 Vermont, Whitcomb v. Rood. The franchises of a corporation cannot be granted away by its own act. 9 W. & Ser. 27; 22 Pick. 122. It was contended that the company received no power by the Act of 1852, to place cars on the state road. By the Act of 1852, the Act of incorporation is referred to for the powers of the company; no additional authority was conferred, although additional means were given to give such powers more effect. In the conclusion of the 2d section, the enactment is stated to be, for the proper business of the company as authorized by their Act of incorporation. That in the incorporation of the two companies in question, it was contemplated that the connexion authorized to be made with the Philadelphia and Columbia Railroad would entitle those companies to transport passengers in the cars provided for the state road, upon the terms prescribed by the Canal Commissioners. It was said that the Act of 1834, allowing individuals to put cars on the road, was to be subject to the regulations of the Canal Commissioners. Commonwealth ex rel. Leech v. Canal Commissioners, 5 W. & Ser. 388.
It was said that the term "individuals," as used in the Act of 1834, should not be construed to embrace corporations. Also that it was not intended by the state to surrender the control of the carrying trade between the east and west, or to give to the company in question any power over it on the state works. It was also alleged that the contract in question was operating to the advantage of the treasury of the state.
The opinion of the Court was delivered December 29, 1852, at Philadelphia, by BLACK, C.J.
This writ of mandamus was issued at Pittsburgh, and made returnable there to the Supreme Court for the Western District. It is objected that we have no jurisdiction there, because the chief place of business for the Canal Commissioners is at Harrisburg in the Middle District. The objection seems to be taken in obedience to what the respondents deem a public duty, and has been rather faintly urged. Our jurisdiction is over the whole state. It is not the practice to issue writs beyond the district in which they are made returnable, and that is all that was decided in Duffy v. The Hanover and Carlisle Turnpike, (9 Ser. & R. 59.) But no law forbids it. There are cases, and this is one of them, in which the rule of practice ought to be relaxed, though it certainly would not be relaxed if a motion were made to quash the writ in a purely local and private case.
The respondents deny that the relators have any right either by their charter or by any other law, to carry freight or passengers on the Columbia Railroad....
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