Pennsylvania Railroad Company v. Clark Brothers Coal Mining Company

• Decision Date: 21 June 1915
• Docket Number: No. 290,290
• Citation: 59 L.Ed. 1408,59 L.Ed. 1406,238 U.S. 456,35 S.Ct. 896
• Parties: PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. CLARK BROTHERS COAL MINING COMPANY
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

238 U.S. 456

35 S.Ct. 896

59 L.Ed. 1406

59 L.Ed. 1408

PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v CLARK BROTHERS COAL MINING COMPANY.

No. 290.

Argued May 14, 1915.

Decided June 21, 1915.

Messrs. Francies I. Gowen, John G. Johnson, and F. D. McKenney for plaintiff in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 457 intentionally omitted] Messrs. A. L. Cole and A. M. Liveright for defendant in error.

Mr. Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the court:

This suit was brought in January, 1912, by the Clark Brothers Coal Mining Company (defendant in error) in the court of common pleas of Clearfield county, Pennsylvania, to recover damages for inadequate and unjustly discriminatory car service and supply. The complaint related to the action of the defendant company with respect to cars required for the transportation of coal from the plaintiff's mines known as Falcon, Nos. 2, 3 and 4, in Clearfield county, and Falcon, Nos. 5 and 6, in Indiana county, Pennsylvania, between October, 1905, and April 30, 1907. A statute of Pennsylvania (act of June 4, 1883, P. L. 72, 4 Purdons 3906; see Const. [Pa.] 1873, art. 17) prohibits undue or unreasonable discrimination by any common carrier 'in charges for or in facilities for the transportation of freight within this state or coming from or going to any other state,' and provides that the carrier guilty of unjust discrimination shall be liable 'for damages treble the amount of injury suffered.'

On behalf of the defendant (plaintiff in error) the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the action was challenged upon the ground that, with respect to car distribution, the defendant was subject to the act to regulate commerce, and that the claim of the plaintiff was cognizable only by the Interstate Commerce Commission or by the courts of the United States. It was urged further that in a proceeding before the Interstate Commerce Commission, which had been instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant prior to the beginning of this action, the Commission had found that the method of car distribution practised by the defendant with respect to the plaintiff's mines known as Falcon, Nos. 2, 3, and 4, was unjustly discriminatory, and that the Commission had made an award of damages accordingly; and that by reason of this proceeding and the action of the Commission the plaintiff was precluded from maintaining the present action so far as it related to the alleged loss sustained with respect to the mines last described.

The trial court overruled these contentions of the defendant. The jury, finding discrimination, assessed the damage at $41,481 and trebled the amount, making $124,443. Motions in arrest of judgment and for a new trial and for judgment non obstante veredicto, upon the grounds above stated (and others), were denied. Judgment for the total amount of the verdict was entered and was affirmed by the supreme court of the state, 241 Pa. 515, 88 Atl. 754. And this writ of error has been sued out.

It clearly appeared that the proceeding before the Interstate Commerce Commission as to the mines Falcon Nos. 2, 3, and 4, embraced substantially the same claim as that litigated in this action. As the trial judge said: 'It' (the plaintiff) 'did get an award of damages for what we understand to be practically the same subjectmatter.' That proceeding was instituted by the plaintiff in June, 1907. Its petition, among other things, alleged that it had been, and was, 'engaged in mining and shipping coal to points and places of delivery and to the coal markets beyond the state of Pennsylvania,' and that it had, during all the period mentioned, to wit, 'from the 15th day of October, 1905, to the date of the filing of this complaint,' orders for coal to be mined and shipped 'beyond the lines of said state.' It complained of the rating of its mines by the defendant and also of unjust and unreasonable discrimination against it in the daily distribution of cars 'for the transportation of its coal into the interstate markets,' that it had suffered 'great loss and damage in its business as a producer, shipper, and seller of bituminous coal' in the interstate coal trade, and that such damage amounted in the aggregate to $36,401.12. It prayed for hearing, for an ascertainment of the damages which it had sustained in its interstate business by reason of unreasonable preferences given to its competitors, as alleged, and for a determination of the proper basis of car distribution to be observed. After hearing, the Commissioner made its report on March 7, 1910. 19 Inters. Com. Rep. 392. On the same day, the Commission rendered its decision in Hillsdale Coal & Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. (19 Inters. Com. Rep. 356), involving similar questions as to the method practised by the defendant in distributing 'its available coal-car equipment.' Upon this point, the Commission there said:

'Under a rule announced by it on February 1, 1903 the defendant seems to have charged all railroad cars, regardless of ownership, and private cars not owned by the operator loading them, against the distributive share of each mine, but it treated its own fuel cars as a special allotment in addition to the distributive share. On March 28, 1905, a notice was sent to shippers of bituminous coal from mines on the lines of the defendant, advising them that thereafter all railroad cars, regardless of ownership, and all private cars not owned by the operator loading them, should be considered as cars available for distribution, except its own company fuel cars and fuel cars sent upon its lines by foreign companies and specially consigned to particular mines.

'On January 1, 1906, the defendant divided all cars into two classes which it designated as 'assigned' and 'unassigned' cars. In the former class were its own fuel cars, foreign railway fuel cars, and individual or private cars loaded by their owners or assigned by their owners to particular mines. The rule then made effective and still in force provides that the capacity in tons of any 'assigned' cars shall be deducted from the rated capacity in tons of the particular mine receiving such cars, and that the remainder is to be regarded as the rated capacity of the mine in the distribution of all 'unassigned' or system cars.' Id. p. 362.

After illustrating the operation of this system and the advantage in distribution thus given to mines having assigned cars (id. pp. 363, 364), the Commission concluded:

'Upon all the facts shown of record the Commission therefore finds that throughout the period of the action the system upon which the defendant distributed its available coal-car equipment, including system fuel cars, foreign railway fuel cars, and individual or private cars, has subjected the complainant to an undue and an unlawful discrimination.'

In the case of the plaintiff's petition, the Commission held that so far as the rating of its mines was concerned 'there was no substantial basis for any finding of discrimination.' But, in the matter of car distribution, unjust discrimination was found. The Commission said (19 Inters. Com. Rep. 394-396):

'There are a number of mines on the Moshannon branch of the defendant that are owned by other operators, but in this connection it will suffice to mention only the six mines operated by or for the Berwind-White Coal Mining Company, one of which, known as Eureka No. 27, immediately adjoins the complainant's Falcon No. 2. The same 'D' coal vein is worked in these two mines. The quality of the coal is therefore the same, and it is claimed that the capacities of the two mines were substantially the same at the period involved in the first of these two complaints. . . .

'But neither Falcon No. 2 nor the mines of the complainant, the Clark Brothers Coal & Mining Company, was placed on an equal footing with the mines of the Berwind-White Coal Mining Company in the matter of the distribution of the defendant's available coal-car equipment during the period of the actions. . . .

'It is established with reasonable clearness on the record that the Berwind-White mines during the years 1906 and 1907, as well as to a period immediately preceding those dates, were daily in receipt of coal cars in large numbers and were therefore kept in operation almost continuously while the complaintants received an inadequate supply and were not able, therefore, to run their mines to the best advantage. This difference is largely explained by the fact that the Berwind-White Coal Mining Company owned a large number of private cars and also enjoyed contracts for supplying the defendant and its connection with coal.

Under the rules of defendant, fully explained in Hillsdale Coal & Coke Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co. supra, the owner- ship of such private cars and the enjoyment of these contracts resulted in the special allotment to the mines of that company of these so-called assigned cars. For the reasons explained at some length in that case those rules operated as an undue discrimination against these complainants, and we so find. But for the present and for the reasons there explained we shall limit our order to a finding that in the several respects here mentioned the defendant was guilty of a discrimination against these complainants, leaving for determination after further argument the question of the extent to which the complainants may have been damaged thereby.'

Order was entered accordingly, condemning the defendant's rule and practice of distribution (as stated) as a violation of § 3 of the act to regulate commerce, requiring the defendant to desist from that practice, and reserving the question of damages for further consideration. Subsequently, in April, 1911, this question was submitted, and it was determined on March 11, 1912. 23 Inters. Com. Rep. 191. The Commission then made its report as follows: 'We now find that the damages sustained by this claimant as result thereof' (the discrimination found) 'amounted to $31,127.96, and...