Penton v. Johnson
| Decision Date | 05 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:11-cv-0518 TLN KJN P,2:11-cv-0518 TLN KJN P |
| Parties | ANTHONY PENTON, Plaintiff, v. L. JOHNSON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
Plaintiff is a state prisoner, proceeding through counsel with a civil rights action. Defendants' motions for judgment on the pleadings1 was noticed for hearing on November 21, 2019, before the undersigned. Because oral argument was not of material assistance, the hearing was vacated, and the matter submitted on the briefs. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g). Upon review of the documents in support and opposition, and good cause appearing therefor, the undersigned finds and recommends that defendants' motions be granted in part and denied in part.
In his first cause of action, plaintiff alleges that defendants Bradford, Morrow, Johnson, Walker, Virga, Donahoo, Nunez, Gaddi, Quinn, Pool and Does 1-11 violated plaintiff's right toaccess the courts in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No. 104 at 20-21.) Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that defendant Pool prevented plaintiff from using the inmate appeal system to proceed with his denial of access to the courts claims arising from the conduct of the remaining defendants. (ECF No. 104 at 24.) "As a result, [plaintiff] was not able to challenge his unconstitutionally increased sentence in light of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Butler v. Curry," "constitut[ing] active interference with [plaintiff's] right of access to the courts, and resulted in a loss of a substantial, nonfrivolous claim." (Id.)
In his second cause of action, plaintiff alleges that defendants Johnson, Walker, Virga, Donahoo, Nunez, Gaddi, Quinn and Does 1-11, wrongfully withheld plaintiff's mail without notice and with no legitimate penological reasons, from November 8, 2007, through July 29, 2008. (ECF No. 104 at 25.)
In plaintiff's third cause of action, he alleges that defendant Pool prevented plaintiff from filing inmate grievances regarding the withholding of plaintiff's mail from November 8, 2007, through July 29, 2008, violating plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (ECF No. 104 at 28.)
Plaintiff alleges in his fourth cause of action that "retaliation defendants" (Pool, Lynch, Salas, Besenaiz and Does 12-13) violated plaintiff's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to file prison grievances without retaliation. (ECF No. 104 at 29.) Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant Pool prevented plaintiff from filing inmate grievances regarding the withholding of his mail, and "[d]uring this time," "Pool also continuously screened out [plaintiff's] attempts to pursue an inmate appeal related to the wrongful return of his 2008 annual package by" Salas. (ECF No. 104 at ¶¶ 57, 72-74, 99, 111, 113). Plaintiff alleges that the pattern of retaliation continued during this time period when defendant Besenaiz issued plaintiff an unfounded infraction for plaintiff purportedly refusing to allow his cellmate to have the lower bunk bed in their cell, even though plaintiff required the lower bunk due to health reasons. (ECF No. 104 at 16 ¶ 70, 29.) Plaintiff alleges that "[a]lso during this time," defendant Lynch told plaintiff that "you have nothing coming to you, referring to withholding [plaintiff's] rights," "and also told [plaintiff] that he should do all that he can to transfer to another prison." (ECF No. 104 at 16 ¶69, 29.)
Defendants ask the court to take judicial notice of the court docket and rulings in plaintiff's habeas case filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Case No. 3:06-00233 WQH RBM. (ECF Nos. 167-2, 169-2, referring to ECF Nos. 167-2 at 5-118; 169-2 at 5-131.)
Generally, on Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c) motions, courts do not consider materials beyond the pleadings, or else risk converting the motion to one for summary judgment. See, e.g., Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453 (9th Cir. 1994), reversed on other grounds by Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 307 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2002). Under Rule 201(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, a court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) or (c) motion may take judicial notice of facts "not subject to reasonable dispute," including matters of public record. Mack v. South Bay Beer Distributors, Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). "When considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings, this court may consider facts that 'are contained in materials of which the court may take judicial notice.'" Heliotrope General, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.3d 971, 981 n.18 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
Thus, a court "may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings have a direct relation to matters at issue." Bias v. Moynihan, 508 F.3d 1212, 1225 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Rule 201(b)(2) permits a court considering a Heck issue to take judicial notice of relevant court records. Harley v. County of Los Angeles, 2011 WL 13214283, at *3, *7-*9 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2011) (); see also Bailey v. Elders, 2012 WL 993292, at *3 (S.D. Cal. March 22, 2012) ().
Here, because plaintiff's habeas action filed in the Southern District are directly relevant to the issues herein, defendants' requests for judicial notice are granted.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), judgment on the pleadings may be granted when, accepting as true all material allegations contained in the nonmoving party's pleadings, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Chavez v United States, 683 F.3d 1102, 1108 (9th Cir. 2012). The applicable standard is essentially identical to the standard for a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). United States ex rel. Cafasso v. Gen. Dynamics C4 Sys., Inc., 637 F.3d 1047, 1055 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011). Thus, although the Court must accept well-pleaded facts as true, it is not required to accept mere conclusory allegations or conclusions of law. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-679 (2009).
In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court may consider evidence beyond the pleadings when (1) it takes judicial notice under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, or (2) material is incorporated by reference to the complaint. Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 998 (9th Cir. 2018). The Court "need not . . . accept as true allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice or by exhibit" attached to the complaint. Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).
A motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted "when there is no issue of material fact in dispute, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009).
The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant's actions and the claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode,423 U.S. 362, 371 (1976); May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980). "Congress did not intend § 1983 liability to attach where . . . causation [is] absent." See Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). "A person 'subjects' another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which complaint is made." Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).
Moving defendants seek judgment on the pleadings based on the Southern District's recent denial of plaintiff's 2006 petition for writ of habeas corpus, after considering plaintiff's objections that should have been submitted in 2007. Defendants also argue that the favorable termination rule should bar plaintiff's access to court and right to legal mail claims. But defendants are mistaken. In the instant case, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that plaintiff's access to the courts claim, which has a causal nexus with his right to legal mail claim, is "not an assessment of the merits of the underlying claim that is now lost." (ECF No. 95 at 6.) Rather, "an inmate must merely show that he 'could not present a claim to the courts because of the state's failure to fulfill its constitutional obligations.'" (ECF No. 95 at 6), quoting Allen v. Sakai, 48 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). Indeed, in a footnote, the Circuit noted that plaintiff's "constitutional injury was complete when his ability to challenge the magistrate judge's report and recommendation was impaired." (...
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