Penunuri v. Sundance Partners, LTD
Decision Date | 09 April 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 20110565.,20110565. |
Citation | 732 Utah Adv. Rep. 28,301 P.3d 984 |
Parties | Lisa PENUNURI and Barry Siegwart, Appellants, v. SUNDANCE PARTNERS, LTD; Sundance Holdings, LLC; Sundance Development Corp; Robert Redford; Redford 1970 Trust; Rocky Mountain Outfitters, L.C.; and Does I–X, Appellees. |
Court | Utah Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Robert D. Strieper, Salt Lake City, for appellants.
H. Burt Ringwood, A. Joseph Sano, Salt Lake City, for appellees.
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
INTRODUCTION
¶ 1 Ms. Penunuri was injured while participating in a guided horseback ride near Sundance Resort. Before the ride, she signed a release (Waiver), in which she waived her right to sue Defendants (collectively, Sundance) for injuries caused by Sundance's ordinary negligence. In this appeal, Ms. Penunuri asks us to find that the Waiver is unenforceable under the Limitations on Liability for Equine and Livestock Activities Act (Equine Act) 1 and that it violates the public policy expressed in the Equine Act.
¶ 2 We first consider whether the Waiver is unenforceable under the Equine Act. We conclude that the Equine Act establishes no public policy that invalidates preinjury releases for ordinary negligence. Second, we consider whether the Equine Act is sufficiently similar to Utah's Inherent Risks of Skiing Act (Skiing Act) 2 such that the “public policy bargain” we inferred from the language of the Skiing Act in Rothstein v. Snowbird Corp.3 similarly invalidates preinjury releases under the Equine Act. Because the Equine Act lacks the discussion of public policy contained in the Skiing Act, we decline to infer that the Equine Act was the result of a public policy bargain. Accordingly, we conclude that the Waiver is enforceable and does not violate public policy.
¶ 3 On August 1, 2007, Ms. Penunuri participated in a guided horseback ride operated by Sundance. Before the ride began, Ms. Penunuri signed the Waiver. The Waiver explained that horseback riding involves “significant risk of serious personal injury,” and that there are certain “inherent risks” associated with the activity, including “the propensity of the animal to behave in ways that may result in injury, harm, or death to persons on or around them.” The Waiver also purported to release Sundance from liability for its ordinary negligence, providing as follows: “I expressly agree to assume all risks of personal injury, falls, accidents, and/or property damage, including those resulting from any negligence of [Sundance]....”
¶ 4 The riding party consisted of five participants and one guide, arranged in single file with the guide in front and Ms. Penunuri in the rear. During the ride, a gap formed between Ms. Penunuri and the eight-year-old rider in front of her. After some of the riders asked the guide to slow down or stop to close the gap, the guide stated that she would hold the eight-year-old's reins to keep the train of horses together. But before she could do so, Ms. Penunuri's horse suddenly accelerated to close the gap and catch up with the other horses. Ms. Penunuri asserts that the sudden acceleration caused her to fall to the ground and that she suffered serious injuries as a result.
¶ 5 Ms. Penunuri sued Sundance, alleging negligence, gross negligence, and vicarious liability. She then filed a motion for partial summary judgment, arguing that the Waiver was unenforceable under the Equine Act. The district court denied her motion, finding that the Waiver was valid and enforceable. Accordingly, the court dismissed all of Ms. Penunuri's claims except her claim for gross negligence.
¶ 6 After the district court certified its order as final pursuant to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Ms. Penunuri appealed. The court of appeals determined that the 54(b) certification was improper, but exercised its discretion to treat Ms. Penunuri's appeal as a petition for permission to appeal from an interlocutory order. The court permitted Ms. Penunuri to appeal, but ultimately affirmed the district court's ruling, concluding that the Waiver was valid and enforceable.4 Specifically, the court concluded that neither the Equine Act nor public policy invalidates preinjury releases for horseback riding.5
¶ 7 Ms. Penunuri then filed a petition for writ of certiorari. We granted her petition to consider whether the court of appeals erred in construing the Equine Act to permit releases of liability for ordinary negligence. We have jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to section 78A–3–102(3)(a) of the Utah Code.
¶ 8 “On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of appeals, not the trial court.” 6 And “[a]s the decision of the court of appeals rests on questions of statutory interpretation, we review it for correctness, affording no deference to the court of appeals' legal conclusions.” 7 Further, summary judgment is appropriate only when “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 8
¶ 9 Section 202 of the Equine Act provides that equine activity sponsors 9 are not liable for injuries caused by the “inherent risks” associated with equine activities.10 “Inherent risk” is defined under the Equine Act as “those dangers or conditions which are an integral part of equine or livestock activities,” including, among other things, “the propensity of the animal to behave in ways that may result in injury” and “the unpredictability of the animal's reaction to outside stimulation.” 11
¶ 10 But section 202 does not completely eliminate an equine sponsor's liability. In relevant part, section 202 provides as follows:
(2) An equine activity sponsor, equine professional, livestock activity sponsor, or livestock professional is not liable for an injury to or the death of a participant due to the inherent risks associated with these activities, unless the sponsor or professional:
(a)(i) provided the equipment or tack;
(ii) the equipment or tack caused the injury; and
(iii) the equipment failure was due to the sponsor's or professional's negligence;
(b) failed to make reasonable efforts to determine whether the equine or livestock could behave in a manner consistent with the activity with the participant;
(c) owns, leases, rents, or is in legal possession and control of land or facilities upon which the participant sustained injuries because of a dangerous condition which was known to or should have been known to the sponsor or professional and for which warning signs have not been conspicuously posted; (d)(i) commits an act or omission that constitutes negligence, gross negligence, or willful or wanton disregard for the safety of the participant; and
(ii) that act or omission causes the injury; or
(e) intentionally injures or causes the injury to the participant.12
¶ 11 While section 202 eliminates liability for the inherent risks of equine activities, section 203 requires sponsors to provide notice to participants that the sponsor is not liable for those risks.13 Section 203 requires that the “[n]otice shall be provided” either by “posting a sign in a prominent location within the area being used for the activity” or by “providing a document or release for the participant, or the participant's legal guardian if the participant is a minor, to sign.” 14
¶ 12 Below, we first consider whether preinjury releases of liability for ordinary negligence are enforceable under the Equine Act. Second, we consider whether the public policy bargain we inferred from the language of the Skiing Act in Rothstein15 should be similarly inferred from the language of the Equine Act, which would render preinjury releases of ordinary negligence unenforceable as violating public policy.
¶ 13 Ms. Penunuri argues that section 202 of the Equine Act prohibits a sponsor from using a preinjury release to escape liability for its negligent acts.16 She asserts that by protecting equine activity sponsors from liability arising out of the inherent risks associated with equine activities, the Legislature impliedly intended that they remain liable for all other claims. Ms. Penunuri also directs our attention to legislative debates that, she argues, support her interpretation of the statute. Further, while noting that section 203 mentions that a sponsor may provide a “release” for a participant to sign, Ms. Penunuri argues that the content of such a release must be limited to providing the notice required by that section.
¶ 14 The court of appeals concluded that reading section 202 to invalidate preinjury releases “stretches the statutory language past its plain meaning.” 17 Instead, the court concluded that while “section 202 protects a sponsor from liability arising from the inherent risks of equine activities unless the sponsor is negligent ... the sponsor remains free to assert all other applicable defenses, including, if appropriate, release.” 18 Regarding section 203, the court declined Ms. Penunuri's invitation to read “ ‘release’ ... to refer merely to a document notifying the participant that the sponsor is insulated against claims arising from certain inherent risks of participating in the activity.” 19 The court concluded that “[b]ecause the statutory term ‘document’ already conveys this meaning, such a reading would impermissibly render ‘release’ redundant.” 20 We agree.
¶ 15 When we interpret a statute, “our primary objective is to ascertain the intent of the legislature.” 21 Because “[t]he best evidence of the legislature's intent is the plain language of the statute itself,” 22 we look first to the plain language of the statute.23 “We presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning.” 24 “Additionally, we presume[ ] that the expression of one [term] should be interpreted as the...
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