Peopel v. Green

• Decision Date: 17 February 1938
• Docket Number: No. 24411.,24411.
• Parties: PEOPEL v. GREEN.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

368 Ill. 242

13 N.E.2d 278

PEOPEL

v.GREEN.

No. 24411.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 17, 1938.

Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; George S. Weiss, Judge.

George T. Green was convicted for reckless driving, and he brings error.

Reversed.

STONE and WILSON, JJ., dissenting.Joseph H. Braun and Ode L. Rankin, both of Chicago (Joseph P. Brodie, Le Roy O. Norby, and Hugh Neil Johnson, all of Chicago, of counsel), for plaintiff in error.

Otto Kerner, Atty. Gen., Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago, and A. B. Dennis, of Danville (Edward E. Wilson, John T. Gallagher, Melvin S. Rembe, and Blair L. Varnes, all of Chicago, of counsel), for the People.

SHAW, Justice.

The defendant, George T. Green, in the municipal court of Chicago, was found guilty of reckless driving under section 48 of the Uniform Traffic Act, State Bar Stat. 1937, c. 95 1/2, § 145, regulating traffic on highways. He was sentenced to pay a fine and prosecutes this writ of error on the contention that the statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutional; it being claimed that both the act, and the information drawn under it, are so vague, uncertain, and indefinite in their statement and definition of a crime as to violate article 3 and sections 2, 9, 10, and 14 of article 2 of the Constitution of Illinois. The facts are not in dispute and it will be unnecessary to consider them.

The section in question provides: ‘Any person who drives any vehicle with a wilful or a wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.’ State Bar Stat.1937, c. 95 1/2 § 145. The act, in section 2, State Bar Stat.1937, c. 95 1/2, § 99, is not limited to automobiles, but includes any device upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices moved by human power or used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks. It also includes private roads and driveways used for travel by the owner and those having express or implied permission from the owner.

The information which is questioned is in the words of the statute and alleges that the defendant did ‘drive a vehicle upon a public highway of this State situated within the limits of the city of Chicago * * * with a wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property,’ etc. The defendant states that his outstanding objection is that the statute is so general in its provisions that it covers every conceivable operation and movement of all vehicles upon the highways or private ways with no one fixed fact or standard either for the driver, the jury, or that judge who may have to pass upon the matter in a judicial investigation. His brief, under three points, suggests that the act is wanting in due process; that whether an act is willful and wanton depends on the particular facts of each case; and that the information violates section 9 of article 2 of the Constitution, in that it does not advise the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation.

It will be seen that the questions presented require an independent consideration of the constitutionality of the law under which the information is filed, and, secondarily, a consideration of the sufficiency of the information itself. On the first point the defendant presents general language from many cases stating the well-recognized rule that laws creating crime ought to be so explicit that all men subject to their penalties may know what acts it is their duty to avoid. The rule is thus stated in Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322: ‘The terms of a penal statute creating a new offense must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties.’ In that case the question before the court was the validity of a statute of Oklahoma, 61 Okl.St.Ann. § 3, which created an eight-hour day for all persons employed by or on behalf of the state, and provided, further, that not less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work was to be performed should be paid to laborers by contractors in the execution of state contracts. A penalty was provided for its violation. The United States Supreme Court said: ‘The result is that the application of the law depends, not upon a word of fixed meaning in itself, or one made definite by statutory or judicial definition, or by the context or other legitimate aid to its construction, but upon the probably varying impressions of juries as to whether given areas are or are not to be included within particular localities. The constitutional guarantee of due process cannot be allowed to rest upon a support so equivocal.’ Many other cases illustrating the same rule are cited and it is argued from them that the law we are considering must be held void as a denial of due process.

Our attention is also called to certain language in our own opinion deciding the case of People v. Beak, 291 Ill. 449, 126 N.E. 201, 202. In that case we were considering the validity of that section of the former Motor Vehicle Act which provided that no person should drive a motor vehicle at a greater speed than reasonable and proper, having regard to the traffic and the use of the way, or so as to endanger the life or limb or injure the property of any person. It further provided that certain speeds therein set forth should be prima facie evidence that the speed was greater than reasonable if it occurred in certain localities. The prima facie rate of reasonableness was limited to ten miles per hour through closely built-up business portions of a city, fifteen miles per hour in the residence district, twenty miles per hour outside the closely built-up residence district, and twenty-five miles per hour on any highway outside the limits of any incorporated city or village. The constitutionality of the act was sustained, and in the opinion we used the following language: ‘There can be no question that counsel for plaintiff in error is right in arguing that in creating an offense by a statute which was not a crime at common law such statute must be sufficiently certain to show what the Legislature intended to prohibit and punish; otherwise it will be void for uncertainty. 16 Corpus Juris, 67. If the law is of such doubtful construction and describes the act, denominated as a crime in terms so general and indeterminate as to make the question of criminality dependent upon the opinions of the individuals who may happen to constitute the court and jury, and of such a nature that honest and intelligent men are unable to ascertain what particular act is condemned by the state, the law is incapable of enforcement and will be held to be null and void. Hayes v. State, 11 Ga.App. 371, 75 S.E. 523. The dividing line between what is lawful and what is unlawful cannot be left ot conjecture. United States v. Capital Traction Co., 34 App.D.C. 592,19 Ann.Cas. 68. This law, however, the constitutionality of which is questioned, does not leave to conjecture when the statute is violated. If the only provision of section 10 were its first sentence, there might be some merit in the argument of counsel that the construction of the statute is subject to conjecture. The section further provides the exact speed which if exceeded in various classifications of localities shall be prima facie evidence of a violation of the law, and the evidence of plaintiff in error himself clearly indicates that he was violating the provisions of the statute as to the speed at which he was traveling at and just before the time he was arrested by the officer. Plaintiff in error, not being aggrieved by the parts of the act which his counsel argues are void, cannot be heard to complain of the provisions which are not so indefinite as to be subject to criticism. State Public Utilities Comm. v. Chicago & West Towns Railway Co., 275 Ill. 555, 114 N.E. 325, Ann.Cas.1917C, 50. It appears from the evidence that the place where plaintiff in error was driving when arrested was in a closely built up residence district of the kind in which the statute clearly provides the speed should not be over 15 miles per hour. He himself admits that he was traveling 25 miles per hour, while the evidence in behalf of the state was that he was traveling 35 miles. The statute is sufficiently clear on the actual questions involved to inform any one what the Legislature intended to prohibit and punish. The fact that drivers of certain other automobiles were going faster than 15 miles per hour without being arrested would not justify plaintiff in error in traveling at the rate of 25 miles per hour. The statute is not invalid for the reasons urged.’

The defendant also presents other cases from Georgia and West Virginia where acts very similar to the one under consideration were held to be void, and he also quotes isolated sentences, without reference to the facts involved, from various other opinions, all merely cumulative in support of the rule above quoted from the United States Supreme Court. On the other hand, the Supreme Courts of Ohio and Wisconsin have sustained statutes of the same kind. In the Ohio case, the statute prohibited operation of a motor vehicle at a speed greater than reasonable and proper, having regard for the width, traffic, use, and the general and usual rules of the way, or so as to endangerthe property, life, or limb of any person, and this provision was sustained, State v. Schaeffer, 96 Ohio St. 215, 117 N.E. 220, L.R.A.1918B, 945, Ann.Cas.1928E, 1137. The opinion of the Supreme Court of Ohio indicates that the same contentions were made in that court as are urged here. In the Wisonsin case of Mulkern v. State, 176 Wis. 490, 187 N.W. 190, 191, the statute was substantially indentical with that in the Ohio case, and the conviction for its violation was upheld. The court said: ‘If the fact that one jury might decide a case one way and another jury a...