People ex rel. Abt v. Bowman

• Decision Date: 21 December 1911
• Citation: 253 Ill. 234,97 N.E. 304
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. ABT v. BOWMAN.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

253 Ill. 234

97 N.E. 304

PEOPLE ex rel. ABT

v.BOWMAN.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 21, 1911.

Appeal from St. Clair County Court; John B. Hay, Judge.

Action by the People, on relation of Paul W. Abt, against Frank B. Bowman. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed in part and remanded.J. M. Freels and Turner & Holder, for appellant.

F. J. Tecklenburg, State's Atty. (Dan McGlynn and John E. Hamlin, of counsel), for appellee.

VICKERS, J.

Paul W. Abt, as county treasurer and collector of taxes for St. Clair county, made application to the county court, at the June term thereof, 1911, for judgment against certain lands and lots described in the delinquent list for the taxes due and unpaid for the year 1910. Frank B. Bowman filed 15 objections to the rendition of judgment against the lots and lands described in the delinquent list owned by him. Some of these objections were sustained in part, and the amount for which judgment was asked was reduced, and judgment was rendered for the amount for which the court found the lots and lands were liable. Other of the objections were overruled altogether, and judgment rendered for the amount shown to be due by the collector's books. The judgment was excepted to by the objector, and he has brought the record to this court by an appeal.

Appellant's first objection questions the validity of the county taxes, because, it is alleged, a number of items are not sufficiently specific, and are, for that reason, not properlylevied upon appellant's property. The several items of county taxes to which appellant made objection are as follows: For warrants of the board of election commissioners, $7,500; for salary, clerk hire, and expenses of the county treasurer, $4,500; for county farm, $25,000; for county jail, $15,000; for workhouse, $1,200; for courthouse $35,000; for salaries of county appointees, $15,000; for other salaries, $4,500; for state institutions, $5,000; for assessments $2,000; for fees of county officers, $15,000; for stenographer's fees, $150; for bridges, $5,000; for sundry and general expenses, the exact nature of which cannot be ascertained in advance, $1,000.

[1] Appellant objects to the first item, being a levy ‘for warrants of the board of election commissioners, $7,500.’ The specific objection made to this item is ‘that there is nothing in the statute which authorizes the board of election commissioners to issue warrants against the county funds.’ The city of East St. Louis, in said county, has a board of election commissioners, under whose supervision elections in that city are held. Appellant apparently overlooked sections 284, 285, and 286 of the election law (Hurd's Stat. 1908, p. 981), which make provision for the payment of the expenses of all elections held in cities which have adopted the act, and which make special provision for the registration of voters and the conducting of elections in cities where that act has been adopted. Section 284 provides for the payment by the city of all the expenses of holding city elections and special elections in any pary of such city at which a city officer is elected. Section 285 provides for the payment by the county of such expenses at all general county and state elections held in such city. It will thus be seen that by these two sections elections held in such city are divided into two classes, and the expense of holding one class is to be paid by the city and the expense of the other class by the county. Section 286 of the act provides that: ‘Said board of election commissioners shall audit all the claims of judges and clerks of election and shall draw a warrant therefor upon such city or county treasury, as the case may be.’ This statute expressly authorizes the board of election commissioners to draw warrants on the county treasury for the expenses of holding county and state elections; and it was therefore within the power of the board of supervisors to levy a tax to pay warrants drawn upon the county treasury in payment of the expenses of such elections as are properly chargeable to the county. This tax has nothing to do with the salaries of the board of election commissioners and their clerks. There is a levy of $4,600 in another item, which is not objected to, that is levied for the salaries of clerk and members of the board of election commissioners. The salaries of the clerk and members of the board of election commissioners are fixed by the statute for the several classes of counties, and are specifically made payable out of the county treasury upon the warrant of the county judge, while the expenses of the board of election commissioners, other than salary, are to be paid by the city upon the warrant of the county judge. The items for which the board of election commissioners are authorized to draw warrants upon the county treasury are, not the expenses of the board, but the expenses of holding elections for county and state officers.

[2] There is also another item of $12,000, levied for election expenses, and this item is not objected to; but it is insisted by appellant that all expenses in connection with elections which the county is liable for should be paid from this general levy. We see no objection to separating the election expenses into two items, since the claims for county and state elections held in the city of East St. Louis are to be audited and paid on the warrant of the board of election commissioners, while the election expenses for the county outside of the city are to be audited and paid by the board of supervisors. It was entirely proper to levy a separate tax to meet these two items of county expenses. The objectionto the levy for warrants of the board of election commissioners was properly overruled.

[3] The next item objected to is ‘for salary, clerk hire and expenses of the county treasurer, $4,500.’ There are two objections made to this item: First, that the salary of the county treasurer is payable only out of fees of his office; and, second, that it is illegal, because it groups ‘salary, clerk hire and expenses,’ and levies a gross sum for those purposes. Under the statute, the county treasurer is ex officio supervisor of assessments, and the statute provides that in counties of the class to which St. Clair belongs the compensation of the treasurer for supervising assessments is $1,000 per annum. The county board fixes the compensation of the treasurer for his work as treasurer by resolution, and under the law his salary, as treasurer, is only payable out of fees and commissions.

[4][5] The amount thus fixed is the only compensation to which such treasurer is entitled. The act of 1898 (Laws Ex. Sess. 1898, p. 34), making the county treasurer ex officio supervisor of assessments, did not create a new office, but simply added new duties to the office of county treasurer. Foote v. Lake County, 206 Ill. 185, 69 N. E. 47;Parker v. Richland County, 214 Ill. 165, 73 N. E. 451. The amount fixed by section 2 of the act of 1898 as compensation to the county treasurer as supervisor of assessments makes such amount an earning of the office, the same as any other fees or commissions, and, when paid by the county, must be applied, like other earnings, to the payment of the salary fixed by the county board as salary for the office of county treasurer. Since the county must pay the county treasurer the amount due him as supervisor of assessments, it was proper to levy a tax for such purpose.

[6][7] The second objection to this item is not well taken. There is no valid objection to levying a gross sum for several different purposes, where the several purposes are properly embraced within some general designation; and particularly is this true where it is difficult, in advance, to determine the amount of the severalitems. This court has steadily adhered to the rule that it is necessary to a valid levy of county taxes to state the amount for each purpose separately. In the construction and enforcement of the statute which imposes this duty upon the county board, this court has sought to give the statute a reasonable and commonsense meaning, so as to avoid making it difficult or impossible for boards to levy county taxes. Thus, in People v. Cairo, Vincennes & Chicago Railway Co., 237 Ill. 312, 86 N. E. 721, this court held that the term ‘court expenses' was sufficiently definite without specifying a particular sum for jury fees, bailiff fees, and the like. ‘Salary, clerk hire and expenses of county treasurer’ would seem to be sufficiently definite to give the taxpayer information respecting the purposes for which the tax was levied. The objection to this item was properly overruled.

[8] The next item to which objection is taken is $25,000 for county farm. The objection to this item is that it is not sufficiently certain. Following this are items ‘for county jail, $15,000,’ ‘for workhouse, $1,200,’ and ‘for courthouse, $35,000,’ all of which are objected to because they are not sufficiently specific and certain. In our opinion, the objection to these items should have been sustained for the reason stated. Twenty-five thousand dollars ‘for county farm,’ $15,000 ‘for county jail,’ $1,200, ‘for workhouse’ and $35,000 ‘ for courthouse’ does not disclose whether the money is levied to buy grounds and buildings, or to improve buildings, or for the general running expenses of the several public places mentioned. In People v. Cairo, Vincennes & Chicago Railway Co., 243 Ill. 217, 90 N. E. 730, this court held that a levy for ‘public buildings account’ and ‘county jail fund account’ was not sufficiently specific to meet the requirements of section 121 of the revenue act (Hurd's Rev. St. 1908, c. 120). We do not see what information the taxpayer would be able to get from the expressions ‘for courthouse,’ ‘for workhouse,’ ‘for county jail,’ and ‘for county farm.’ These several expressions are so vague and general that they might be construed to apply to any one of...