PEOPLE EX REL APE, No. 98CA0588.
| Docket Nº | No. 98CA0588. |
| Citation | 988 P.2d 172 |
| Case Date | April 01, 1999 |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Colorado |
988 P.2d 172
The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee,In the Interest of A.P.E., a Child, Juvenile-Appellant
No. 98CA0588.
Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.
April 1, 1999.
Certiorari Granted November 8, 1999.
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Daniel G. Katz, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant.
Opinion by Judge PLANK.
A.E., a juvenile, appeals from a judgment adjudicating him a delinquent after a bench trial finding him guilty of committing acts that would, if committed by an adult, constitute possession of an illegal weapon and unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon. We affirm.
Because A.E. was yelling profanities and making obscene gestures at passing cars, a police officer contacted him and conducted a search as authorized by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). A.E. informed the officer that he was carrying a concealed "knife" (the weapon) (see photocopy depiction in appendix). The officer examined the weapon, and A.E. was later charged with one count of possession of an illegal weapon in violation of § 18-12-102(4), C.R.S.1998, one count of carrying a concealed weapon in violation of § 18-12-105, C.R.S. 1998, and another count that was later dismissed. The delinquency adjudication at issue here resulted.
I.
A.E. contends that his conviction for possession of an illegal weapon should be reversed because the lack of a definition of the phrase "metallic knuckles" in the criminal code renders § 18-12-102(4), C.R.S.1998, unconstitutionally vague as applied to him. We disagree.
When a defendant asserts that a criminal statute is unconstitutionally vague because it violates constitutional due process guarantees, we must carefully scrutinize the statute. Nevertheless, we presume the statute to be constitutional unless the defendant proves otherwise beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Gross, 830 P.2d 933 (Colo.1992).
To be unconstitutionally vague, a statute must forbid or require "the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application." People v. Becker, 759 P.2d 26, 31 (Colo.1988).
"Brass knuckles" have been variously defined as a "weapon worn on the hand for the purposes of offense or defense so made that in hitting with the fist considerable damage is inflicted," Black's Law Dictionary 188 (6th ed.1990); as a "set of four metal finger rings or guards attached to a transverse piece and worn over the front of the doubled fist for use as a weapon," Webster's Third New International Dictionary 269 (1981); and as "a band of metal with four holes that fits over the upper fingers and is gripped when a fist is made, used as a weapon." Random House Webster's College Dictionary 166 (1991).
These definitions, and others commonly in use, convey an unambiguous sense of the nature of metallic knuckles: there must be four metal finger rings or guards attached to a cross piece; the assemblage must be intended to be worn on the hand with the fingers through the rings or guards; and it must be designed and intended for use as a weapon.
We are not persuaded that persons of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess at the meaning of the phrase "metallic knuckles" as used in the statute prohibiting possession of illegal weapons, nor that they would differ as to the application of that definition to particular weapons. Therefore, we hold that § 18-12-102(4), C.R.S.1998, is neither facially void for vagueness as to its prohibition of possession of metallic knuckles, nor is it unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant and the particular weapon at issue here.
II.
A.E. next contends that there was insufficient evidence to support either...
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APE v. People, No. 99SC392.
...A.P.E. intended to use the knife as a weapon. The court of appeals affirmed A.P.E.'s conviction on both counts. People ex rel. A.P.E., 988 P.2d 172, 176 (Colo.App.1999). In its decision, the court rejected A.P.E.'s claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Id. at......
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PEOPLE EX REL. JMN, No. 00CA2317.
...those for reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting a judgment of conviction in a criminal case. See People in Interest of A.P.E., 988 P.2d 172 (Colo.App.1999), rev'd on other grounds, 20 P.3d 1179 (Colo.2001). The reviewing court must determine whether the evidence, viewed as a whol......
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People v. Lesslie, No. 99CA1048.
...that persons of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application." People ex rel. A.P.E., 988 P.2d 172, 173 A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and a party asserting the contrary assumes the burden of establishing such assertion beyond ......
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APE v. People, No. 99SC392.
...A.P.E. intended to use the knife as a weapon. The court of appeals affirmed A.P.E.'s conviction on both counts. People ex rel. A.P.E., 988 P.2d 172, 176 (Colo.App.1999). In its decision, the court rejected A.P.E.'s claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. Id. at......
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PEOPLE EX REL. JMN, No. 00CA2317.
...those for reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting a judgment of conviction in a criminal case. See People in Interest of A.P.E., 988 P.2d 172 (Colo.App.1999), rev'd on other grounds, 20 P.3d 1179 (Colo.2001). The reviewing court must determine whether the evidence, viewed as a whol......
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People v. Lesslie, No. 99CA1048.
...that persons of ordinary intelligence must necessarily guess as to its meaning and differ as to its application." People ex rel. A.P.E., 988 P.2d 172, 173 A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and a party asserting the contrary assumes the burden of establishing such assertion beyond ......