People ex rel. Barrett v. Gentile Coop. Ass'n
| Citation | 392 Ill. 393,64 N.E.2d 907 |
| Decision Date | 23 January 1946 |
| Docket Number | No. 29006.,29006. |
| Parties | PEOPLE ex rel. BARRETT, Atty. Gen., v. GENTILE COOPERATIVE ASS'N et al. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Joseph A. Graber, judge.
Quo warranto proceeding by the People, on the relation of George F. Barrett, Attorney General, against Gentile Co-operative Association and its directors, Eugene R. Flintcraft and others, to oust the directors from exercising the privileges of a corporation, and to oust the corporation of its franchise, and to compel its dissolution. From an adverse judgment, the named defendants appeal.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
George T. Spensley, of Chicago, for appellants.
George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen., (William C. Wines, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.
The Attorney General of Illinois filed a petition in quo warranto against Gentile Cooperative Association, and its directors, Eugene R. Flintcraft, Marvin Ferree and John M. Nolan, to oust said directors from exercising the privileges of a corporation, and to oust the corporation of its franchise, and to compel its dissolution. The superior court of Cook county entered its judgment holding the purposes of the corporation were illegal, ousting it from its corporate franchise, and prohibiting the directors from exercising rights or privileges as officers and directors of such corporation. An appeal is perfected to this count by the corporation and Eugene R. Flintcraft. We have jurisdiction on direct appeal because of franchise is involved.
The appellee claims that the purposes enumerated in the corporate charter are illegal per se, and also that the corporation was abusing its corporate franchise, all of which is denied by the defendants. But, before the validity of the judgment of the superior court can be determined, it is necessary to examine the pleading upon which the judgment was entered.
Prior to 1937 the complaint in a quo warranto proceeding filed by the Attorney General merely inquired by what authority the defendant exercised the claimed right, franchise or privilege, and thereupon the defendants were required by plea to justify the warrant of authority under which they acted. The issue between the Attorney General and the defendants was formulated by the replication, where the real controversy against the defendants was first disclosed. The Quo Warranto Act was amended in 1937, and this practice was still authorized but, in addition, an alternative manner of pleading was provided, viz., Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, chap. 112, par. 11.
In this case the alternative practice authorized had been followed in a complaint of two counts, the first directed against the directors, and the second against the corporate defendant. Count 1 alleges the directors filed an application to form a corporation not for pecuniary profit, setting out the purposes, and that the Secretary of State issued a certificate of incorporation for such purposes; that such certificate of incorporation was illegally issued because the purposes were void, and that the individual defendants as directors are exercising privileges and franchises of the Gentile Cooperative Association without authority, because the purposes of said incorporation are illegal and subversive; and it thereupon sets out as conclusions in what respect the purposes disclosed in the corporate charter are contrary to law, thereby rendering the individual defendants subject to be ousted from the exercise of such privileges, and it requires an answer to show by what right they claim, etc.
The second count is directed against the corporate defendant, and alleges it is a corporation created by law and still exists, but is exceeding the rights and privileges granted in its corporate charter by doing certain acts which are illegal, subversive and against public policy, and therefore exercises such claimed rights, privileges and franchises without warrant of law, and prays that an answer be required. It is also alleged in the second count, as a matter of fact, that the illegal acts consist of discrimination against other persons, and doing other acts againt public policy and law.
To the first count the defendants filed an answer, setting forth the corporate charter, and denying in express words each allegation of purpose contained in the first count of the complaint. To the second count the corporate defendant answered that its charter was granted in accordance with law, and expressly denied each and every fact alleged to have been illegally done upon its part.
After these answers were filed the plaintiff made a motion to strike, directed to the first count only, praying judgment because the complaint and answer disclosed an...
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...Fredrich v. Wolf, 383 Ill. 638, 50 N.E.2d 755;Gray v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 388 Ill. 124, 57 N.E.2d 363, and People v. Gentile Co-op. Ass'n, 392 Ill. 393, 64 N.E.2d 907. In the Fredrich case a unit judgment was entered against Wolf and Margaret Thiele. The power of attorney which auth......
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People v. Wood
...the common law have been largely preserved in our statutory information in the nature of a quo warranto. People ex rel. Barrett v. Gentile Cooperative Ass'n, 392 Ill. 393, 64 N.E.2d 907; Adair v. Williams, 407 Ill. 309, 95 N.E.2d 345. The distinction which presently exists between a quo war......
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