People ex rel. Barrett v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 26 December 1947
• Docket Number: No. 30417.,30417.
• Citation: 398 Ill. 480,76 N.E.2d 773
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. BARRETT, Atty. Gen., v. ANDERSON, County Clerk.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

398 Ill. 480

76 N.E.2d 773

PEOPLE ex rel. BARRETT, Atty. Gen.,

v.ANDERSON, County Clerk.

No. 30417.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 26, 1947.

Original mandamus proceeding by the People, on the relation of George F. Barrett, Attorney General, against Brainard F. Anderson, County Clerk of Iroquois County, respondent, to require respondent to comply with the provisions of the Reapportionment Act.

Writ awarded.George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen., of Springfield (Weymouth Kirkland, Howard Ellis, Charles A. Thomas, Owen Rall, Walter V. Schaefer and William C. Wines, all of Chicago, of counsel), for petitioner.

A. Fred Kendall, State's Atty., of Watseka, and Albert E. Jenner, Jr., of Chicago, for respondent.

GUNN, Justice.

On September 16, 1947, the People of the State of Illinois, on the relation of George F. Barrett, Attorney General, filed a petition in this court for an original writ of mandamus against Brainard F. Anderson, county clerk of Iroquois County, to require him to comply with the provisions of the recent Reapportionment Act, entitled ‘An Act to apportion the State of Illinois into twenty-six Congressional districts and to establish the same and to provide for the election of representatives therein and to repeal an act therein named.’ Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 46, par. 156a et seq. The court granted the petition and ordered the defendant to answer, and upon respondent filing his answer to the petition for writ of mandamus, the petitioner filed a general demurrer thereto, and upon the issues thus formed the parties filed their respective briefs, and on November 20, 1947, argued the cause orally in this court.

It appearing that the matter involved in the cause was of great public importance, and that an early decision was necessary to prevent confusion in the selection of candidates for Congressional offices in the primary election for the spring of 1948, because of the claim of respondent that the Apportionment Act of 1901, Laws 1901, p. 3, Smith-Hurd Stats c. 46, s 154 et seq., which provided for different districts, was the only legal act in effect, the court thereupon, after the closing of the arguments, considered the case as presented by the petitioner and the respondent, and an announcement was made on November 21, 1947, ordering the writ of mandamus to issue against Brainard F. Anderson, as county clerk of Iroquois County, as prayed in the petition, and that the opinion of the court be rendered as the conveience of the court would permit.

The petition alleged that the act referred to above was enacted at the 65th General Assembly of Illinois, was signed and approved by the Governor on June 26, 1947, and became a law and went into effect upon that date, and attached a copy of such law as an exhibit to the petition. It was further alleged that the county of Iroquois was by said act included in the 17th Congressional District, and that under the Apportionment Act of May 13, 1901, said county constituted a part of the 18th Congressional District; that said Anderson was the duly elected and qualified county clerk of Iroquois County and required by the Election Code of the State of Illinois to prepare the notice of primary elections within said district, and that he had stated and declared that he had been advised that the Apportionment Act of 1947, placing his county in the 17th Congressional District, was unconstitutional and void, and that the act of May 13, 1901, was still in force and effect, and that he, in the coming primary of 1948, would disregard the recent act of 1947 and would proceed under the act of 1901. It was further alleged that if respondent persisted in his announced intention to follow the earlier act he would give notice of a primary election to be held in April, 1948, for offices from the 18th Congressional District, whereas under the act of 1947, his county was within the 17th Congressional District, with the result that congressional officers would not be legally nominated or elected if the said respondent persisted in his announced intention. Other facts are alleged setting forth more in detail the confusion which would arise from such action, and prayed that a writ of mandamus be issued to compel him to comply with the Apportionment Act of 1947.

The respondent filed his answer and admitted his announced intention of following the act of 1901 and in declaring the Apportionment Act of 1947 unconstitutional and void, and, among the principal objections to the validity of the said act, alleged that certain territory, being a portion of the township of Stickney in Cook County, Illinois, was not assigned to any of the Congressional districts but was omitted entirely, and the electors of said territory were thus deprived of the constitutional right to vote; and that certain other errors in description were made, whereby there was no proper description of the boundaries of the Eleventh and Thirteenth Congressional Districts; nor of the Sixth and Tenth Congressional District; nor of the Third and Fifth Congressional Districts; all of which will be referred to with more particularity hereafter.

The answer also set out that the populations of the several districts under the act of 1947 are so disproportionate that there is no approximation of equality in population among and between the several districts as required by the constitution of the State of Illinois, and that for this reason the act is unconstitutional and void. The details of the matters pertaining to these objections are set forth with great particularity in the answer, so that all of the details of the legislation, from the introduction of the bill to its enactment and approval and signing by the Governor, are disclosed.

To this answer the petitioner filed a general demurrer, thus creating an issue of law upon which briefs and arguments were presented to this court. The petitioner claims the intention of the legislature is clearly indicated, and that it undertook to, and did include all of the territory of the State of Illinois within the several districts, and that the same are clearly described, and that the inaccuracies, if any, were a mere matter of mistake, and that the alleged inaccuracies in describing said districts will by a proper construction or interpretation of the language used conform with the manifest intention of the General Assembly.

On the other hand, the respondent claims there was a clear omission to include certain territory within the boundaries of some one or more of the districts, and that there was a complete lack of description of boundaries in certain other districts, so that the boundary lines could not be ascertained with certainty, thereby rendering the entire act incomplete and invalid.

The decision of this case involves a single question of the intent of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois in enacting the law of apportioning the territory of the State into Congressional Districts. If the General Assembly intended to include all of the territory of the State in the several districts, and this may be ascertained from an examination of the law as a whole, language may be made to conform to the intention. On the other hand, if all of the territory within the boundaries of the State is not included within the description of the several districts, and cannot be reasonable construction be assigned to any district, thus depriving a part of the population of the State of the right to vote for the representation in Congress, then such omission would invalidate the act.

The first and principal objection urged by the respondent is the claim that a part of Stickney Township is not included with any district, thus constituting an omission fatal to the law. The rule for the guidance of courts in such a case is to ascertain the intention of the legislature and not its mistakes either as to the law or facts. The only question is, Has the legislature expressed its purpose intelligently? If it has, the act is valid and must be upheld. People v. Penman, 271 Ill. 82, 110 N.E. 894;Patton v. People ex rel. Sweet, 229 Ill. 512, 82 N.E. 386;People v. VanBever, 248 Ill. 136, 93 N.E. 725. The question in any case of statutory construction is one of soundly seeking and tolerantly effectuating convincing legislative intention. United States v. Rosenblum Truck Lines, 315 U.S. 50, 62 S.Ct. 445, 86 L.Ed. 671. Thus, it is the language of the act as a whole that is to be read and not words of a section or provision in isolation, ‘that courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose.’ Securities and Exchange Com. v. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 64 S.Ct. 120, 123, 88 L.Ed. 88.

So, while courts are and should be cautious about adding words, as such, to a statute generally, they will not hesitate to read into the sense of some section or provision a qualifying or expanding expression plainly implied by the general context of the act, which has been palpably omitted and which is necessary to prevent the legislative purpose from failing in one of its material aspects. Elizabeth Arden Sales Corp. v. Gus Blass Co., 8 Cir., 150 F.2d 988, 161 A.L.R. 370. We have held in Burns v. Industrial Commission, 356 Ill. 602, 191 N.E. 225, 227, ‘The primary purpose of statutory construction is to arrive at the legislative intent. People v. Talbot, 322 Ill. 416, 153 N.E. 693. In order to arrive at this intent, the several provisions of the statute are to be construed together in the light of the general purpose and object of the act and so as to give effect to the main intent and plan thereof as therein expressed. State Public Utilities Commission v. Monarch Refrigerating Co., 267 Ill. 528, 108 N.E. 716, Ann.Cas.1916A, 528. If this intention can be collected from the statute, words may be modified, altered, or supplied so as to obviate any repugnancy or inconsistency with such legislative intention. (Citations.)’ And also we have held in Smith v. County of Logan, 284...