People ex rel. Benoit v. Miller

• Decision Date: 10 April 1872
• Citation: 24 Mich. 458
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: The People on the relation of Emil P. Benoit v. George Miller

24 Mich. 458

The People on the relation of Emil P. Benoit v. George Miller

Supreme Court of Michigan

April 10, 1872

Heard April 6, 1872

Information in the nature of quo warranto.

Judgment rendered on the verdict for the damages assessed with costs.

William A. Moore and Theodore Romeyn, for the respondent.

E. W Meddaugh and George V. N. Lothrop, for the relator, were stopped by the court.

Campbell, J. Cooley and Graves, JJ., concurred. Christiancy, Ch. J., did not sit in this case.

OPINION

Campbell, J.:

In this case, which is a proceeding in quo warranto, originating in this court, the defendant was convicted of an unlawful intrusion into the office of treasurer of Wayne county, the proceeding having been commenced at once after the beginning of the official term in 1867, and the ouster laid as of the earliest period of that term.

Judgment having been rendered in favor of the relator, he filed his suggestion of damages, under section 5297 of the Compiled Laws, and they have been assessed at three thousand three hundred and forty-seven dollars and thirty-three cents, being confined to the official salary, without fees or other perquisites.

Motion being made for judgment, it is opposed, on the ground that the judge before whom the issue was sent down to be tried, refused to allow in reduction of damages evidence of the value of Miller's services, or of Benoit's earnings in other pursuits while kept out of the office, or that Benoit did, and offered to do, nothing towards the discharge of the official duties.

Before considering the principal legal questions touching the measure or damages, a preliminary question requires attention. It is claimed that Miller, having been in office during the preceding term, was bound to hold over until his successor was elected and qualified, and that as Benoit did not qualify until after the judgment of ouster, Miller's right to the salary and his duty to hold over continued.

It would be a sufficient answer to this to refer to the judgment already given, which is conclusive against any pretense of a lawful holding over. That would have been a complete defense to the original action, if there had been any foundation for the claim. But there is no foundation whatever for any such pretext. The defense in this case rested upon a new election, and a title thereby, certified by the proper authority to be in Miller, and his taking steps to qualify. That action precluded Benoit from qualifying, and his attempt to do so would probably have been nugatory. He could not be compelled to tender his qualifying papers to officers who had already acted, or who had no evidence of his rights. The law expressly allows an officer ousted by another to qualify after he obtains judgment in his favor: Comp. L., § 5295; People v. Mayworm, 5 Mich. 146; People v. Miller, 16 Mich. 56.

The effect of this judgment is to decide that, from the beginning of the official term, in the year 1867, Miller was in office wrongfully, and Benoit was, during that whole time, wrongfully excluded. His right to damages covers the whole time of exclusion.

The only question, therefore, is whether any deduction should have been made from the official salary, for Miller's services, or Benoit's outside profits and earnings.

The case finds expressly that the whole office and contingent expenses, and the services of the deputy and clerks, were paid by Wayne county. No expenditures of Miller are in controversy, for he had none to make. There are no ascertainable pecuniary deductions in question.

We do not find any reason or authority for holding that the good faith of the intruder can make any difference touching the pecuniary value of the office to the person kept out. His damages are to be measured by what he has lost, and his loss cannot be lessened by any such consideration. In the present case, however, it is admitted Miller knew all the facts which gave the legal right to the relator, and whether he knew the law or not, he must be held responsible for such knowledge; and so he has neither equity nor legal claim to favor on any such ground.

The case, therefore, is very free from disturbing elements, and the principles which ought to settle it are not complicated. There are not many decisions fixing special rules for the measure of damages, but there are familiar principles which will enable us to come to a safe conclusion.

The old remedy for disseisin of offices of profit seems to have been by assise, and the suit was allowed by analogy to proceedings for the recovery of possessions in lands and their appurtenances: Com. Dig. "Assise" (B. 1), (B. 2); Bac. Ab., "Assise," "Office." So far as this analogy holds, it would not permit any deduction from the recovery of damages based on personal services of the disseisor, or on the outside profits of the disseisee.

It is no answer to an action for mesne profits that the plaintiff has made more money in other business than he would have done by farming. And it would be a strange doctrine to hold that a trespasser could claim compensation for his personal services in clearing or improving land against the owner's claim of entry. But none of these analogies are perfect, and it might not be quite safe to follow them implicitly, although the law concerning trespassers and disseizors of all kinds is not subject to very many...