People ex rel. Biebinger v. Cincinnati, I.&W. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 22 December 1906
• Citation: 224 Ill. 523,79 N.E. 657
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. BIEBINGER, County Collector, v. CINCINNATI, I. & W. RY. CO.

224 Ill. 523

79 N.E. 657

PEOPLE ex rel. BIEBINGER, County Collector,

v.CINCINNATI, I. & W. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 22, 1906.

Appeal from Piatt County Court; F. M. Shonkwiler, Judge.

Application by the people, on the relation of I. N. Biebinger, county collector, for judgment and order of sale against the property of the Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Company for taxes. From a judgment sustaining an objection to an item in the levy, the people appeal. Affirmed.

A. C. Edie, State's Atty., for appellant.

George W. Fisher, for appellee.

WILKIN, J.

At the June term, 1906, of the county court of Piatt county the county collector made application for a judgment and order of sale against the property of appellee, the Cincinnati, Indianapolis & Western Railway Company, for delinquent county taxes for the year 1905. In making the levy for county purposes the board of supervisors specified five different items for which the taxes were to be extended, the third and fifth of which were as follows: ‘Three-For payment of county claims (janitor's services, supplies, repairs, improvements and current expenses) $12,000.’ ‘Five-For building bridges, etc., as may be required by law, $5,000.’ Objections were filed by appellee to each of these items on the ground that they were not sufficiently specific under the requirements of Revenue Act, § 121, c. 120 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1905). The objection to the third item was sustained and to the fifth overruled, and judgment entered accordingly. To reverse the judgment of the county court for error in sustaining the objection to the third item, this appeal has been prosecuted.

A motion has been made by appellee to dismiss the appeal and strike the record, brief, and abstract of appellant from the files because there is no placita or convening order of the county court preceding the final judgment; also because the bill of exceptions does not show that there was any prayer or motion by appellant for an appeal, or order granting the same. The record is not as full, complete, and orderly arranged as it should be. The placita is not in its proper place in the record and is not as specific as it should be. It does, however, sufficiently set out the convening order of the court for the June term to answer all practical purposes. What is said of the placita may also be said of the order allowing an appeal. Greater care should have been taken in the recitals as to that order, but it shows that an appeal was allowed to this court without bond, and that, we think, is substantially sufficient. The motion to dismiss will be overruled.

Section 121, c. 120, p. 1662, Hurd's Rev. St. 1905, after providing that the county boards of the respective counties shall annually, at the September session, determine the amount of all taxes to be raised for county purposes, requires that, ‘when for several purposes, the amount for each purpose shall be stated separately.’ The third item as specified by the board of supervisors does not comply with that requirement. It has embraced in it several different purposes, but the amount to be levied for each is not named or specified. We have recently held in several cases that a tax levied under the foregoing section is illegal...