People ex rel. Brown v. Toledo, St. L.&W.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 16 December 1914
• Docket Number: No. 9718.,9718.
• Citation: 265 Ill. 502,107 N.E. 220
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. BROWN, County Collector, v. TOLEDO, ST. L. & W. R. CO.

265 Ill. 502

107 N.E. 220

PEOPLE ex rel. BROWN, County Collector,

v.TOLEDO, ST. L. & W. R. CO.

No. 9718.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 16, 1914.

Appeal from Bond County Court; Wm. H. Dawdy, Judge.

Proceeding by the People, on relation of Joseph M. Brown, County Collector, against the Toledo, St. Louis & Western Railroad Company. From a judgment against it for delinquent taxes, the defendant appeals. Reversed in part and remanded, with directions.

C. E. Cook, of Greenville, and C. E. Pope and H. F. Driemeyer, both of E. St. Louis (Charles A. Schmettau, of Toledo, Ohio, of counsel), for appellant.

John D. Biggs, of Greenville, for appellee.

CARTWRIGHT, C. J.

On the application of the county collector of Bond county for judgment against the lands of the appellant for taxes alleged to be delinquent, objections to various taxes were filed. On a hearing some of the objections were sustained, others were overruled, and judgment was entered with an order of sale, from which this appeal was prosecuted.

[2] Four items of the county tax were objected to and the objections were overruled. One of them was an item of $1,000 for repairs of county property. Section 121 of the Revenue Act, which requires the county board to determine the amount of county taxes to be raised for all purposes, requires that when the tax is for several purposes the amount for each purpose shall be stated separately. The object of this requirement is to give the taxpayer an opportunity to prevent unjust and illegal taxes. People v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co., 231 Ill. 209, 83 N. E. 111;People v. Cairo, Vincennes & Chicago Ry. Co., 237 Ill. 312, 86 N. E. 721. The word ‘repairs' designates only a single purpose, but it is objected that the amounts required for that purpose should have been distributed between the several kinds and pieces of property of the county. The statute must receive a reasonable construction, and it was plainly impossible for the county board to tell what minor repairs might be required during the coming year, from time to time, on the courthouse, jail, county farm buildings, and other property. It would have been impossible to anticipate the amount of such items in advance, or where, either from ordinary wear and tear or from accident, some repair might become necessary. The amount levied was clearly within reason and the objection properly overruled.

[3] The next item of the county tax objected to was, ‘Sinking fund, $1,000; interest, $475-$1,475.’ The argument against this tax is that the item does not state the purpose, but we think it does. The act of 1905, enabling county boards to issue bonds (Laws of 1905, p. 132), requires the county board of each county issuing bonds to include in the amount of all taxes to be raised for county purposes in each year a sum sufficient to pay the accruing interest on such bonds and also a sufficient sum to be set apart as a sinking fund, to be accumulated and used as a payment of the principal of the bonds at their maturity. The General Assembly did not consider it necessary to give any further definition of a sinking fund, and the county board did what it was required by statute to do. That being so, the tax was legal and the court was right in overruling the objection.

[4] Another item was, ‘For salaries of county officials, $5,000.’ The objection to that tax was that it was in excess of the amount necessary to pay salaries payable out of the county treasury. The salaries were fixed and certain and consisted of the following: County judge, $700; county superintendent of highways, $1,000; state's attorney, $1,700; and members of the board of supervisors, $400. The appellee insists that $400 paid to the keeper of the poor farm was a salary of a county official, but that is a mistake. The keeper of the poor farm was the lowest responsible bidder for performing the duties of such keeper, and the county board entered into a contract with him to perform them for $400. He was a mere employé and did not come within the definition of an officer contained in section 24 of article 5 of the Constitution. His position was similar to that of an overseer of the poor or a janitor, who are held not to be officers. People v. Smith, 236 Ill. 64, 86 N. E. 167;People v. Cincinnati, Lafayette & Chicago Ry. Co., 247 Ill. 506, 93 N. E. 421.

The appellant contends that the salary of the state's attorney was not payable out of funds raised by general taxation, but that position cannot be maintained. Section 2 of the act of 1913 (Laws of 1913, p. 360) provides that the salaries of the state's attorneys,...