People ex rel. Brzica v. Village of Lake Barrington

• Decision Date: 15 December 1994
• Docket Number: No. 2-94-0038,2-94-0038
• Citation: 644 N.E.2d 66,268 Ill.App.3d 420
• Parties: , 205 Ill.Dec. 850 THE PEOPLE ex rel. Slavko BRZICA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF LAKE BARRINGTON, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 66

644 N.E.2d 66

268 Ill.App.3d 420, 205 Ill.Dec. 850

THE PEOPLE ex rel. Slavko BRZICA et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. VILLAGE OF LAKE BARRINGTON, a Municipal Corporation Defendant-Appellee.

No. 2-94-0038.

Appellate Court of Illinois Second District.

Dec. 15, 1994.

Howard R. Teegen, Soffietti, Johnson, Teegen & Phillips, Ltd., Fox Lake, for Mary Brzica, Slavko Brzica.

James P. Bateman, Barrington, for Village of Lake Barrington.

Justice COLWELL delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Slavko and Mary Brzica, appeal from the circuit court's order of December 7, 1993, granting the motion of defendant, the Village of Lake Barrington, to dismiss their petition for leave to file a quo warranto complaint. Plaintiffs' petition sought to have the defendant's annexation of certain property declared null or void because the underlying petition filed during the annexation proceeding (case No. 92-MC-12) was not signed by the requisite majority of owners of the territory in question contrary to the statutory requirements of the Illinois Municipal Code (Code) (65 ILCS 5/7-1-2 (West 1992)). The petition for leave to file a complaint quo warranto was filed on October 6, 1993, within the one-year limitations period after the annexation was completed by an ordinance adopted October 6, 1993. (See 65 ILCS 5/7-1-46 (West 1992).) Notice of the quo warranto proceeding was given to the State (which is not an active party to the action or appeal).

In granting defendant's motion, the trial court found that the court in the annexation proceeding (annexation court) had jurisdiction to enter the order approving the annexation petition and that any challenge to that order should have been by direct appeal. Relying on People ex rel. Town of Richwoods v. City of Peoria (1967), 80 Ill.App.2d 359, 225 N.E.2d 48, the trial court concluded that the quo warranto remedy was unavailable to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs, who were not parties in case No. 92-MC-12, maintain that quo warranto is the proper method to challenge the validity of the completed annexation and to contest thereby the annexation court's jurisdiction or authority to enter its order on the annexation petition. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.

Defendant argues here, as it did below, that quo warranto was not an available remedy to attack the validity of an annexation ordinance premised on a prior court order finding the annexation petition valid because, as Richwoods concluded, a judicially sanctioned annexation differs from an annexation instituted purely by the legislative action of a municipality. (See Richwoods, 80 Ill.App.2d 359, 225 N.E.2d 48; accord People ex rel. O'Malley v. Village of Ford Heights (1994), 261 Ill.App.3d 571, 574, 199 Ill.Dec. 52, 633 N.E.2d 848 (citing Richwoods without detailed analysis, court determined quo warranto proceeding would amount to impermissible de novo review of findings in collateral proceeding).) According to defendant, the only appropriate remedy in the present case would have been a direct appeal of the underlying order of the court which authorized the annexation. Plaintiffs argue that our supreme court's decision in People ex rel. Jordan Co. v. Village of Forest View (1961), 21 Ill.2d 384, 172 N.E.2d 780, is controlling. The Jordan court determined that the statutory requirements of a petition are jurisdictional and that the lack of jurisdiction on the part of the "county" court can be asserted in a quo warranto proceeding. (Jordan, 21 Ill.2d at 390, 172 N.E.2d 780.) In the present case, the trial court found that, because the jurisdiction of "county" courts prior to 1964 was more limited when Jordan was decided in 1961 than that of "circuit" courts today, the statutory requirements for petitions no longer limit the subject-matter jurisdiction of the courts, and Jordan was therefore inapplicable. After examining these and other authorities, we disagree with this reasoning and the resulting foreclosure of any possible quo warranto remedy for plaintiffs.

The principle that statutory subject-matter jurisdiction may arise from statutory conditions precedent to a court's exercise of its power, we believe, is still alive and well in Illinois even though circuit courts derive their plenary power to adjudicate "justiciable matters" from the constitution generally. (Ill.Const.1970, art. VI, § 9.) Though the legislature has no power to limit a court's constitutional jurisdiction to hear a matter, an exception exists when the legislature creates a statutory right having no counterpart in common law or equity. In such a case, the legislature is not limiting or precluding the court's jurisdiction, but is merely defining the justiciable matter it has created so that certain facts must exist before a court can act in a particular case (Skilling v. Skilling (1982), 104 Ill.App.3d 213, 219, 59 Ill.Dec. 937, 432 N.E.2d 881), or grant the relief requested (People ex rel. Illinois Department of Human Rights v. Arlington Park Race Track Corp. (1984), 122 Ill.App.3d 517, 521, 77 Ill.Dec. 882, 461 N.E.2d 505). One court has explained that, when a court is acting pursuant to present-day statutory subject-matter "jurisdiction," it does so because the legislature may impose by statute certain conditions precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction and these conditions precedent cannot be waived. In re Estate of Mears (1982), 110 Ill.App.3d 1133, 1137-38, 66 Ill.Dec. 606, 443 N.E.2d 289.

Jurisdiction in a particular case involves not only the power to hear and determine a given case but also the power to grant the particular relief requested, and every act of the court beyond its jurisdiction is void. (J.L. Simmons Co. v. Capital Development Board (1981), 98 Ill.App.3d 445, 446, 54 Ill.Dec. 71, 424 N.E.2d 821.) Thus, even if a court is one of general jurisdiction, when its power to act in a particular matter is controlled by statute, the court is governed by the rules of limited jurisdiction, and defects in subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. (Arlington Park, 122 Ill.App.3d at 521, 77 Ill.Dec. 882, 461 N.E.2d 505.) In exercising jurisdiction over matters made justiciable by statute and having no counterpart in common law or equity, courts must proceed within the strictures of the statute and cannot exceed their statutory authority. (In re M.M. (1993), 156 Ill.2d 53, 64-66, 189 Ill.Dec. 1, 619 N.E.2d 702.) The requirements for the court's statutory subject-matter jurisdiction must be strictly complied with and must affirmatively appear in the record. Evans v. Corporate Services (1990), 207 Ill.App.3d 297, 302, 152 Ill.Dec. 191, 565 N.E.2d 724.

The right of annexation by a municipality did not exist at common law (Scheuer v. Johns-Manville Products Corp. (1946), 330 Ill.App. 250, 260, 70 N.E.2d 876), and, because the right is a creature of statute, there can be no justification for annexation absent statutory authority (People ex rel. City of North Chicago v. City of Waukegan (1983), 116 Ill.App.3d 88, 93, 71 Ill.Dec. 578, 451 N.E.2d 293). As it did in 1961 when Jordan was decided, a section 7-1-2 petition has to meet certain statutory, jurisdictional requirements in order for the court to act and grant the requested relief, including that the petition be signed by a majority of the owners of record of land in the territory and also by a majority of the electors, if any, residing in the territory. (Jordan, 21 Ill.2d at 385, 172 N.E.2d 780; In re Petition to Annex Certain Property to the City of Wood Dale (1993), 244 Ill.App.3d 820, 833-34, 183 Ill.Dec. 343, 611 N.E.2d 606; 65 ILCS 5/7-1-2 (West 1992).) If, in fact, the petition does not satisfy all of the statutory, jurisdictional requirements, then the petition may be declared invalid or void as the court would not have had the authority to act. (People ex rel. Lange v. Old Portage Park District (1934), 356 Ill. 340, 343-46, 190 N.E. 664 (deficient signatures on petition in court-approved annexation challenged by quo warranto; burden of justification was on defendant); accord People ex rel. Curtin v. Heizer (1967), 36 Ill.2d 438, 441, 223 N.E.2d 128 (collateral attack upon proceedings of county court purporting to establish fire district permissible to reach jurisdictional defect in petition); People ex rel. Mills v. Fairfield Community High School District No. 225 (1947), 397 Ill. 233, 73 N.E.2d 292 (in annexation case, where record of court proceedings showed court did not have jurisdiction of subject matter because of defective petition, attempted judgment was a nullity that could be challenged by quo warranto despite court's finding that it had jurisdiction); see City of Wood Dale, 244 Ill.App.3d at 834-36, 183 Ill.Dec. 343, 611 N.E.2d 606 (holding that deficient jurisdictional facts (insufficient number of valid signatures) in petition will not confer subject-matter jurisdiction for court to act); People ex rel. Village of Long Grove v. Village of Buffalo Grove (1987), 160 Ill.App.3d 455, 461, 111 Ill.Dec. 965, 513 N.E.2d 408.) In a statutory proceeding, if the prescribed conditions are not, in fact, met, the court has no power to confer jurisdiction on itself by making a finding purporting to show that they were met; a recital of jurisdictional facts will not in itself render a judgment conclusive, and jurisdictional facts and findings can be inquired into and proved through a quo warranto proceeding. People ex rel. Goldsbery v. Zoller (1929), 337 Ill. 362, 365, 169 N.E. 228 (petition to organize drainage district).

It is well settled that jurisdictional defects can be raised anytime in purely statutory proceedings of this type, even where an objector did not timely object before the entry of judgment. (In re Carol Stream Fire Protection District (1977), 47 Ill.App.3d 158, 168, 5 Ill.Dec. 544, 361 N.E.2d 867; In re Annexation of Territory to the Village of Palatine (1967), 84 Ill.App.2d 6, 14-15, 228 N.E.2d 117.) A void order, that is, one entered by ...