People ex rel. Burton v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co.

• Decision Date: 05 February 1919
• Docket Number: No. 12090.,12090.
• Citation: People ex rel. Burton v. Corn Prods. Ref. Co., 286 Ill. 226, 121 N.E. 574 (Ill. 1919)
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. BURTON et al. v. CORN PRODUCTS REFINING CO.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

286 Ill. 226

121 N.E. 574

PEOPLE ex rel. BURTON et al.

v.CORN PRODUCTS REFINING CO.

No. 12090.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 18, 1918.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 5, 1919.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Madison County; J. F. Gilham, Judge.

Mandamus by the People, on the relation of C. S. Burton and others, to compel the Corn Products Refining Company, and the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Granite City, to remove obstructions from a street.From a decree granting part of the relief demanded, the Refining Company appeals, and the plaintiff assigns cross-errors.Reversed in part and remanded, with directions.

Burroughs & Ryder, of Edwardsville, Morgan Le Masters, of Granite City, and James M. Sheean, of Chicago, for appellant.

Joseph P. Streuber, State's Atty., and E. G. Hill, both of Edwardsville, and T. T. Hinde, of Madison, for appellees.

STONE, J.

This is a petition for mandamus filed by the people, on the relation of C. L. Burton and others, in the circuit court of Madison county, against the Corn Products Refining Company and the mayor and aldermen of the city of Granite City, for the purpose of compelling them to remove certainalleged obstructions from that portion of Nineteenth street, in said city, extending through and between certain land of the Corn Products Refining Company, which street had been obstructed and later closed by virtue of certain ordinances of said city known as No. 195, authorizing the building of an overhead bridge, and No. 301, vacating said street.A hearing was had on the petition, answer, and replication before the court without a jury.After such hearing and the submission of certain propositions of law by both parties, the court entered judgment for petitioners as to OrdinanceNo. 301, holding the same void and directing the writ to issue against defendants, directing them to reopen said street, but denying the relief as to the other matters under OrdinanceNo. 195.Motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled, and the Corn Products Refining Company brings the cause to this court by appeal on the ground that the validity of a municipal ordinance is involved; the trial court having certified that the public interest so required.

The appellant owns a tract of land upon which its plant is constructed, in all amounting to about 30 acres.It is in two parcels adjacent to either side of Nineteenth street.As its plant was enlarged, new buildings were erected on either side and adjacent to Nineteenth street.The appellant, in writing, petitioned the mayor and aldermen of the city of Granite City to pass OrdinanceNo. 195.Said ordinance in its preamble refers to the petition in the following language:

‘Whereas, Corn Products Refining Company, by a petition dated the 21st day of May, A. D. 1907, and presented to the city council at its meeting of May 27, A. D. 1907, has requested that the said city authorize and permit it to construct, at its own cost, a bridge over and across Nineteenth street, in said city, connecting the syrup house of said company with its can factory to be erected on the opposite side of said street, and extend gas, steam and water pipes and electric wires over and across said street, said petitioner obligating itself to certain liabilities in said petition; and whereas it is deemed advisable and beneficial to said city and those concerned to comply with the spirit of said petition,’ etc.

The ordinance was passed and approved at the special instance and request of appellant on June 4, 1907, and by it accepted on July 1, 1907.Section 1 reads as follows:

‘That the authority, right and privilege be and the same are hereby given to Corn Products Refining Company to construct and maintain, at its own cost, a bridge over and across Nineteenth street, in said city, connecting what is known as the syrup house of said company with its can factory to be erected on the opposite side of Nineteenth street, in said city, and to extend gas, steam and water pipes and electric wires across the aforesaid street.’

The structure or bridge was built and is one of the obstructions complained of and sought to be removed by this petition.

Again, on June 11, 1912, the Corn Products Refining Company presented to the mayor and aldermen of Granite City another petition, in which it set forth that it is the owner of said 30-acre tract and petitions the mayor and aldermen to vacate that portion of Nineteenth street being within the limits of its property, ‘for the reason that the enlargement of our plant necessitates the vacation of that part of said street, and for the further reason that the best interest of the city of Granite City and the inhabitants thereof will be subserved thereby.’On the same day, J. Masserang, an alderman and chairman of the ordinance committee, presented to said committee a certain ordinance known as OrdinanceNo. 301 for its consideration, and asked the other members of said committee to join with him in a written recommendation to the council that said ordinance do pass.The other members of the committee refused to join in the recommendation, and thereupon, on the same day, Masserang submitted the said ordinance with a recommendation that it pass, signed by himself.On that day the council acted on this report as a minority report.After the reading of the ordinance it was on special motion duly carried, placed upon final passage, and passed as read.The mayor vetoed the ordinance, and it was subsequently by the necessary vote passed over his veto on June 18, 1912, and is in the following language:

‘Whereas, Corn Products Refining Company has petitioned the city council of the city of Granite City, Illinois, to vacate that portion of Nineteenth street which extends from the westerly side of the right of way used by the Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis railway to the southwesterly side of Twentieth street, in McCasland & Youree's subdivision of the Wulfemeyer tract, in the city of Granite City Illinois; and whereas it is deemed to be to the best interest of the city of Granite City and the inhabitants thereof, and to all persons affected thereby, that that part of Nineteenth street be vacated; therefore

‘Be it ordained by the city council of the city of Granite City, Illinois:

‘Section 1.That that portion of Ninteenth street being within the limits of the property of the Corn Products Refining Company and extending in a northerly direction from the westerly side of the right of way used by the Chicago, Peoria & St. Louis railway to the southerly side of Twentieth street, in McCasland & Youree's subdivision of the Wulfemeyer tract, in the city of Granite City, Illinois, be and the same is hereby declared vacated.

‘Sec. 2.That that vacation of said portion of Nineteenth street is made subject to the rights, uses and interest of the City Water Company of East St. Louis and Granite City in said street, and the Corn Products Refining Company shall save and indemnify the city of Granite City from any and all damages caused from the vacating of said street.

‘Sec. 3.All ordinances or part of ordinances in conflict with this ordinance are hereby declared repealed.

‘Sec. 4.This ordinance shall be in full force and effect from and after its passage and approval.’

Soon after the passage and approval of this ordinance, the appellant fenced that portion of Nineteenth street and has since excluded the public from the same, except that it has recognized the rights reserved in said ordinance.This obstruction is complained of and sought to be removed by this proceeding.

At the time of the passage and approval of each of said ordinances, there was in force and effect an ordinance making it illegal to place any building, fence, or other obstruction upon any of the streets of said city and providing a penalty for the same.That ordinance was introduced in evidence by stipulation.Notice was served on the city and the appellant prior to the filling of the petition for mandamus herein, requiring them to remove all obstructions and open said street.

The circuit court, in effect, held OrdinanceNo. 301 void and directed that a writ issue requiring the removal of the obstructions from Nineteenth street, except a certain overhead structure authorized by OrdinanceNo. 195, and refused to hold OrdinanceNo. 195 void.

It is contended by the appellant that the judgment is an illegal interference with the exercise of the discretionary and legislative authority vested in cities and villages to vacate streets; that authority to vacate streets is lodged exclusively with the city council; that OrdinanceNo. 301 was legally passed; and that incompetent parol evidence was admitted, over appellant's objections, to prove the purpose of OrdinanceNo. 301 to be for the private use of appellant.Cross-errors are assigned and argued by appellees that the trial court erred in excepting from the judgment a certain overhead structure authorized by OrdinanceNo. 195 and in refusing to hold said ordinance void.

The questions to be decided here are as to the validity of the two ordinances, No. 195andNo. 301.The validity of these ordinances depends upon whether or not the city council had power to pass them.If it had such power, they are valid even though they may have been unwise, as courts have no power to review acts of the legislative department which involve only the question of motives actuating the exercise of legislative discretion, except in cases where there is such an abuse of that discretion that it may be said to be no exercise of discretion at all.People v. Carlock, 198 Ill. 150, 65 N. E. 109.

Did the city council in this case have power to pass OrdinanceNo. 195, permitting appellants to build an overhead bridge across the street in question?If it did not have that power, then the question is not one of legislative discretion or motive in the exercise thereof, as there can be no exercise of discretion when there is no power to act at all.

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