People ex rel. Campau v. Circuit Court for County of Wayne, in Chancery

• Decision Date: 30 May 1863
• Citation: 11 Mich. 393
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: The People on the relation of Daniel J. Campau v. The Circuit Court for the County of Wayne, in Chancery

11 Mich. 393

The People on the relation of Daniel J. Campau v. The Circuit Court for the County of Wayne, in Chancery

Supreme Court of Michigan

May 30, 1863

Heard May 12, 1863; May 13, 1863 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Motion on behalf of Daniel J. Campau and Francis Palms, two of the defendants to a suit pending in the Circuit Court for the county of Wayne in Chancery, for a writ of prohibition, to be directed to said court. The petition therefor had attached to it a copy of the bill in that cause, from which the following facts appear:

The complainants are children and presumptive heirs at law of Joseph Campau, who is upwards of 94 years old.

In 1860, the relators, Daniel J. Campau, who is also one of the children of said Joseph, and Francis Palms, who is a son-in-law, together with the wife of said Francis, and several other of his children, applied to the Probate Court for the county of Wayne, under § 3311, Compiled Laws, for the appointment of a guardian of said Joseph, as mentally incompetent, by reason of old age, to have the care and management of his property.

Such proceedings were thereupon had, that the Judge of Probate, on the tenth day of December, 1860, made an order or decree, finding such incompetency, and appointing Henry C. Knight guardian.

From this order, an appeal was taken in the name of said Joseph, by one of the complainants, Alexander T. Campau, purporting to act on behalf and as agent for said Joseph, and also for himself, Alexander T., individually.

Subsequently, by an act passed in 1862, said § 3311 was so amended as to empower the Judge of Probate, in case of an appeal from his action in appointing a guardian under said section, in his discretion to appoint a special guardian of the supposed non compos, to act pending the appeal and litigation relative to the appointment of general guardian, said special guardian to have like power and perform like duties as a general guardian, and no appeal to be taken from such appointment.

Under this act the relator, Daniel J., was, in January, 1862, appointed special guardian of said Joseph.

He thereupon assumed to appear for and represent said Joseph in said appeal, and persuaded said Alexander T. to dismiss his individual appeal.

Complainants, Theodore J. and Dennis J., and defendant James J. Campau, then petitioned the Circuit Court, under § 3636, Compiled Laws, for leave to appeal from said order. Leave was granted, and the appeal taken and perfected.

The bill alleges that the relators resisted all efforts to bring such appeal to trial. A trial however was reached at the last February term of said court, and that part of the said order of the Probate Court, which appointed said Knight guardian, was set aside, on the ground that, under the circumstances, said Knight was not a proper person to act as guardian of said Joseph, and said Dennis was appointed guardian, and the matter remitted to the Probate Court to fix and approve the bonds of said Dennis, and for further proceedings.

Thereupon said relator, Daniel J., sued out a writ of error to this court, and when application was made to the Probate Court to proceed and fix and approve the bond of said Dennis, objected because of the pendency of said writ of error; and the Judge of Probate declined to proceed.

The bill further alleges, that said Daniel J. has interposed all obstacles in his power to the appointment of a general guardian, in order to retain his position as special guardian.

That he is an unfit person for the position of guardian of said Joseph, and that he is grossly mismanaging the property of the estate.

The bill also shows that a petition had been filed by complainants or some of them in the Probate Court, for the removal of Daniel J. from the guardianship for cause alleged; that Daniel J. excepted to this petition, the Judge of Probate overruled his exceptions, and ordered him to answer, from which order he appealed to the Circuit Court, whereupon the petitioners discontinued the appeal.

The bill prays for injunction, prohibiting said Daniel J. from interfering with the estate of said Joseph, and that a receiver may be appointed of said estate pending the litigation; that said Daniel J. be removed from the position of special guardian, and that a general guardian of the person and estate of said Joseph may be appointed.

Upon filing this bill, complainants moved for an injunction and receiver as prayed.

Daniel J. answered, denying jurisdiction. Palms demurred, and the Circuit Judge' assuming to entertain jurisdiction upon the motion for injunction and receiver, said Daniel J. and Palms apply to this court for writ of prohibition.

Writ denied.

L. Bishop and A. Pond. for the motion:

I. The Circuit Court in Chancery has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of said bill of complaint, and hence no jurisdiction to grant an injunction and appoint a receiver as prayed.

The object of the bill is, as its prayer indicates, the removal of Daniel J. as special guardian and the appointment of a general guardian, and the injunction and receiver are asked pending the litigation in that behalf under this bill.

The Constitution gives to the Circuit Courts original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal not excepted in the Constitution and not prohibited by law, and appellate jurisdiction from all inferior courts and tribunals, and supervisory control over the same.

The statute, Comp. L., § 3475, provides that "the powers and jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts in Chancery, shall be coextensive with the powers and jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery in England, with the exceptions, additions and limitations created and imposed by the Constitution and laws of the State."

This is very broad and general language, and must, we think, be taken with a qualification. It never was intended to confer upon our courts, and they have never assumed to exercise, all the powers and jurisdiction exercised in England by or through "the Court of Chancery:" Goldsmith's Eq., 6 et seq.; 3 Bl. Com., 47; 1 Story Eq. Juris., § 38.

1. Our construction of the statute is, that by the Court of Chancery in England we are to understand the Court of Chancery as a Court of Equity.

2. But as matter of fact, the Court of Chancery in England as such never had or exercised jurisdiction over idiots and lunatics and their committees.

This jurisdiction was vested in the Chancellor or person holding the great seal: Shelf. on Lunatics, 11, 12, 15 et seq., also 25, 166, 784; Stock. on Non Compos Mentis, 79, 125; Story Eq. Juris., §§ 1334, 1335 and 1336 et seq.; Philips ex parte, 19 Ves. 122; Oxenden v. Lord Compton, 4 Brown Ch., 231; Oakley, Ex., v. Long, 10 Humph. 254.

It will, we presume, be admitted that the power to appoint the committee was in the Chancellor or keeper of the great seal, by warrant under the sign manual. But it will be contended, from some loose expressions to be found in the books, and especially in 2 Sch. & Lef., 436, that the control and direction of the committee after appointment is in the court. This is not so.

1. Appeal from all orders in lunacy, is to the King in council, and not to Lords in Parliament: Shelf. p. 12; 3 P. Wms., 108; 2 Ves. 72; 4 Bro. Ch., 231; Story Eq. Juris., § 1364 note 2; 10 Humph. 257.

2. Acts of Parliament relative to the subject of lunatics and idiots and their committees, distinguish between the "Chancellor" and the "Court of Chancery:" Shelf., 318, 323, 332; Stock. on Lunatics, 212, 241, 249; Hill on Trustees, 95.

3. Whilst it is true that the language frequently used in the books would seem to warrant the conclusion that the control of the committees is in the court, as in Shelford on Lunatics, 17, yet when essential the distinction is made: Shel., 166; 6 Ves. 782; 1 B. & B., 241.

The Court of Chancery in England having never exercised jurisdiction over lunatics and idiots or their committees, our Legislature acted with intelligence and forethought in providing for the vesting of this jurisdiction in some tribunal, as they have in the Probate Court.

The whole subject of guardian and ward is covered by the statute. Compiled Laws § 3225 makes provision for guardians.

The jurisdiction of the Probate Court is exclusive. That such was the understanding of the Legislature is shown by Compiled Laws, § 3310. See also Blanton v. King, 2 How. Miss., 857; Steen v. Steen, 25 Miss. 513.

The bill is not, as may be claimed, a bill to protect property pending litigation in another court.

There is no litigation pending in the Probate Court for removal of Daniel J. from the position of special guardian.

What is alleged relative to the commencement and discontinuance of proceedings for his removal is wholly immaterial.

The absurdity of entertaining a bill of this character other than as collateral to proceedings in the Probate Court for the removal of Daniel J., is apparent in this; that Daniel J. can not institute proceedings in the Probate Court, to test the question as to whether or not he ought to be removed; and if complainants succeed in getting a receiver appointed under this bill, it will not be for their interest to do so; and thus if the Court of Chancery can exercise jurisdiction and appoint a receiver under this bill, Daniel J. may be deprived of his rights as guardian, without any possibility of testing such rights.

We submit there is no jurisdiction in the Circuit Circuit to entertain this bill. And, hence:

II. We are entitled to the writ of prohibition. The Constitution gives the Supreme Court general supervisory control of all inferior courts. Section 3382 Comp. L. authorizes ...