People ex rel. Carpentier v. Arthur Morgan Trucking Co.

Decision Date20 March 1959
Docket NumberNo. 35089,35089
PartiesPEOPLE ex rel. Charles F. CARPENTIER, Secretary of State, Appellee, v. ARTHUR MORGAN TRUCKING COMPANY, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Drach & Terrell, Springfield (George E. Drach and Raymond L. Terrell, Springfield, of counsel), for appellant.

Latham Castle, Atty. Gen. (William C. Wines and Burton Berkley, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

DAILY, Chief Justice.

This direct appeal, involving the revenue, is prosecuted by Arthur Morgan Trucking Company, a Missouri corporation, from a judgment of the circuit court of Sangamon County finding that it is indebted to the State of Illinois in the amount of $9,112.50 for 1952 motor vehicle fees and taxes pertaining to 17 trucks. When appellant applied for licenses in December, 1951, the Secretary of State had been enjoined from administering or enforcing certain amendments to the Motor Vehicle Act that were to become effective January 1, 1952, Laws 1951, p. 1147, and, accordingly, appellant paid a $5 registration fee for each vehicle and $821.41 in privilege taxes computed under the act as it existed prior to amendment. The validity of the amendments having been subsequently established, (Bode v. Barrett, 412 Ill. 204, 106 N.E.2d 521) the Secretary of State instituted this action to collect mileage taxes under rates established in such amendments. Cf. People ex rel. Carpentier v. Lange, 8 Ill.2d 437, 134 N.E.2d 266; People ex rel. Carpentier v. Treloar Trucking Co., 13 Ill.2d 596, 150 N.E.2d 624.

Appellant admits its liability for one vehicle, in the amount of $714, but denies liability for the balance on the ground that reciprocity statutes of Illinois and Missouri, and its compliance with the registration laws of Missouri, entitled it to operate the trucks in interstate commerce on Illinois highways without the need of Illinois plates or the payment of Illinois fees and taxes. Likewise, appellant admits making application for Illinois licenses and the partial payment of fees but contends that it did not thereby waive its rights under the reciprocity statutes for reason that the application and payment were made under duress and economic compulsion. On this appeal the State of Illinois does not controvert the claim that reciprocity existed, or that appellant was entitled to its benefits, but asserts that the Illinois applications were voluntarily make, without duress and under a mistake of law, therefore rendering appellant liable to pay in full for the licensing privilege extended.

Generally speaking, taxes paid under a mistake of law and not made under duress cannot be recovered in the absence of a statutory provision for refund, (People ex rel. City of Highland Park v. McKibbin, 380 Ill. 447, 44 N.E.2d 449,) and it is also held that where a person voluntarily accepts the benefits of a statute, he will, as a general rule, thereafter be barred from challenging its validity, provided no question of public policy is involved; however, where one is incorrectly compelled to pay money under pressure of severe statutory penalties or to avoid disastrous effects to business, the payment in involuntary and the money paid may be recovered. People ex rel. Carpentier v. Treloar Trucking Co., 13 Ill.2d 596, 150 N.E.2d 624; Benzoline Motor Fuel Co. v. Bollinger, 353 Ill. 600, 187 N.E. 657; Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railway Co. v. Miller, 309 Ill. 257, 140 N.E. 823. When these principles are applied to the facts and contentions in this case, the initial question for determination becomes whether or not appellant's acceptance of the Illinois licensing provisions was voluntary or involuntary. The evidence on this issue is in conflict and although the trial court made no specific finding with reference thereto, this court may, on direct appeal, consider both errors of law and of fact. Ill.Rev.Stat.1957, chap. 110, par. 92(3)(a) and (b); Bradish v. Yocum, 130 Ill. 386, 391, 23 N.E. 114.

Factual background discloses that for 1952 and many years prior thereto, appellant was a Missouri corporation having offices in St. Louis, Missouri. During such period appellant engaged in a trucking business limited to the hauling of heavy commodities, construction materials and equipment. It did not, in 1952 or in previous years, maintain any place of business in Illinois, although it did, in 1951 and 1952, operate 17 of its fleet of 125 trucks into Illinois for the purpose of hauling sand, rock and general contractor equipment from producing plants and quarries in or near East St. Louis, Illinois, to construction sites in the St. Louis area of Missouri. Additionally, some contractor supplies were hauled from St. Louis to points in and around East St. Louis and, whether the cargoes originated in Illinois or Missouri, it is undisputed that all movements of the trucks were interestate. All of the 17 trucks used for the foregoing purposes were licensed by appellant in Missouri for 1952 and prior years as 'local commercial vehicles,' a classification under Missouri law which permitted travel within 25 miles from the limits of the city in which the vehicle was licensed, in this case St. Louis. Fred Johnson, an employee of the Illinois Secretary of State, who was called as an adverse witness by appellant, testified that it was his duty to determine matters of reciprocity in 1952, and stated that in such year Illinois recognized the Missouri local commercial licenses under the reciprocity statutes to the extent that Missouri vehicles bearing such license would be permitted to use in Illinois any balance of the 25-mile limitation upon them that had not been used up in Missouri operation. With the exception of one truck, which did make intrastate movements in Illinois and for which appellant admits liability, there is no evidence that any of the trucks involved operated in Illinois beyond the 25-mile limit to which reciprocity was given.

On several occasions during 1951 drivers of trucks displaying the Missouri local plates were arrested in Illinois for failure to have Illinois plates even though such trucks were operating in interstate commerce within the 25-mile limit. The arrests resulted in fines paid by appellant, as well as a disruption of business, and the situation prompted its vice-president, Arthur Morgan, Jr., to visit the Illinois license bureau on December 18, 1951, for the purpose of discussing reciprocity as to the 25-mile plates. According to Morgan, he first spoke with John Hamdtmann and told the latter it was his understanding that the Missouri plates his company used would be recognized under reciprocity. However, by Morgan's version, Hamdtmann advised him that Illinois would not recognize the Missouri local plates, and that appellant's drivers would be subject to arrest if Illinois plates were not obtained. Similar statements were attributed to Cal Gordon, then chief investigator of the motor division, to whom Morgan says he was referred by Hamdtmann. Morgan's testimony was corroborated in all respects by Alfred Gambill, the general manager of a large St. Louis drayage company, who was in Springfield to discuss a similar licensing problem and who testified he was presented during the conversations of Morgan with Hamdtmann and Gordon. Several days later appellant...

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    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
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    ...either invalid or inapplicable to him. Relying upon Benzoline Motor Fuel Co. v. Bollinger, 353 Ill. 600 , and People ex rel. Carpentier v. Arthur Morgan Trucking Co., 16 Ill.2d 313 , the court held that payments made to avoid 'disastrous effects to business' were involuntary and that the mo......
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    ...position and action in this cause." Treloar, 13 Ill.2d at 601, 150 N.E.2d 624. Similarly, in People ex rel. Carpentier v. Arthur Morgan Trucking Co., 16 Ill.2d 313, 157 N.E.2d 41 (1959), the State sought mileage taxes for trucks operated in Illinois by the defendant Missouri-based trucking ......
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