People ex rel. Carr v. Martin

• Court: New York Court of Appeals
• Citation: 286 N.Y. 27,35 N.E.2d 636
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. CARR v. MARTIN, Warden.
• Decision Date: 12 June 1941

286 N.Y. 27
35 N.E.2d 636

PEOPLE ex rel. CARR
v.
MARTIN, Warden.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 12, 1941.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division; Third Department.

Proceeding by the People, on the relation of Chester W. Carr, against Walter B. Martin, as Warden of Clinton Prison, for a writ of habeas corpus. An order of the Clinton County Court, dismissing the writ and remanding relator to the custody of the Warden of Clinton Prison, was reversed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in an order entered January 31, 1941, which sustained the writ and directed the relator's discharge, 261 App.Div. 865, 24 N.Y.S.2d 729, and the People appeal.

Order of the Appellate Division reversed, that of the County Court affirmed, and relator remanded to custody.

[35 N.E.2d 637]

John J. Bennett, Jr., Atty. Gen. (Henry Epstein and Patrick H. Clune, both of Albany, and Everett D. Mereness, of Sharon Springs, of counsel), for appellant.

Morton M. Z. Lynn, of Albany, for respondent.

LEHMAN, Chief Judge.

The relator was indicted by the grand jury of Saratoga county upon charges of grand larceny. The indictment contained five counts. In two counts he was accused of grand larceny, first degree; in three counts he was charged with grand larceny, second degree. In March, 1940, he pleaded guilty of grand larceny, second degree, as charged in the third count which accused him of the appropriation of five rings ‘owned by Rose Davin.’ He was sentenced upon that plea to imprisonment for the term of not less than five years nor more than ten years as a second offender. In habeas corpus proceedings the relator thereafter challenged the jurisdiction of the court to sentence him to imprisonment upon his plea of guilt of that charge.

In his petition for a writ of habeas corpus the relator urges that the court was without jurisdiction and its judgment invalid on many grounds. Upon this appeal we need consider only the allegations ‘that the complainant herein named as ‘Rose Davin’ was and is the defendant's legal lawful wife ‘Rose Carr.“ And ‘that the defendant could not steal his own property and the property alleged to have been stolen is and was the joint property of the petitioner, Charles (Chester) W. Carr, and his legal lawful wife, Rose Davin Carr.’ The Clinton County Court dismissed the writ. The Appellate Division reversed and sustained the writ, stating: ‘It appears that he was convicted of the crime of grand larceny for having stolen two rings from his wife. A husband may not be convicted for larceny from his wife.’ 261 App.Div. 865, 24 N.Y.S.2d 729.

It has been said that ‘at common law crimes against the property of another cannot be committed by husband or wife against the property of the other, owing to the unity of husband and wife and the rights of the husband in the property of the wife.’ 30 Corpus Juris page 715, and cases there cited. Under the provisions of the Domestic Relations Law (Consol.Laws, ch. 14) a married woman has ‘all the rights in respect to property, real or personal * * * and to make contracts in respect thereto with any person, including her husband * * * as if she were unmarried.’ s 51. ‘Husband and wife may convey or transfer real or personal property directly, the one to the other, without the intervention of a third person.’ s 56. ‘A married woman has a right of action against her husband for his wrongful or tortious acts resulting to her in any personal injury as defined in section thirty-seven-a of the general construction law, or resulting in injury to her property, as if they were unmarried.’ s 57. These and other statutes have so changed the status of husband and wife that few vestiges are left of the common-law concept of the unity of husband and wife, or of the husband's

[35 N.E.2d 638]

right to possess and control his wife's chattels; and it was upon these concepts that the conclusion that neither husband nor wife can commit a crime through appropriation or destruction of the property of the other was based. The question whether that common-law rule survives the statutory changes in the status and mutual rights and obligations of husband and wife is not free from doubt. No such question was raised at the trial of the indictment and we do not reach that question unless it may be raised in habeas corpus proceedings.

A person claiming that he is unlawfully imprisoned is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus ‘where he * * * is detained by virtue of the final judgment or decree of a competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction.’ Civil Practice Act, s 1231. Here the relator is imprisoned by virtue of the judgment of conviction of the County Court of Saratoga County. That court has general jurisdiction to try indictments for felonies. The indictment sufficiently charges that the relator is guilty of larceny in the second degree committed as set forth therein. The relator pleaded guilty to the charge. The sentence imposed is in accordance with the statute defining the punishment that may be imposed for the offense charged. The relator claims that the judgment is nevertheless void because a husband cannot be guilty of larceny by appropriation of property belonging to his wife and that no court has jurisdiction to pass judgment of imprisonment upon an accused where the acts charged do not constitute a crime.

An order or judgment of a court acting without jurisdiction is entirely void and a person imprisoned by virtue of such an order or judgment may obtain his release by habeas corpus proceedings. A final order or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, though erroneous, is not void if the court had jurisdiction of the person of the accused and jurisdiction to try the charge made against him. The statute in express terms places that limitation upon the jurisdiction of a court to examine in habeas corpus proceedings the validity of a sentence of imprisonment passed upon an accused by another court, and even without a statute there are analogous limitations of jurisdiction ‘arising from the nature and objects of the writ itself, as defined by the common law, from which its name and incidents are derived.’ Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 375, 25 L.Ed. 717. In that case the Supreme Court of the United States said: ‘The only ground on which this court, or any court, without some special statute authorizing it, will give relief on habeas corpus to a prisoner under conviction and sentence of another court is the want of jurisdiction in such court over the person or the cause, or some other matter rendering its proceedings void.’ 100 U.S. at page 375, 25 L.Ed....