People ex rel. Castle v. Spivey, s. 34229

CourtSupreme Court of Illinois
Citation10 Ill.2d 586,141 N.E.2d 321
Docket Number34230,Nos. 34229,s. 34229
PartiesThe PEOPLE ex rel. Latham CASTLE, Attorney General, Petitioner, v. Quinten SPIVEY, Circuit Judge, Respondent.
Decision Date20 March 1957

Page 321

141 N.E.2d 321
10 Ill.2d 586
The PEOPLE ex rel. Latham CASTLE, Attorney General, Petitioner,
v.
Quinten SPIVEY, Circuit Judge, Respondent.
Nos. 34229, 34230.
Supreme Court of Illinois.
March 20, 1957.

[10 Ill.2d 588]

Page 322

Latham Castle, Atty. Gen., Springfield, (Fred G. Leach, Decatur, and Edwin A. Strugala, Chicago, of counsel), for petitioner.

John M. Karns, John M. Karns, Jr., East St. Louis, and Paul H. Nehrt, Chester, for respondent.

DAVIS, Justice.

By leave of this court, two original petitions for mandamus have been filed by the petitioner to compel the respondent, Quinten Spivey, judge of the circuit court of Randolph County, to expunge orders entered by him in habeas corpus proceedings, by which he discharged Willard Schray and Fred William Bujenski from the custody of the warden of the Illinois State Penitentiary at Menard. The petitions for writ of habeas corpus, and the returns thereto, which include transcripts of the original proceedings in which Schray and Bujenski were convicted and committed to the penitentiary, and others thereafter made by the parole board, are set forth in the mandamus petitions. Respondent filed motions to dismiss these petitions which raise common questions of law, and accordingly the cases have been consolidated for opinion.

Willard Schray was indicted for the crime of armed robbery at the March, 1934, term of the circuit court of Lake County. The record shows that he shot the victim of the robbery three times without provocation, and that [10 Ill.2d 589] he had been previously

Page 323

imprisoned in Indiana for larceny and manslaughter. On April 26, 1934, he entered a plea of guilty and was sentenced to the Illinois State Penitentiary, there to remain 'until discharged by due course of law.' The statutory penalty for armed robbery was then, as now, imprisonment in the penitentiary 'for any term of years not less than one year or for life.' (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1955, chap. 38, par. 501.) On July 13, 1956, Schray filed petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he had been convicted and sentenced for a term of one year to life; that he had served in excess of 22 years of his sentence and that he had 'paid the full penalty for said crime and is therefore entitled to release and discharge from further imprisonment.' He further alleged that since his imprisonment he had been subjected to cruel, unjust, severe, excessive and inhuman punishment by the Department of Public Safety and the Parole and Pardon Board in violation of his constitutional rights, in that the board had repeatedly refused to grant him a parole, and that by reason thereof he was being deprived of his liberty without due process of law in violation of the applicable provisions of the State and Federal constitutions. The warden, by the Attorney General and State's Attorney of Randolph County, made return to the writ of habeas corpus, and therein admitted the allegations concerning commitment and imprisonment; alleged that the prisoner was being held by virtue of the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County; denied that the prisoner was being deprived of his liberty without due process of law; alleged that the sentence imposed was for the maximum term of life and that the term had not expired; that parole is an act of clemency which the prisoner, as a matter of law, has no right to invoke at his own will, but is a matter of discretion to be exercised by the Parole and Pardon Board; and prayed that the petition be dismissed and the writ quashed. The return was not traversed. On the return day in the habeas corpus proceedings, the [10 Ill.2d 590] respondent, Judge Spivey, entered an order finding that Schray had duly served the time legally imposed upon him and discharged the prisoner from the custody of the warden.

The order discharging Bujenski was entered on the same day, contained a similar finding, and likewise discharged the prisoner. On October 28, 1935, a jury of the circuit court of Jefferson County found Bujenski guilty of the crimes of burglary and larceny. The theft involved a small amount of corn, and there is no proof that the defendant was armed at the time. The record recites prior forgery, petit larceny and drunkenness. On October 31, 1935, he was sentenced to the Illinois State Penitentiary 'for a period of years of not less than the minimum of one year nor more than the maximum (which may extend to life).' He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court of Randolph County on July 7, 1956; alleged his indictment, conviction and sentence in the circuit court of Jefferson County; and the petition contained further allegations similar to those of the Schray petition. The return filed by the warden was in form and substance like that filed in the Schray case. Exhibits attached to the return showed that Bujenski had been conditionally paroled four times during the period of his confinement, and on each occasion had been returned to prison for violation of parole. Bujenski's traverse to the return admitted that he was being held by virtue of the judgment of the circuit court sentencing him for a term of one year to life, and that such sentence was for the maximum term provided by law, but reasserted that he was being held in violation of his constitutional rights; and denied that parole is an act of clemency and that the Parole and Pardon Board has unlimited discretion in that respect.

The respondent to the mandamus petitions does not question the validity of the original judgments of conviction of Schray and Bujenski and his motions to dismiss the petitions admit all of the material facts as set forth. [10 Ill.2d 591] The petitioner for mandamus argues that the respective petitions for writ

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of habeas corpus contained no allegations which, if true, entitled the prisoners to discharge, or which authorized the court to entertain them; that the orders of discharge entered by respondent were in excess of the jurisdiction of the court and are void. Respondent contends that though the original convictions were valid, he...

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27 cases
  • Heirens v. Mizell
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • 24 Febrero 1984
    ......ex rel. Scott v. Ill. Parole and Pardon Bd., 669 F.2d 1185 (7th ... In People v. James, 46 Ill.2d 71, 263 N.E.2d 5 (1970) the Illinois ...191, 79 N.E.2d 479 (1948); People v. Spivey, 10 Ill.2d 586, 141 N.E.2d 321 (1957); People ex rel. ......
  • People v. Lang
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 20 Junio 1978
    ...253 N.E.2d 378; People ex rel. Skinner v. Randolph (1966), 35 Ill.2d 589, 590, 221 N.E.2d 279; People ex rel. Castle v. Spivey (1957), 10 Ill.2d 586, 593, 141 N.E.2d 321.) The Myers court commented "This defendant, handicapped as he is and facing an indefinite commitment because of the pend......
  • Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Mosele, 48876
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • 1 Junio 1977
    ...appellate process. (People ex rel. Sears v. Romiti (1971), 50 Ill.2d 51, 55, 277 N.E.2d 705; People ex rel. Castle v. Spivey (1957), 10 Ill.2d 586, 591, 141 N.E.2d 321.) Mandamus does not lie where the result is to fragment the appeal. (People ex rel. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. ......
  • Hill v. Walker
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • 24 Marzo 2011
    ...296 N.E.2d 725 (1973); People ex rel. Jones v. Brantley, 45 Ill.2d 335, 337–38, 259 N.E.2d 33 (1970); People ex rel. Castle v. Spivey, 10 Ill.2d 586, 594, 141 N.E.2d 321 (1957). The Board is an administrative agency created by the legislature. Hanrahan, 174 Ill.2d at 274, 220 Ill.Dec. 339, ......
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