People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff

• Decision Date: 11 March 1948
• Docket Number: No. 30115.,30115.
• Citation: 77 N.E.2d 693,399 Ill. 282
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. CHICAGO BAR ASS'N et al. v. TINKOFF.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

399 Ill. 282

77 N.E.2d 693

PEOPLE ex rel. CHICAGO BAR ASS'N et al.

v.TINKOFF.

No. 30115.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 22, 1948.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing March 11, 1948.

Original information in contempt by the People on the relation of Chicago Bar Association againt Paysoff Tinkoff for unauthorized practice of law.

Paysoff Tinkoff found guilty of contempt.Charles Leviton, of Chicago (Samuel M. Kane, Douglass Pillinger and Abner Goldenson, all of Chicago, of counsel), for relators.

Paysoff Tinkoff, of Chicago, pro se.

MURPHY, Chief Justice.

Prior to the June term, 1937, of this court, Paysoff Tinkoff was a duly licensed attorney at the bar of this court and his name appeared on the roll of attorneys. During said term he was disbarred. In March, 1944, and again in November, 1946, he petitioned this court to have his name reinstated on the roll of attorneys. Both petitions were denied. During the March term, 1947, leave was granted to file an information against Paysoff Tinkoff on the relation of the Chicago Bar Association and certain of its members serving on a committee for unauthorized practice of the law. The purpose sought was to obtain a rule on Tinkoff to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt of this court. An order was issued as prayed, and on May 1, 1947, Tinkoff filed a motion to dismiss the information and on the same day filed and answer.

The information set forth certain acts of respondent in connection with three suits started and prosecuted in the superior court of Cook County, which conduct it was alleged constituted the practicing of law. The motion to dismiss raised an issue as to whether the acts charged was sufficient to show that he was practicing law. The issues raised by the answer are not materially different from those raised by the motion to dismiss, and the discussion of the facts will be confined to those admitted by respondent's answer to be true.

Respondent maintained an office on the first floor at 6353 North Clark Street, Chicago. By letterheads and advertisement on two of the office windows respondent held himself out to the public as a tax accountant, specializing in Federal and State tax matters. He was a licensed real-estate broker and such occupation was referred to in the lettering on one of the windows. It is not claimed that his activities as a real-estate agent or as an accountant specializing in Federal and State tax matters constituted the practice of law, but it does appear that in one of the cases respondent first contacted the parties whom he is alleged to have represented as an attorney, while engaged in assisting them on income tax matters. On one of the windows of his office opening onto the street was the following advertisement: ‘Specialist in long term leases and trust conveyances.’

The exact date does not appear, but it was some time between February 24, 1946, and March 30 following, that respondent contacted Peter Harles and Christine Harles, husband and wife, while conferring in reference to their income tax matters. According to respondent's version, he learned at that meeting that the Harleses formerly owned some real estate which they had conveyed to one John Huske on February 24, 1946. It is stated in his answer that his inquiry as to such conveyance was to ascertain the circumstances surrounding the execution of the deed and to determine whether there was a profit or loss to be reported in their income tax return. The motive for the inquiry is not matterial but what he did for the Harleses thereafter is pertinent. Huske conveyed the property to Samuel M. Fleischer and Thirza Fleischer. The consideration the Harleses received for the conveyance was $2,000.

On March 30, 1946, respondent drafted a notice addressed to Samuel H. Fleischer and one William E. Marks, doing business as R. W. Roberts Real Estate Company. It was entitled a rescission of oral contract and warranty deed executed February 24, 1946. It was signed Peter Harles and Christine Harles, by Paysoff Tinkoff, ‘Real Estate Agent.’ The substance of the notice was that the Harleses had learned that Huske purchased the property for Fleischer, and that they had recently ascertained that Marks who had been the Harleses' agent was also the agent of the purchaser and that Marks had concealed such facts from them. It was also stated that the conveyance had been made subject to a right of redemption as in foreclosure suits, and the Harleses thereby offered to return the $2,000 previously paid. The condition of the tender was that the deeds were to be canceled and title revested in the Harleses. It was further stated that the notice did not purport to set forth all the fraud and conspiracy that had transpired in the transaction, but it concluded with a warning that if no reply was received to the communication in three days, it would be cause for instituting legal proceedings to set aside the entire transaction.

Two instruments were signed by the Harleses on August 31, 1946. One assigned, transferred and delivered all their right, title and interest in and to the property transferred February 24, 1946, to John Huske, to ‘Paysoff Tinkoff, legal and natural guardian of Paysoff Tinkoff, Jr., Ward and Son.’ The assignment also included all rights the assignors had against William E. Marks, R. W. Roberts Real Estate Company, Samuel H. Fleischer and his wife Thirza Fleischer. The considerator for the assignment was stated to be $1. It granted ‘Paysoff Tinkoff, Guardian, any and all rights to institute any proceedings at law or in equity to enforce any and all rights which may exist in our behalf against the parties aforementioned, and which rights are transferred hereby, with the specific understanding that the said Peter Harles and Christine Schaack Harles, the assignors herein shall not in any way be directly or indirectly liable for any costs or expenses in the prosecution of any suit or suits at law or in equity to enforce said rights.’

The second instrument signed by the Harleses as parties of the first part and Paysoff Tinkoff, guardian, party of the second part, was a contract which recited that in consideration of the assignment of all right, title and interest which the Harleses had in the property transferred to Huske, and all their rights they had against Marks and the Roberts Real Estate Company ‘that the said parties of the first part should retain as their own the $2,000 which they had received for the conveyance to Huske on February 24, 1946.’ It was further agreed that the Harleses ‘shall not incur any liability for costs or expenses in prosecuting any suits to enforce the rights of said parties of the first part against said John Huske,’ and others. It was further agreed that the Harleses would be entitled to receive as a part of their consideration ‘10% of any and all profits that may be realized by the assignee, Paysoff Tinkoff, Guardian of Paysoff Tinkoff, Jr., in the successful prosecution of any proceeding or proceedings, after determining the costs of the property plus the reasonable value of the services rendered in the prosecution of said claims or proceedings, as the basis for establishing the costs, in the determination of the said 10% profit aforementioned.’

On September 4, 1946, respondent filed an action in the superior court of Cook County entitled ‘Paysoff Tinkoff, Guardian of Paysoff Tinkoff, Jr., Ward, Assignee of Peter Harles and Christine Schaack Harles v. William H. Fleischer, Thirza Fleischer, his wife, William E. Marks, R. W. Roberts, d/b/a Roberts Real Estate Company and John Huske,’ defendants. The suit was an action to vacate, set aside and cancel the warranty deed executed on February 24, 1946, to Huske. It further appears that after said cause was...