People ex rel. City of Chicago v. Hummel

Decision Date17 April 1905
Citation74 N.E. 68,215 Ill. 43
PartiesPEOPLE ex rel. CITY OF CHICAGO v. HUMMEL, Treasurer.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Mandamus by the people, on relation of the city of Chicago, against Ernst Hummel, to compel respondent, as city treasurer of the city of Chicago, to transfer a certain sum of money from the fund derived from the sale of permanent improvement bonds to a special fund to be used by the city to pay outstanding interest-bearing anticipation warrants. Writ denied.

Edgar Bronson Tolman, Corp. Counsel, and William D. Barge, Asst. Corp. Counsel, for petitioner.

John C. Richberg, for defendant.

HAND, J.

This is a petition for a writ of mandamus, filed in thid court in the name of the people, upon the relation of the city of Chicago, against Ernst Hummel, the treasurer of said city, to coerce him, as such treasurer, to honor the warrant of the mayor and city comptroller of said city bearing date November 23, 1904, directing him to transfer $672,496.45 from the fund derived from the sale of permanent improvement bonds issued by said city pursuant to the terms of an ordinance bearing date July 18, 1904, for the purpose of making permanent municipal improvements in said city, to a special fund, said special fund to be used by the city to take up outstanding interest-bearing tax-anticipation warrants, the proceeds derived from which were used, prior to the issue and sale of said permanent improvement bonds, for the making of permanent municipal improvements in said city. A demurrer was interposed to the petition, and it is contended by the respondent that he should not be required to honor such warrant and make such transfer, as he urges the fund arising from the sale of said permanent improvement bonds now in his hands as city treasurer can lawfully be used only for the purpose of paying for permanent municipal improvements made by the city subsequent to the issue of said permanent improvement bonds, and that to require him to honor said warrant and transfer said permanent improvement fund, or any part thereof, to a special fund with which to redeem said tax-anticipation warrants, would be a wrongful diversion of said fund, although the fund received by the city upon said tax-anticipation warrants was used by the city with which to pay for permanent municipal improvements made by the city.

We are of the opinion the contention of the respondent is sound, and that the fund in his hands derived from the sale of said permanent improvement bonds can only be used by the city to pay for permanent municipal improvements made subsequent to July 18, 1904, the date of the ordinance authorizing the issuing of said permanent improvement bonds. Section 1 and 5 of the ordinance of July 18, 1904, which are the only sections of the ordinance which bear upon the subject of the use to be made of the fund derived from the sale of said permanent improvement bonds, read as follows:

Section 1. That for the...

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6 cases
  • Dean Milk Co. v. City of Chicago
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 22 March 1944
    ...of a statute. People ex rel. Dwight v. Chicago Railways Co., 270 Ill. 87, 110 N.E. 386, Ann.Cas.1917B, 821;People ex rel. City of Chicago v. Hummel, 215 Ill. 43, 74 N.E. 68;People ex rel. Griffith v. Mohr, 252 Ill. 160, 96 N.E. 893;Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 169 Ill. ......
  • McQueeney v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, Gen. No. 47523
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • 22 April 1959
    ...City, 408 Ill. 33, 37, 95 N.E.2d 920; People ex rel. Manczak v. Carpentier, 3 Ill.2d 556, 558, 121 N.E.2d 762; People ex rel. City of Chicago v. Hummel, 215 Ill. 43, 74 N.E. 68. The rules for the construction of an ordinance are the same as those which govern the construction of a statute. ......
  • People ex rel. Dwight v. Chicago Rys. Co.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 9 December 1915
    ...held that the rules for the construction of an ordinance are the same as those applied in the construction of a statute. People v. Hummel, 215 Ill. 43, 74 N. E. 68;People v. Mohr, 252 Ill. 160,96 N. E. 803. It is a primary rule in the interpretation and construction of a statute that the in......
  • Clark v. Harper
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 17 April 1905
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