People ex rel. Crowe v. Williams

• Decision Date: 21 April 1928
• Docket Number: No. 18783.,18783.
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. CROWE, State's Atty., v. WILLIAMS, Judge.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

330 Ill. 150

161 N.E. 312

PEOPLE ex rel. CROWE, State's Atty.,

v.WILLIAMS, Judge.

No. 18783.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

April 21, 1928.

Original petition for mandamus by the People, on the relation of Robert E. Crowe, State's Attorney, and another, against Charles A. Williams, Judge.

Writ awarded.

Oscar E. Carlstrom, Atty. Gen., and Robert E. Crowe, State's Atty., of Chicago (Edward E. Wilson, Q. J. Chott, and John Holman, all of Chicago, of counsel), for petitioner.

Eugene L. McGarry and W. G. Anderson, both of Chicago, for respondent.

DE YOUNG, J.

Pursuant to leave granted, there was filed in this court an original petition in the name of the people of the state, on the relation of Oscar E. Carlstrom, Attorney General, and Robert E. Crowe, the state's attorney of Cook county, praying for the issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding Charles A. Williams, one of the judges of the superior court of Cook county, to expunge from the records of that court an order discharging Joseph Chapman from the Illinois State Penitentiary at Joliet. It is set forth in the petition that Chapman was indicted in the criminal court of Cook county for murder; that on his arraignment he pleaded guilty, and on May 1, 1918, was sentenced to imprisonment in the penitentiary for the term of his natural life; that the judgment was spread upon the records of the criminal court; and that, by virtue of the order of commitment, the sheriff delivered Chapman to the warden of the penitentiary. The petitioner further alleges that on December 13, 1927, a verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus was presented to the respondent; that in this petition it is stated that the record of Chapman's trial shows that he entered a plea of guilty to the indictment, that he was warned, that testimony was heard, and that on his plea he was sentenced to life imprisonment in the penitentiary, but that the record fails affirmatively to show that Chapman persisted in his plea of guilty; that, by reason of this omission, the trial court was without jurisdiction to accept the plea or to render judgment; that, lacking such jurisdiction, the judgment under which Chapman is held in custody is void, and that he should be released from such unlawful detention and imprisonment. It is further alleged in the instant petition that the warden of the penitentiary in his return to the writ of habeas corpus stated that he held Chapman by virtue of an order of commitment from the criminal court of Cook county and that he exhibited the original order to the respondent; that, on the hearing upon the habeas corpus petition and the return thereto before the respondent, the Attorney General and the state's attorney pointed out that the only reason assigned in the petition for the release of Chapman was that, after the trial court's warning had been given, the record failed to show that Chapman persisted in his plea of guilty; that it was repeatedly urged upon the respondent that, even if the petition were true in this respect, yet the omission was merely an error which did not constitute a ground for the release of Chapman; that, notwithstanding this fact, the respondent stated that, because of the failure of the record to show that Chapman had persisted in his plea, the trial court which sentenced him was without jurisdiction of the subject-matter or of the person of Chapman, and that the respondent thereupon discharged him from imprisonment in the penitentiary. The concluding allegations of the present petition are that the respondent had no authority to order the discharge of Chapman and that the order is null and void; that neither the petition for Chapman's relief, with the return thereto, nor the hearing before the respondent, justified Chapman's release under the Habeas Corpus Act; and that, if the judgment by which Chapman was sentenced to the penitentiary was faulty, the remedy was by a writ of error and not by habeas corpus. The respondent answered the petition, admitting its material allegations of fact, but averring that he had authority and jurisdiction to enter the order sought to be expunged and that the order was valid. The petitioner demurred to the answer.

To sustain the order releasing Chapman from the penitentiary prior to the expiration of his term of imprisonment, the respondent relies upon section 4 of division 13 of the Criminal Code (Cahill's Stat. 1927, p. 952; Smith's Stat. 1927, p. 1019), which provides:

‘In cases where the party pleads ‘guilty,’ such plea shall not be entered until the court shall have fully explained to the accused the consequences of entering such plea; after which, if the party persist in pleading ‘guilty,’ such plea shall be received and recorded, and the court shall proceed to render judgment and execution thereon, as if he had been found guilty by a jury. In all cases where the court possesses any discretion as to the extent of the punishment, it...