People ex rel. Crump v. Brantley

• Decision Date: 21 January 1974
• Docket Number: No. 57813,57813
• Citation: 17 Ill.App.3d 318,307 N.E.2d 651
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Illinois ex rel. Paul O. CRUMP, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Elza BRANTLEY, Warden of the Illinois State Penitentiary at Menard et al., Respondent-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 651

307 N.E.2d 651

17 Ill.App.3d 318

PEOPLE of the State of Illinois ex rel. Paul O. CRUMP, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Elza BRANTLEY, Warden of the Illinois State Penitentiary at

Menard et al., Respondent-Appellee.

No. 57813.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

Jan. 21, 1974.

James J. Doherty, Public Defender of Cook County, Chicago (Richard Kling, Robert Gray, Asst. Public Defenders, of counsel), for petitioner appellant.

Bernard Carey, State's Atty., County of Cook, Chicago (Kenneth L. Gillis, Jerald A. Kessler, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for respondent appellee.

HALLETT, Justice.

The petitioner appeals to this court from the dismissal of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. By that petition he sought to overturn a ruling by the Attorney General of the State of Illinois that he was barred from consideration for parole because of the terms under which his death sentence had been commuted by the Governor of this State. He also sought immediate release as a means of relief from alleged mistreatment by the administrators of the State correctional system. The petitioner was originally convicted of murder, and sentenced to death. The conviction and sentence were reversed by the Illinois Supreme Court, People v. Crump (1955), 5 Ill.2d 251, 125 N.E.2d 615. A second conviction and the same sentence were imposed on the petitioner upon retrial, and this was affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court, People v. Crump (1958), 12 Ill.2d 402, 147 N.E.2d 76. While awaiting execution, the death sentence was commuted by the Governor on August 1, 1963, to 199 years, without parole. In spite of the wording of the commutation order, the petitioner was considered for parole in 1965 and again in 1969. Another hearing was scheduled by the Parole Board for 1972, but was canceled after the Attorney General issued his said advisory ruling. Thereafter the instant petition was filed, heard and denied.

This appeal raises two issues: 1) whether the refusal further to consider parole is the proper subject matter for a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and 2) whether the transfer of the petitioner to the Psychiatric Division of the Illinois State Penitentiary and other alleged mistreatment by prison officials can properly be raised in a habeas corpus petition.

With respect to the first issue, it has long been established in this State that habeas corpus is properly employed only where it can be shown that the original proceeding or judgment of conviction is void, or where something has happened since the rendition of the judgment to entitle the prisoner to his outright release. See People ex rel. Totten v. Frye (1968),39 Ill.2d 549, 237 N.E.2d 709; and People ex rel. Skinner v. Randolph (1966), 35 Ill.2d 589, 221 N.E.2d 279. A writ of mandamus is considered the appropriate remedy to compel the Parole Board to grant a prisoner a hearing to determine his eligibility for parole. People ex rel. Abner v. Kinney (1964),30 Ill.2d 201, 195 N.E.2d 651. This problem was carefully considered by our Supreme Court in the case of People ex rel. Castle v. Spivey (1957), 10 Ill.2d 586, at 594--595, 141 N.E.2d 321, at 325, where the court said:

'Parole is a matter of grace and not of legal right. A convict cannot invoke it at his own will and has no right to demand that he be discharged before the expiration of the maximum term of his sentence. People v. Nowak, 387 Ill. 11, 55 N.E.2d 63, 152 A.L.R. 1101; People v. Thompson, 381 Ill. 71, 44 N.E.2d 876; People v. Connors, 291 Ill. 614, 126 N.E. 595. The Parole Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1955 chap. 38, par. 801 et seq.) does not by its provisions violate any right of a citizen guaranteed by the Federal or State constitutions. People v. Rohde, 403 Ill. 41, 85 N.E.2d 24; People v. Roche, 389 Ill. 361, 59 N.E.2d 866; People v. Mikula, 357 Ill. 481, 192 N.E. 546; People v. Connors, 291 Ill. 614, 126 N.E. 595. Neither prisoner had the legal right to release prior to the expiration of his full term of life imprisonment. The court could not legally discharge them prior thereto upon the mere showing that they had not been admitted to parole, or because the court might feel that denial of parole was unreasonable, or that the period of years served was sufficient to satisfy the ends of justice. A court has no jurisdiction in a Habeas corpus proceeding to enter an order for a prisoner's release because of equitable considerations and no right to exercise clemency through its own processes. People ex rel. Barrett v. Crowe, 387 Ill. 53, 55 N.E.2d 84. The exercise of clemency is an executive, not a judicial function.'

We therefore hold that the Board's refusal again to consider the petitioner's parole is not a proper subject for a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

With respect to the second point raised by this appeal, a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is likewise not a proper vehicle by which this court or the court below can determine whether or not the petitioner is being mistreated by the prison system administration. Since the implementation of the new Illinois State Penitentiary Act, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 108) and the implementation of new Administrative Regulations by the Department of Corrections, our Supreme Court has considered whether or not a protest of transfer to the Psychiatric Division is the proper subject matter for a writ of habeas corpus and has held that it is not. In People ex rel. Willis v. Dept. of Corrections (1972), 51 Ill.2d 382, at pages 383--384, 385, 387--388, 282 N.E.2d 716, at page 717, the court said that:

'He (the petitioner) contends that his confinement at Menard is tantamount to being detained 'in a mental institution' and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment to the Federal constitution and a deprivation of liberty without due process. He also contends that he was afforded inadequate assistance of counsel with regard to the Habeas corpus proceeding. The State's contentions are that the transfer of an inmate to the psychiatric division of the Illinois State Penitentiary is an administrative determination and may be done without a full hearing, and that Habeas corpus is not an appropriate proceeding for the review of such an action.

'The Illinois State Penitentiary Act moderized and streamlined the penitentiary system and consolidated all institutions for the incarceration of convicts under the administration of the Department of Corrections, subject to certain exceptions which are not pertinent here. The institution previously known as the Illinois Asylum for Insane Criminals became known as the psychiatric division. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 108, par. 106.) Diagnostic Depots were established under section 5 of the Act. (...