People ex rel D.S.L.
| Decision Date | 23 February 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 05CA0850.,05CA0850. |
| Citation | 134 P.3d 522 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF COLORADO, Petitioner-Appellee, In the Interest of D.S.L., Juvenile-Appellant. |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Elizabeth Rohrbough, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee.
David A. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Tracy A. Drager, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant.
D.S.L., a juvenile, appeals the trial court's judgment adjudicating him delinquent based on a finding that he committed acts which, if committed by an adult, would constitute the offenses of false reporting and second degree assault on a peace officer. D.S.L. also appeals his sentence. We affirm the judgment, vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing.
The trial court conducted a consolidated suppression motion hearing and delinquency adjudication proceeding. The following evidence was adduced at that proceeding.
At approximately 10:30 p.m. on the evening in question, two police officers noticed a Pontiac Grand Am, which appeared to be painted either tan or gold. The car was parked in a lot adjacent to an assisted living facility. Although it was evident that the car was running, the headlights were turned off. The officers could not see inside the car because the windows were tinted.
One of the officers had heard a report the night before that a tan or gold Pontiac Grand Am with a temporary license plate had been stolen. Accordingly, the officers decided to investigate.
The officers activated the emergency lights of their patrol car and pulled alongside the parked car. As the officers approached the car on foot, they could see that it had a temporary registration mounted on the rear. One of the officers contacted the driver and obtained her proof of identification and the documentation of the temporary registration. The second officer asked the lone passenger in the car, D.S.L., to identify himself. D.S.L. told the officer that his name was Daniel Vigil and that his date of birth was May 17, 1988. After obtaining the vehicle identification number (VIN) from the car, the two officers returned to their patrol car to verify all the information.
The officers were able to confirm the driver's identification, the temporary registration, and the VIN. They were unable, however, to find any record for a "Daniel Vigil." This uncertainty was significant to one of the officers, who testified that in ninety percent of the cases in which he had been involved, the inability to verify a juvenile's identity was attributable to the juvenile's having provided false information.
The officer's suspicion that D.S.L. had provided a false name was bolstered by the fact that the computer, which was programmed to retrieve "close matches," indicated that a juvenile with the same first name and a "similar" date of birth was wanted as a runaway.
At this point, the officers asked D.S.L. to step out of the car. D.S.L. complied. The officers informed him that, although he was not under arrest, he would be handcuffed while they investigated his identity. Upon hearing this, D.S.L. told the officers that his mother was inside the assisted living facility and would confirm his identity.
One of the officers walked toward the building to find D.S.L.'s mother as the other officer began to place handcuffs on D.S.L.'s wrists. D.S.L. quickly spun around and tried to pull away, snagging the officer's finger in the chain connecting the two handcuffs and thus breaking the officer's finger in three places.
A violent struggle ensued as the officers took D.S.L. into custody. Soon thereafter, D.S.L.'s mother arrived and told the officers D.S.L.'s real name and date of birth.
D.S.L. first argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as the result of an allegedly unlawful seizure. We disagree.
D.S.L. does not specify what evidence he was seeking to have suppressed. The record does not indicate that the officers discovered any physical evidence during his detention, and the only statement D.S.L. made during that brief detention was that his mother was inside the building. That remark was neither inculpatory nor causally connected to the officers' contact with D.S.L.'s mother, which occurred after the mother arrived at the scene as the officers were attempting to take D.S.L. into custody following the assault. Further, we reject D.S.L.'s suggestion that evidence of the assault was the product of the purportedly unlawful seizure. See Brown v. City of Danville, 44 Va.App. 586, 606 S.E.2d 523 (2004)(unlawful search of defendant's person by police officers did not render their testimony regarding defendant's subsequent struggle inadmissible as fruit of poisonous tree, but rather, testimony was admissible for purpose of determining defendant's guilt on charge of obstruction of justice; defendant's "post-frisk" struggle with officers constituted a separate and distinct criminal offense, and thus, the exclusionary rule did not apply to officers' testimony describing events that occurred after initial attempted pat-down).
Accordingly, because defendant has not demonstrated that any error in the trial court's denial of his suppression motion affected his substantial rights, we perceive no basis for reversal. See C.A.R. 35(e).
D.S.L. contends that the trial court erred by finding, for purposes of the delinquency adjudication, that he was "in custody" when he assaulted the officer. Again, we disagree.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an adjudication of juvenile delinquency, the standards are the same as those to be applied in a criminal case. The reviewing court must determine whether the evidence, viewed as a whole and in the light most favorable to the prosecution, is substantial and sufficient to support a conclusion by a reasonable person that the defendant is guilty of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt. People in Interest of J.P.L., 49 P.3d 1209, 1210 (Colo.App.2002).
As relevant here, a person commits second degree assault against a peace officer if "[w]hile lawfully confined or in custody, he or she knowingly and violently applies physical force against the person of a peace officer. . . engaged in the performance of his or her duties." Section 18-3-203(1)(f), C.R.S.2005.
To be deemed to be in custody for purposes of this section, a person need not be subject to a formal arrest. All that is required is that the "peace officer must have applied a level of physical control over the person being detained so as reasonably to ensure that the person does not leave." People v. Rawson, 97 P.3d 315, 323 (Colo.App. 2004).
The evidence in this case shows that, at the time of the assault, the officer was applying a level of physical control over D.S.L. to ensure that he would not leave.
Contrary to D.S.L.'s suggestion, it is irrelevant that the trial court, in addressing the suppression motion, made an alternative finding that the initial portion of the interaction was a consensual encounter and that defendant was not in custody. That determination has no bearing on our assessment of the evidence supporting the delinquency adjudication.
Further, we reject D.S.L.'s argument that evidence of the assault cannot be considered because the altercation would not have occurred but for the allegedly unlawful detention. Even if we were to assume that he was illegally held, the unlawfulness of a detention does not absolve a person of liability for criminal conduct committed during that detention. See generally People v. Lanzieri, 25 P.3d 1170, 1175 (Colo.2001)(the same public policy that permits a defendant to be convicted of resisting arrest even if the arrest is unlawful permits a defendant to be convicted of escape despite procedural defects in the confinement or sentence).
D.S.L. contends that the trial court abused its discretion in crafting a remedy for a discovery violation. We disagree.
Discovery in juvenile delinquency proceedings is governed by Crim. P. 16. See C.R.J.P. 3.3.
Crim. P. 16(III)(g) states:
If at any time during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed to comply with this rule or with an order issued pursuant to this rule, the court may order such party to permit the discovery or inspection of materials not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, prohibit the party from introducing in evidence the material not disclosed or enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.
This rule gives the trial court broad discretion in determining the appropriate remedy, if any, for a discovery violation. People v. Loggins, 981 P.2d 630 (Colo.App. 1998).
Here, after the delinquency trial had begun, D.S.L. moved for dismissal based on the prosecution's failure to provide in discovery a videotaped interview of D.S.L. and photographs of his injuries and of the scene. The prosecutor then informed the court that the materials in question were contained in a police department internal affairs file and that she had not previously known of their existence. The trial court denied D.S.L.'s request for dismissal and instead ordered a one-day recess to allow D.S.L. an opportunity to examine the undisclosed materials.
When the proceedings reconvened, D.S.L.'s counsel renewed her request for dismissal. As grounds, she asserted that it would be necessary to call D.S.L. as a witness to admit the photographs of his injuries. In response, the prosecutor stipulated to the admissibility of the photographs. The trial court then denied the dismissal motion.
On appeal, D.S.L. argues that the trial court's remedy was insufficient because it "hindered [counsel's] ability to assert affirmative defenses." However, D.S.L. does not specify which affirmative defenses he would have raised or state how, if at all, these defenses could have been...
To continue reading
Request your trial