People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Systems Corp.
Decision Date | 17 October 1991 |
Docket Number | Nos. 68141,68164,s. 68141 |
Citation | 146 Ill.2d 1,585 N.E.2d 51,165 Ill.Dec. 655 |
Parties | , 165 Ill.Dec. 655 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois ex rel. Richard M. DALEY, Appellee, v. DATACOM SYSTEMS CORPORATION et al., Appellants. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
Baker & McKenzie, Chicago (Francis D. Morrissey, Thomas F. Bridgman, William Lynch Schaller and Jane M. McFetridge, of counsel), for appellant Datacom Systems Corp.
Judson H. Miner and Kelly R. Welsh, Corp. Counsel, Chicago (Ruth M. Moscovitch and Lynn K. Mitchell, of counsel), for appellant City of Chicago.
Cecil A. Partee, State's Atty., and Mercer Cook, Deputy State's Atty., Chicago (Allen Reiffman, Raquel G. Martinez, Shauna L. Boliker Andrews amd David R. Butzen, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.
Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., Springfield (Robert J. Ruiz, Solicitor Gen., and William H. London, Asst. Atty. Gen., of Chicago, of counsel) for appellee Dept. of Registration and Education et al.
According to an interim report by the Traffic Court Task Force, issued on January 31, 1985, to the Special Commission on the Administration of Justice in Cook County, the City of Chicago (City) had approximately 34 million unpaid parking tickets pending in its traffic court. One day prior to the issuance of this report, the City entered into a contract with Datacom Systems Corporation (Datacom), a New York corporation, in which Datacom agreed to evaluate the City's parking management system and collect the monies due on the delinquent parking tickets.
On February 26, 1986, the Cook County State's Attorney, on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois (State), filed a four-count complaint in the circuit court of Cook County against the City and Datacom, alleging the actions of Datacom concerning collection of the parking tickets violated the Collection Agency Act ( ), the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Consumer Fraud Act) ( ), and the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Deceptive Trade Practices Act) ( ). The State also set forth allegations in quo warranto (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, par. 18-101 et seq.) purporting to show that both the City and Datacom exceeded their lawful authority. The City and Datacom filed a joint motion on March 12, 1986, to dismiss the complaint, claiming the complaint failed to state a cause of action pursuant to section 2-615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, par. 2-615). The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the cause of action with prejudice on February 9, 1987.
On the same day the State filed its complaint, the Department of Registration and Education (Department) (now the Department of Professional Regulation (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 111, par. 2003)) of the State of Illinois initiated an administrative action against Datacom, contending Datacom violated various provisions of the Collection Agency Act. On March 12, 1986, Datacom filed a motion seeking leave to file a third-party complaint against the Department and requesting declaratory and injunctive relief from the Department's attempt to enforce the Collection Agency Act. The motion was granted the following day. The Department filed a motion to dismiss Datacom's third-party complaint; the circuit court denied the motion on February 9, 1987. The court granted Datacom's request for a permanent injunction barring the Department from suspending or revoking Datacom's licenses or otherwise proceeding against Datacom.
Both the State and the Department appealed. The appellate court reversed and remanded (176 Ill.App.3d 697, 126 Ill.Dec. 212, 531 N.E.2d 839), concluding that Datacom was subject to the Collection Agency Act, the Consumer Fraud Act, and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and that the State sufficiently stated claims against the City and Datacom in quo warranto. The appellate court held that the circuit court erred in dismissing the State's complaint and in permanently enjoining the Department's action against Datacom. (176 Ill.App.3d at 714, 126 Ill.Dec. 212, 531 N.E.2d 839.) The appellate court also held that the circuit court should have dismissed Datacom's third-party complaint against the Department. (176 Ill.App.3d at 714, 126 Ill.Dec. 212, 531 N.E.2d 839.) The City and Datacom then filed petitions for leave to appeal with this court, which were allowed and consolidated for the purpose of appeal. (134 Ill.2d R. 315.) In view of the voluminous record, those facts necessary for the resolution of each issue will be reviewed. We affirm the decision of the appellate court, which reversed and remanded with directions.
Since the circuit court dismissed all four counts of the State's complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, par. 2-615), the standard of review is that "all facts properly pleaded in the complaint must be taken as true." (Fitzgerald v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1978), 72 Ill.2d 179, 187, 20 Ill.Dec. 581, 380 N.E.2d 790.) "This court has repeatedly held that a cause of action should not be dismissed on the pleadings unless it clearly appears that no set of facts can be proved which will entitle plaintiffs to recover." Fitzgerald, 72 Ill.2d at 187, 20 Ill.Dec. 581, 380 N.E.2d 790; Fechtner v. Lake County Savings & Loan Association (1977), 66 Ill.2d 128, 133, 5 Ill.Dec. 252, 361 N.E.2d 575; Edgar County Bank & Trust Co. v. Paris Hospital, Inc. (1974), 57 Ill.2d 298, 305, 312 N.E.2d 259.
We will then address each issue in light of that standard.
In count I, the State alleged that numerous actions on the part of Datacom violated various provisions of the Collection Agency Act, and those unlawful acts also constituted violations of section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 121 1/2, par. 262). The State set forth the following allegations in count I:
(1) In violation of section 4 of the Collection Agency Act, Datacom unfairly and deceptively continued to engage in debt collection activities prior to obtaining registration in Illinois to do business as a collection agency. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 111, par. 2007.
(2) In violation of sections 9 and 9.12 of the Collection Agency Act, Datacom failed to disclose its business name in the demand notices and envelopes sent to the alleged parking violators. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 111, pars. 2012, 2024.
(3) In violation of sections 9 and 9.13 of the Collection Agency Act, Datacom forwarded to the alleged parking violators demand notices which gave the appearance of being issued by the department of revenue of the City. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 111, pars. 2012, 2025.
(4) In violation of sections 9 and 9.14 of the Collection Agency Act, Datacom forwarded to the alleged parking violators demand notices which contained the City's trademark when the City did not in fact send the notices. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 111, pars. 2012, 2026.
(5) In violation of sections 9 and 9.15 of the Collection Agency Act, Datacom forwarded to the alleged parking violators demand notices which represented that the City's department of revenue sent the notices when in fact Datacom sent the notices. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 111, pars. 2012, 2027.
(6) In violation of sections 9 and 9.17 of the Collection Agency Act, Datacom misrepresented the amounts allegedly owed for violating the City's parking ordinances. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 111, pars. 2012, 2029.
(7) In violation of sections 9 and 9.18 of the Collection Agency Act, Datacom represented it could increase the amounts owed by the alleged parking violators when only a judge of the circuit court of Cook County could increase the amounts. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 111, pars. 2012, 2030.
(8) In violation of sections 9 and 9.20 of the Collection Agency Act, Datacom attempted to collect additional monies in excess of the minimum fines owed by the alleged parking violators. Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 111, par. 2031 [2032].
(9) Datacom unfairly and deceptively continued to send demand notices to alleged parking violators who either had previously paid their parking fines, or had not violated any parking ordinances, or had already obtained a dismissal of their tickets by the court.
(10) Datacom unfairly and deceptively deposited checks and money orders made payable to the clerk of the circuit court in Datacom's bank accounts without authorization from the clerk.
The State contends in count I that all of the foregoing acts by Datacom also constituted violations of section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act. Section 2 prohibits "[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices * * * in the conduct of any trade or commerce * * *." Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 121 1/2, par. 262.
We must decide whether Datacom is subject to the Collection Agency Act. Our decision affects not only the sufficiency of the State's complaint, but also the injunction barring the Department from proceeding administratively against Datacom, and Datacom's third-party complaint against the Department.
We must first determine whether a municipal fine is a debt within the parameters of the Collection Agency Act. However, our reading of the Act reveals that the term "municipal fine" is absent. Since "municipal fine" is absent from the Act, this court must analyze the Act "to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature." (People v. Wallace (1920), 291 Ill. 465, 467, 126 N.E. 175; City of Decatur v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Local 268 (1988), 122 Ill.2d 353, 364, 119 Ill.Dec. 360, 522 N.E.2d 1219.) Where the meaning of a statute is in doubt, ...
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