People ex rel. DeLia v. Munsey

• Decision Date: 22 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. 136,136
• Citation: 2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 07697,26 N.Y.3d 124,41 N.E.3d 1119,20 N.Y.S.3d 304
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Lesley M. DeLIA, as Director of Mental Hygiene Legal Service, on Behalf of Stephen S., Appellant, v. Douglas MUNSEY, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

26 N.Y.3d 124

41 N.E.3d 1119

20 N.Y.S.3d 304

2015 N.Y. Slip Op. 07697

The PEOPLE of the State of New York ex rel. Lesley M. DeLIA, as Director of Mental Hygiene Legal Service, on Behalf of Stephen S., Appellant

v.Douglas MUNSEY, Respondent.

No. 136

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 22, 2015.

Michael D. Neville, Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Mineola (Lisa Volpe, Dennis B. Feld and Ana Vuk–Pavlovic of counsel), for appellant.

Abrams, Fensterman, Fensterman, Eisman, Formato, Ferrara & Wolf, LLP, Lake Success (Eric Broutman of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

STEIN

, J.

In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether a patient who is involuntarily committed under article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law and is unlawfully held beyond the authorized retention period may seek a writ of habeas corpus under article 70 of the CPLR. We answer this question in the affirmative, concluding that Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15

is not the exclusive habeas corpus provision available to article 9 patients and does not govern habeas corpus proceedings for those patients whose detention is challenged for reasons other than the patient's recovery.

I.

As relevant here, Mental Hygiene Law article 9 governs the procedures and standards for the involuntary commitment of mentally ill persons who are in need of inpatient care and treatment but are unable to understand the necessity of such treatment. Pursuant to the Mental Hygiene Law, “[t]he director of a hospital may receive and retain therein as a patient any person alleged to be mentally ill and in need of involuntary care and treatment upon the certificates of two examining physicians, accompanied by an application for the admission of

such person” executed by a qualified person (id. § 9.27 [a]; see id. § 9.27[b][1]-[11] ).¹ When a patient is involuntarily admitted, the facility may hold that person for a limited period of time; if further retention is necessary, the director of the facility must apply to the court for an order authorizing continued retention within 60 days of the admission (see id. § 9.33[a] ). Upon request, the patient is entitled to a hearing on the application for a retention order (see id. ). Once an order retaining the patient for a specific duration has been obtained, if the director believes that it is necessary to retain the patient beyond that time, the director “shall ... apply during the period of retention authorized by the last order of the court ... for an order authorizing further continued retention of such patient” (id. § 9.33[d] [emphasis added] ). The patient is, again, entitled to appear before the court on such an application (see id. ).

The Mental Hygiene Law presents several specific avenues for a patient to challenge his or her retention. For example, Mental Hygiene Law § 9.31

allows the patient to request a hearing prior to the expiration of the 60–day admission period (see

id. § 9.31[a] ). Section 9.35 permits a patient to seek a rehearing and review of a court's order of retention within 30 days of the making of such an order. Additionally, and central to the present dispute, Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15 provides that “[a] person retained by a facility ... is entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to question the cause and legality of detention upon proper application” (id. § 33.15 [a] ). This section requires the court to “examine the facts concerning the person's alleged mental disability and detention,” and the court may discharge the patient only “if it finds that he [or she] is not mentally disabled or ... in need of further retention for in-patient care and treatment” (id. § 33.15 [b] ).

More generally, article 70 of the CPLR governs special proceedings for a writ of habeas corpus, the historic common-law writ that protects individuals from unlawful restraint or imprisonment and provides a means for those illegally detained

to obtain release (see People ex rel. Duryee v. Duryee, 188 N.Y. 440, 445 [1907]

). CPLR 7001 provides that, “[e]xcept as otherwise prescribed by statute, the provisions of ... article [70] are applicable to common[-]law or statutory writs of habeas corpus.” The CPLR does not specifically enumerate the circumstances in which a writ may be sought beyond providing that “[a] person illegally imprisoned or otherwise restrained in his [or her] liberty within the state, or one acting on his [or her] behalf ..., may petition without notice for a writ of habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such detention and for deliverance” (CPLR 7002 [a] ). “If the person is illegally detained a final judgment shall be directed discharging him [or her] forthwith ” (CPLR 7010[a] [emphasis added] ).

II.

In March 2012, Stephen S. was involuntarily admitted to Holliswood Hospital upon two medical certifications averring that, as a result of his paranoid delusions, Stephen S. was unable to care for himself and required mental health treatment. In May 2012, the Hospital applied to Supreme Court for authorization to continue his involuntary retention. In June 2012, Supreme Court granted the application upon the parties' consent, extending his retention for a period not to exceed three months. The Hospital thereafter failed to apply for court authorization of its continued involuntary retention of Stephen S. on or before the expiration date of the existing order, as was required by Mental Hygiene Law § 9.33(d)

.

In October 2012, Mental Hygiene Legal Service commenced this habeas corpus proceeding on behalf of Stephen S., seeking his immediate release from the Hospital on the ground that he was being illegally detained. In response, the Hospital applied for an order authorizing his continued involuntary retention for a period of six months pursuant to Mental Hygiene Law § 9.33

. The Hospital conceded that it had erroneously retained Stephen S. without a court order for approximately six weeks, but it argued that, under Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15, he could not be released without a hearing and, then, only if the court found him to be mentally fit for discharge. Conversely, Stephen S. argued that he was entitled to immediate release upon a writ of habeas corpus under CPLR article 70.

Supreme Court granted the writ and directed the Hospital to discharge Stephen S., but stayed his discharge for five days in order to allow for appellate review. In directing the release of

Stephen S., the court reasoned that holding a hearing on his mental status would be a “non-remedy” for the violation of his due process rights because such a hearing would have been held had the Hospital filed a timely retention application. In other words, the court postulated that, if it merely granted the Hospital such a hearing, the Hospital's failure to follow the Mental Hygiene Law would have had no effect on whether it could retain him without his consent.

The Hospital appealed. The Appellate Division, Second Department, initially stayed enforcement of the judgment pending its determination of the appeal (2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 90691[U] [2d Dept.2012]

) and, thereafter, reversed (117 A.D.3d 84, 983 N.Y.S.2d 35 [2d Dept.2014] ). The Appellate Division determined that, although the matter had been rendered moot by the discharge of Stephen S. during the pendency of the appeal, the mootness exception applied. Despite the Hospital's failure to comply with the Mental Hygiene Law, the Appellate Division held that Stephen S. was not entitled to immediate release without a determination of his mental fitness, reasoning that the habeas corpus petition was governed by Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15, not CPLR article 70.

Stephen S. appealed pursuant to CPLR 5601(b)(1)

, and we now reverse.²

III.

The Hospital argues that Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15

governs all habeas corpus proceedings brought by article 9 patients and, therefore, a patient is not entitled to release unless a determination is made that further involuntary treatment is unnecessary. The Hospital contends that section 33.15 should be construed as the exclusive habeas corpus provision available to article 9 patients because the more general CPLR article 70 habeas provisions must yield to the specific mandate of section 33.15. According to the Hospital, such an interpretation is consistent with principles of due process because involuntary commitment of an individual is lawful so long as the individual is in need of treatment—without regard to whether the procedures of the Mental Hygiene Law were followed.

We disagree on all counts. The construction of Mental Hygiene Law § 33.15

advanced by the Hospital and our dissenting colleague abrogates the common-law writ of habeas corpus for mentally ill patients and is not supported by our case law, the rules of statutory construction, or principles of due process. As explained below, section 33.15 does not supplant the common-law writ of habeas corpus available through CPLR article 70.

Although article 70 governs the procedure of the common-law writ of habeas corpus, “[r]elief from illegal imprisonment by means of this remedial writ is not the creature of any statute” (People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N.Y. 559, 565 [1875]

). As we have long emphasized, “the right to invoke habeas corpus, ‘the historic writ of liberty’, ‘the greatest of all writs',” is a “primary and fundamental” one (People v. Schildhaus, 8 N.Y.2d 33, 36, 201 N.Y.S.2d 97, 167 N.E.2d 640 [1960] ; see U.S. Const., art. I, § 9; N.Y. Const., art. I, § 4 ). Due to its constitutional roots, “[t]his writ cannot be abrogated, or its efficiency curtailed, by legislative action,” except in certain emergency situations (People ex rel. Tweed, 60 N.Y. at 566

; see

Hoff v. State of New York, 279 N.Y. 490, 492, 18 N.E.2d 671 [1939] ; People ex rel. Sabatino v. Jennings, 246 N.Y. 258, 261, 158 N.E. 613 [1927] ). Moreover, statutes pertaining to the writ of habeas corpus must be “construed in favor of, and not against, the liberty of the subject and the citizen” (People ex rel. Tweed, 60 N.Y. at 569 ; see

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