People ex rel. Dept. of Conservation v. Triplett

Decision Date08 August 1996
Docket NumberNo. F024360,F024360
Citation55 Cal.Rptr.2d 610,48 Cal.App.4th 233
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 5979, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9711 The PEOPLE ex rel. DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. David TRIPLETT, as Tax Assessor, Defendant and Respondent, DIABLO GRANDE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.
Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General, Charles W. Getz, IV, Assistant Attorney General, Edna Walz, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiffs and Appellants
OPINION

WISEMAN, Associate Justice.

In this action, the State of California sues the Assessor of the County of Stanislaus and the private landowner real party in interest for money owed following an alleged improper calculation of a cancellation fee made pursuant to a decision to cancel a Williamson Act contract. We hold the State of California has standing to bring this action; the action is not barred for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; and the 180-day statute of limitations period contained within Government Code section 51286 does not apply.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 16, 1994, in the Stanislaus Superior Court, the People of the State of California (State) filed a first amended petition and complaint for writ of mandate, declaratory relief and damages. It named David Triplett, the Stanislaus County Assessor (Assessor) as the defendant, and Diablo Grande Limited Partnership (Diablo Grande) as the real party in interest (collectively, respondents). The suit alleged Douglas P. Wheeler, Secretary of the Resources Agency (hereafter Secretary and Agency, respectively), and the Department of Conservation (Department), were the relators on whose behalf the State (collectively, plaintiffs) had filed the action in order to enforce the California Land Conservation Act, more commonly called the Williamson Act.

The suit alleged the County of Stanislaus (County) had entered into a Williamson Act contract (WAC) (No. 72-1025) regarding land now owned by Diablo Grande. 1 The first cause of action for writ of mandate alleged that on May 21, 1993, Diablo Grande filed an application for a tentative cancellation on 5,070 acres of the land restricted by WAC No. 72-1025 for a destination resort (resort parcel), including hotel/conference center, 2,000 homes, development of estate lots, golf course and clubhouse, winery, swimming and tennis club, and associated commercial and services uses. 2

On September 8, 1993, the Assessor certified to the County Board of Supervisors (Board) that the cancellation value for the resort parcel was $3,750,000. To determine the cancellation value, the Assessor employed the comparable sales method, using six properties. Of these six properties, at the time of the sales, all six were devoted to open dry-land farming, and four of them were restricted under WACs.

On October 27, 1993, the Board adopted a decision tentatively approving the Diablo Grande application. At the time pertinent here, the amount of the cancellation fee was set at 12.5 percent of the full cash value of the land as though it were free of the WAC at the time the land was appraised for cancellation. The cancellation fee was $468,750, representing 12.5 percent of the cancellation valuation certified by the Assessor. 3 By January 1995, County had remitted the $468,750 cancellation fee to the State.

Plaintiffs alleged the Assessor abused his discretion and violated the Government Code because his cancellation valuation was on the resort parcel's restricted use as open dry-land farming instead of its current fair market value as a destination resort and residential estate project. Thus, plaintiffs alleged the cancellation fee established by the Board was unlawful, and injured plaintiffs in that it frustrated the purposes of the Williamson Act, which they are charged with enforcing, and the State suffered pecuniary loss because the cancellation fee is income to the State.

The same allegations were relied on to support plaintiffs' cause of action for declaratory relief.

In their cause of action for damages under a constructive trust theory, plaintiffs alleged the State had provided subventions to the County to offset its loss of revenue stemming from entering into a WAC with a property owner. They further alleged the County had a fiduciary duty to the State in carrying out its duty under the Williamson Act to assess a cancellation fee in accordance with section 51283 and to transfer it to the State. As a result of the County's failure to lawfully discharge that duty, the State was unjustly deprived of money it was entitled to and Diablo Grande was unjustly enriched. Thus, a constructive trust was created whereby the County and Diablo Grande are jointly and severally liable for damages to the State by virtue of the breach of fiduciary duty and unjust enrichment.

The Assessor filed a demurrer to the complaint and requested judicial notice of several documentary exhibits. Diablo Grande also filed a demurrer and requested judicial notice of plaintiffs' motion for intervention filed in an action entitled Stanislaus Natural Heritage Foundation, et al. v. County of Stanislaus, case No. 301417, the order denying the motion, and the reporter's transcript of the hearing. 4

After a hearing on the demurrers, the court filed an order sustaining the demurrers on the grounds (1) the action was barred by the 180-day statute of limitations pursuant to section 51286; (2) plaintiffs lacked standing to sue; and (3) plaintiffs failed to exhaust their administrative remedies. 5

Following the filing of a judgment of dismissal, a timely notice of appeal was filed.

DISCUSSION
I. Section 51286 does not bar plaintiffs' action.

Plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by holding section 51286 provides the applicable statute of limitations for the instant action. Plaintiffs further contend that since section 51286 does not apply, the three-year statute as set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 338, subdivision (a) applies, because it pertains generally to "An action upon a liability created by statute, other than a penalty or forfeiture." Section 51286 provides:

"Any action or proceeding which, on the grounds of alleged noncompliance with the requirements of this chapter, seeks to attack, review, set aside, void, or annul a decision of a board of supervisors or a city council to cancel a contract shall be brought pursuant to Section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

"The action or proceeding shall be commenced within 180 days from the council or board order acting on a petition for cancellation filed under this chapter."

The language of section 51286, by its terms, refers only to actions of the Board and not to actions of the Assessor. Plaintiffs argue section 51286 does not apply to the instant challenge to the Assessor's actions in establishing a cancellation value as required by section 51283, subdivision (a), because review of the Assessor's valuation is no part of the Board's deliberations in determining whether to cancel the contract. In other words, plaintiffs contend they are not challenging whether the Board erred in determining to cancel the contract. They are only challenging whether the Assessor followed the provisions of the Williamson Act when it made the cancellation valuation. The Assessor counters by focusing on the language stating "[a]ny action [based] on the grounds of alleged noncompliance with the requirements of this chapter ... [p] shall be commenced within 180 days...." The problem with this focus is that it leaves out critical language upon which appellants rely, i.e., that it applies only to an action which "seeks to attack, review, set aside, void, or annul a decision of a board of supervisors ... to cancel a contract...."

Diablo Grande contends the Assessor's cancellation valuation was an essential element of the Board's decision to cancel the contract. "As mandated by section 51283, the Board's determination of the cancellation fee was based on the Assessor's determination of the cancellation valuation and both determinations were made prior to (and as preconditions of) the Board's approval of the cancellation." As such, Diablo Grande concludes, an attack on the Assessor's cancellation valuation is an attack on the Board's decision to cancel the WAC, within the meaning of section 51286.

A. Rules of statutory construction.

In proceeding to determine the correct interpretation of section 51286, we are aided by certain general principles of statutory construction:

"The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.] In order to determine this intent, we begin by examining the language of the statute. [Citations.] But '[i]t is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that language of a statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend.' [Citations.] ... Thus, '[t]he intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act.' [Citation.] Finally, we do not construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute 'with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.' [Citation.]" (People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898-899, 276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420, fn. omitted; accord Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr....

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