People ex rel. Elliott v. Juergens

• Decision Date: 27 November 1950
• Docket Number: No. 31690,31690
• Citation: People ex rel. Elliott v. Juergens, 95 N.E.2d 602, 407 Ill. 391 (Ill. 1950)
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. ELLIOTT, Atty.Gen., et al. v. JUERGENS, County Judge.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 602

95 N.E.2d 602

407 Ill. 391

PEOPLE ex rel. ELLIOTT, Atty.Gen., et al. v. JUERGENS, County Judge.

No. 31690.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 27, 1950.

Ivan A. Elliott, Atty.Gen. (William C. Wines, James C. Murray, and Raymond S. Sarnow, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Conn & Clendenin, of Sparta, and Schuwerk & Schuwerk, of Chester, for appellee.

GUNN, Justice.

The People of the State of Illinois, on the relation of the Attorney General, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the circuit court of Randolph County against William G. Juergens, as county judge, appellee, to require him to vacate a certain order entered January 10, 1950, in which said county judge refused to entertain a petition to examine an inmate of the penitentiary, who was claimed to come within the provisions of section 8 of the act of 1933 in relation to the State penitentiary, (Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 108, par. 112,) relating to the examination and detention of criminal sexual psychopaths. The defendant answered and claimed said section of the act was unconstitutional, and the circuit judge declined to issue a writ of mandamus. The People being a party to said suit, the case comes to this court upon direct appeal.

The facts disclose that Menard penitentiary is located in Randolph County; that there are a number of persons imprisoned in said penitentiary for the crimes of rape, incest, crime against nature, indecent liberties, and attempts to commit said crimes; that under the act above referred to it is made the duty of the Director of Public Safety to cause persons convicted of said crimes to be examined before their discharge, and for that purpose the act above mentioned was enacted, making it the duty of the county judge, upon the application of said Director, to appoint competent physicians to examine said persons, and if they are found to be insane or feeble- minded, or a criminal sexual psychopath, such person at the end of his sentence shall be delivered to the Department of Public Welfare in an appropriate hospital instead of being released from the penitentiary.

Several applications had been made to the said county judge, and after mature deliberation he came to the conclusion that the act in question was unconstitutional, and that he had no power and authority to appoint physicians to make the examination provided for in the statute. This had occurred several times before the commencement of the present lawsuit. The instant case involves the refusal of the county judge to appoint physicians to make examination of one Herbert Hollowell, who was confined in the penitentiary for one of the above-enumerated offenses.

The petition, addressed to the county judge, requested the court to enter its order for an examination to determine whether the said Hollowell was insane, feeble-minded or a criminal sexual psychopath. The county judge refused to appoint physicians as required by the statute on the ground the act was unconstitutional, and therefore he had no authority to comply with the petition of the Director of Public Welfare. The petition for mandamus was then filed to compel the county judge to expunge the order entered by him, and to proceed in the manner required by the act. After the hearing, the circuit judge entered an order denying the writ of mandamus because he found that in refusing to make the appointment the county court exercised a judicial action, in that it found that the act was unconstitutional, and that mandamus could not properly be issued to control judicial discretion; and for the further reason that he found the question had become moot, because the issuance of the writ of mandamus would not operate as an effectual remedy in the cause.

From the foregoing issues it appears that there are two questions before this court: First, is the Criminal Sexual Psychopathic Act constitutional; and, second, if held to be constitutional, was mandamus the proper remedy in the present case?

In order to get the proper perspective we should examine the legislation upon the subject of psychopaths. In 1938 the General Assembly enacted an act to provide for the commitment and detention of criminal sexual psychopathic persons. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 38, par. 820 et seq.) Such person was defined as follows: "All persons suffering from a mental disorder, and not insane or feeble-minded, which mental disorder has existed for a period of not less than one (1) year, immediately prior to the filing of the petition hereinafter provided for, coupled with criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses, are hereby declared to be criminal sexual psychopathic persons." (Par. 820.) The law also provided that when it appeared to the Attorney General or to the State's Attorney that such a person was a criminal sexual psychopath he could file a petition in court, whereupon it became the duty of such court to appoint two qualified psychiatrists to make examination of such criminal sexual psychopath and file their report, and later a trial by jury was authorized and provision made for his discharge from the Department of Public Safety in case of his recovery. This act applied to persons who were charged with crime, and who had not yet been convicted, and who were placed in the custody of the Department of Public Safety until they recovered, and were tried for the crime with which they were charged.

The act under consideration here was designed for a different purpose. It was intended to cover the cases of those who had been convicted of sex crimes, and who had become feeble-minded, insane, or had become criminal sexual psychopaths, and if such was found to be the case at the termination of such person's imprisonment he was not kept in prison, or in charge of the Department of Public Safety, but, if it was found he was insane, feeble-minded, or a criminal sexual psychopath, he was to be delivered to the Department of Public Welfare until he had recovered. The provisions of this act are quite similar to those relating to the detention of criminal psychopaths provided for in the Criminal Code.

Briefly, the act in question provides that it is the duty of the Department of Public Safety to cause an examination to be made at suitable intervals to ascertain whether any convict has developed a condition of insanity, or has given evidence that he is feeble-minded, with continuing criminal tendencies, or has become a criminal sexual psychopath, and in such event to transfer the convict to the psychiatric division of the penitentiary for custody and treatment. The act further provides that before the expiration of the sentence of any convict who has been confined for certain sex crimes, or for attempts to commit the same, the Department of Public Safety shall apply to the county court of the county where the convict is confined to require an examination to be made of such convict to determine whether he is insane or feeble-minded, or is a criminal sexual psychopath; and if such convict is found to be insane, feeble-minded or a criminal sexual psychopath he shall, upon the expiration of his sentence, be committed to the Department of Public Welfare for confinement in an appropriate State hospital, best suited and equipped to rehabilitate and care for him.

The act then provides how the examination shall be conducted by the physicians, for production of the records of the penitentiary; and provides that any person committed to the Department of Public Welfare, if found to be insane or feeble-minded and confined to the State hospital, when found to have recovered, shall be dealt with in the manner provided for the discharge of persons confined in insane or feeble-minded hospitals. And a person committed to the Department of Public Welfare, after having been found to be a criminal sexual psychopath and confined in the State hospital, if found later to have recovered, shall be dealt with in the manner provided by section 6 of the act first above described. Section 6 of this act (chap. 38, par. 825) provides that after a person is committed, and an application is made in writing showing that such criminal sexual psychopathic person has recovered, he may be tried before a jury after a time fixed by the court, and if the verdict of the jury finds that such person has fully recovered he shall be discharged from the custody of the Department of Public Safety. If it finds...