People ex rel. Faulk v. District Court In and For Fremont County, 83SA386
Citation | 673 P.2d 998 |
Decision Date | 05 December 1983 |
Docket Number | No. 83SA386,83SA386 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, ex rel. Dennis E. FAULK, District Attorney In and For the Eleventh Judicial District of Colorado, Petitioner, v. The DISTRICT COURT In and For the COUNTY OF FREMONT, and the Honorable John Anderson, One of the Judges Thereof, Respondent. |
Court | Supreme Court of Colorado |
Dennis E. Faulk, Dist. Atty., Steven B. Rich, Deputy Dist. Atty., Fairplay, for petitioner.
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Philip L. Dubois, Deputy State Public Defender, Salida, for Jack Clark.
John Anderson, pro se.
The respondent court held section 16-13-103, C.R.S.1973 (1982 Supp.), a part of the Colorado habitual-criminal statute, unconstitutional and dismissed four habitual-criminal counts against the defendant, Jack Clark. The People brought this original proceeding under C.A.R. 21, requesting that we issue a rule to show cause why the respondent court should not be ordered to reinstate the habitual-criminal counts. We issued the rule and now make it absolute.
Jack Clark was charged with two counts of first-degree kidnapping, 1 two counts of holding hostages, 2 one count of attempted escape, 3 and four counts of being an habitual criminal. 4 The charges arose out of an incident in which the defendant overpowered two guards and attempted to escape from prison in Canon City.
Before trial, Clark moved to dismiss the habitual-criminal counts on the basis that section 16-13-103, C.R.S.1973 (1982 Supp.), is unconstitutional. This statute outlines the bifurcated system for determining habitual criminality in Colorado. Subsection (1) states:
(Emphasis added.) 5
Clark argued that section 16-13-103 violates his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury by requiring that the separate sentencing hearing be conducted before the same jury which sits for his trial on the substantive offenses. He claimed that, under the statute, his right to an impartial jury "is impermissibly diluted by the de facto denial of the opportunity to voir dire prospective jurors on matters relative to the Habitual Criminal proceedings." In effect, the same-jury requirement allegedly forces a defendant in Clark's position to choose between an impartial jury for the substantive phase of the trial and an impartial jury for the habitual-criminal phase of the trial.
At a hearing on Clark's motion to dismiss, the respondent court agreed that section 16-13-103 is unconstitutional. The same-jury requirement, it concluded, In the court's view, section 16-13-103 deprived Clark of the ability to select a fair and impartial jury for the habitual-criminal sentencing hearing. 6 It therefore declared the statute to be unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to Clark and dismissed the four habitual-criminal counts.
See also Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505, 91 S.Ct. 490, 27 L.Ed.2d 571 (1971) ( ).
The question in this case is whether, due to the same-jury requirement in section 16-13-103, the defendant can have an impartial jury during the habitual-criminal sentencing hearing. This issue should be distinguished from the more basic question of whether the defendant is entitled to a jury trial at all. Even though the habitual-criminal statute describes a status rather than a substantive offense, see Maestas v. District Court, 189 Colo. 443, 541 P.2d 889 (1975), it expressly provides for a jury trial to determine if that status is applicable. We recognize that, under the statute, the same jury which returns a guilty verdict on the underlying offense must then decide whether the defendant committed the necessary prior crimes to be adjudged an habitual criminal. Vigil v. People, 196 Colo. 522, 587 P.2d 1196 (1978); see Wolff v. People, 123 Colo. 487, 230 P.2d 581 (1951); Routa v. People, 117 Colo. 564, 192 P.2d 436 (1948); People v. Trujillo, 40 Colo.App. 220, 577 P.2d 297 (1977). 7 If the prosecution proves that the defendant has the necessary prior felony convictions, the sentence for the underlying offense will be enhanced under the provisions of section 16-13-101, C.R.S.1973 (1982 Supp.). 8
Despite the fact that constitutional safeguards are built into the bifurcated system, the respondent court nevertheless held section 16-13-103 to be unconstitutional. It concluded that the defendant's right to an impartial jury during the habitual-criminal sentencing hearing was violated by the de facto inability of defense counsel, before the beginning of the substantive trial, to voir dire prospective jurors about the habitual-criminal charges. We have considered the respondent court's interpretation of section 16-13-103 but are not persuaded that the statute in question is constitutionally defective.
Some time ago, in Brown v. People, 124 Colo. 412, 238 P.2d 847 (1951), we upheld the "well-established" procedures contained in section 16-13-103's predecessor. 9 Three defendants were tried jointly and convicted of the necessary substantive offense. The trial court then conducted separate hearings before the same jury to determine habitual criminality. On appeal, the defendants argued that, despite the separation, they were prejudiced by the use of the same jury during the habitual-criminal phase of the trial. We stated:
Id. at 417, 238 P.2d at 849-50 (emphasis added). See also Swift v. People, 171 Colo. 178, 465 P.2d 391 (1970) ( ).
In addition, we rejected the argument that a defendant should be permitted, before the habitual-criminal phase of the trial, to voir dire the already-impanelled jury once again. The defendant in this case suggests further voir dire examination and the use of peremptory challenges as an alternative to the respondent court's ruling. The respondent court, however, concedes that further voir dire of the same jury is not permitted, and we agree. See Brown, 124 Colo. 412, 238 P.2d 847 (1951); Wolff, 123 Colo. 487, 230 P.2d 581 (1951). Since the same-jury requirement in section 16-13-103 is, in our view, constitutional, we see no reason to disturb the corollary principle on voir dire recognized in Brown and Wolff.
The bifurcated system in section 16-13-103, which incorporated the same-jury requirement discussed above, was not instituted until after our decision in People v. Chavez, 621 P.2d 1362 (Colo.1981). In Chavez, we held that, even if a defendant testifies during the substantive phase of the trial, and evidence is introduced concerning prior convictions, the prosecution must still prove those convictions beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict the defendant of being an habitual criminal. We noted that it was "not inappropriate" for the trial court in Chavez to bifurcate the two phases of the trial, even though bifurcation was not mandatory at the time. 10 While the primary focus was not on the use of the same jury to determine habitual criminality,...
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