People ex rel. Freeman v. Murphy

• Citation: 72 N.E. 902,212 Ill. 584
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. FREEMAN v. MURPHY.
• Decision Date: 07 December 1904
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

212 Ill. 584

72 N.E. 902

PEOPLE ex rel. FREEMAN

v.MURPHY.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 7, 1904.

Motion by the people, on the relation of George Freeman, for leave to file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against E. J. Murphy, warden. Motion denied.A. B. Dunning, for relator.

RICKS, C. J.

A motion for leave to file a petition for habeas corpus is made by the relator, Freeman, and the particular ground for relief set forth in the petition is that the petitioner, who was indicted for murder, was not given a trial within four months after the time of his commitment to jail. The relator was committed to jail in Cook county November 21, 1903, on a coroner's warrant, charged with the murder of Cornelius Van Zandwick, following an inquest. He was indicted at the December term, 1903, of the criminal court, entered his plea of not guilty on December 22, 1903, and demanded a trial at the February term, 1904, on the last day of the month and term. He obtained a continuance of the cause at the March term, 1904, on the 28th day of March, and on the 29th day of the same month the order of continuance was, on his motion, set aside. He then moved to be discharged for want of prosecution within the fourth term of the court. The motion was denied and the trial entered upon, and the examination of jurors begun and continued until a jury was fully impaneled and sworn on March 30th, and the trial was proceeded with to April 6th, when a verdict of guilty of manslaughter was returned. A motion for a new trial was made, and at the June term, 1904, overruled, and the relator sentenced.

The criminal court of Cook county has a term commencing the first Monday of each month, and all pending and undisposed of causes are continued from one term to another by operation of law, unless otherwise continued. Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, c. 37, par. 56. Relator was tried, or his trial entered upon, at a term of court commencing within four months from his commitment, but the trial was not concluded until the April term, which commenced more than four months after his commitment. He was tried by a jury impaneled at the March term, and did not, during the trial, move for or demand his discharge, and no order was asked of or entered by the criminal court touching his discharge after the trial began.

The statute relied on is as follows: ‘Any person committed for a cirminal or supposed criminal offense, and not admitted to bail, and not tried at some term of the court having jurisdiction of the offense commencing within four months of the date of commitment, or if there is no term commencing within that time, then at or before the first term commencing after said four months, shall be set at liberty by the court, unless the delay shall happen on the application of the prisoner, or unless the court is satisfied that due exertion has been made to procure the evidence on the part of the people, and that there is reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be procured at the next term, in which case the court may continue the case to the next term.’ Hurd's Rev. St. 1899, c. 38, par. 438.

It is contended by the relator that because his trial was not completed during the March term of the court, but extended over into the April term, the court lost jurisdiction of his person under the provisions of the above statute, and that he is therefore entitled to his discharge under the writ of habeas corpus. It is not denied that, at the term the jury was impaneled and his trial entered upon, the court had jurisdictionof both the subjectmatter and the person of the relator, and there can be no question but that the court retained jurisdiction, unless the jurisdiction of the person of the relator was lost by the court entering some order that it should not have entered, or failing to enter some order that should have been entered.

The above statute authorizes the court to continue a cause to a term commencing after four months from the time of commitment, if the delay has happened upon the application of the prisoner, or if the court is satisfied that due exertion has been made to procure the evidence on the part of the people, and if the court is also satisfied that there is reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be procured at the term to which said cause is continued. When the court is moved to discharge a prisoner, or when his release is sought under the provisions of the above statute, a number of questions arise upon such application, which, we think, must be determined in the court in which the prisoner is held for trial. Some of these questions are of such a nature that it could well be said that they rest within the sound legal discretion of the trial court. In view of the provisions of the statute and the authority reposed in the court under it, we are clearly of the opinion that no court but the trial court in which the proceeding is pending has jurisdiction to primarily determine this question, and that no court except a court of review has jurisdiction...