People ex rel. Gordon v. Murphy

• Citation: 285 N.Y.S.2d 198,55 Misc.2d 275
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York on the relation of Henry GORDON, Petitioner, v. Henry T. MURPHY, Director of the Woodbourne Rehabilitation Center, Woodbourne, New York, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 21 November 1967
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (New York)

Page 198

285 N.Y.S.2d 198

55 Misc.2d 275

The PEOPLE of the State of New York on the relation of Henry GORDON, Petitioner, v. Henry T. MURPHY, Director of the Woodbourne Rehabilitation Center, Woodbourne, New York, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Sullivan County.

Nov. 21, 1967.

Nathan G. Hand, Liberty (Warren A. Cohen, Rochester, of counsel), for relator.

Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., of the State of New York (Malvin A. Cohen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Albany, of counsel), for respondent.

LAWRENCE H. COOKE, Justice.

Relator having been found to be a narcotic addict within the meaning of article 9 of the Mental Hygiene Law and having been certified to the care and Custody of the New York State Narcotic Addiction Control Commission and now confined to the Woodbourne Rehabilitation Center, this habeas corpus proceeding has been instituted to secure his release based on the stated grounds: (1) that the consent to detention by relator was not made voluntarily within the 'appreciation' of Miranda v. State of Arizona; (2) that the physical facilities as they presently exist at Woodbourne are those of a correctional institution and not of a rehabilitation center; and (3) that relator is now rehabilitated.

Speaking generally, the writ of habeas corpus is a traditional means of inquiring into the legality of a person's detention, it being a special proceeding used, where a person is actually imprisoned or otherwise restrained in his liberty at the time the writ is issued, to test the jurisdiction of the person or authority which presumes to restrain him (CPLR 7001; People ex rel. Wachowicz v. Martin, 293 N.Y. 361, 366, 57 N.E.2d 53, 55, 154 A.L.R. 1128; Matter of Morhous v. N.Y. Supreme Court, 293 N.Y. 131, 135, 56 N.E.2d 79, 81; People ex rel. Tweed v. Liscomb, 60 N.Y. 559; Wachtel, New York Practice Under the CPLR, pp. 346--347; 21 Carmody-Wait, Cyclopedia of New York Practice, pp. 67--68; 25 N.Y.Jur., Habeas Corpus, § 1).

I

Relator cites Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, as establishing the principle that a person may not waive his right against self-incrimination unless it was done knowingly and with full appreciation of the consequences thereof. The gist of said holding is found at page 444, 86 S.Ct. at page 1612--'the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.' In Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 at page 67, 26 S.Ct. 370, at page 376, 50 L.Ed. 652, it was held: 'The interdiction of the 5th Amendment operates only where a witness is asked to incriminate himself,--in other words, to give testimony which may possibly expose him to a criminal charge. But if the criminality has already been taken away, the amendment ceases to apply.' These statements were quoted at length in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, at page 431, 76 S.Ct. 497, 100 L.Ed. 511 (1956). In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, at page 94, 84 S.Ct. 1594, at page 1611, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964), Justice White, in concurring, stated: 'The privilege can be claimed in any proceeding, be it criminal or civil, administrative or judicial, investigatory or adjudicatory * * * and it protects any disclosures which the witness may reasonably apprehend could be used In a criminal prosecution or which could lead to other evidence that might be so used' (emphasis supplied). In Matter of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, it was held that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juveniles charged with delinquency (p. 55, 87 S.Ct. 1428). Here, there was no self-incrimination because section 206--b of the Mental Hygiene Law conferred complete immunity in its statement that 'The certification of a narcotic addict * * * shall not forfeit or abridge any of the rights of any such narcotic addict as a citizen of the United States or of the State of New York; * * * nor shall the facts or proceedings relating to the admission, certification or treatment of any such narcotic addict be used against him in any proceeding in any court, other than a proceeding pursuant to the provisions of this article' (Matter of Spadafora, 54 Misc.2d 123, 128, 281 N.Y.S.2d 923, 928; cf. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 434--435, 76 S.Ct. 497; Matter of Grand Jury, County of Kings (Nicastro), 201 Misc. 4, 111 N.Y.S.2d 222, affd. 279 App.Div. 915, 110 N.Y.S.2d 532, affd. 303 N.Y. 983, 106 N.E.2d 63; People v. Nowacki, 180 Misc. 100, 40 N.Y.S.2d 131).

In Miranda v. State of Arizona, supra, custodial interrogation was defined, 386 U.S. at page 444, 86 S.Ct. at page 1612, as: '* * * questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' Here, there is no proof of questioning initiated by law enforcement officers. The proof demonstrates that the petition or application under subdivision 2(a) of section 206 of the Mental Hygiene Law was made by relator himself and, under said section, the medical examination was ordered by a Judge. Cf. Sas v. State of Maryland, 4 Cir., 334 F.2d 506, 511.

The proceeding resulting in relator's confinement was not one involving criminal charges as in Miranda and Escobedo v. State of Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977; nor was it one charging juvenile delinquency as in Gault and Matter of Rust, 53 Misc.2d 51, 278 N.Y.S.2d 333. Narcotic addiction is an illness, not a crime, and the addict is a sick person who may be confined for treatment or for the protection of society and concerning whom, in the interest of the general health or welfare of its inhabitants, a state might establish a program of compulsory treatment (Robinson v. State of California, 370 U.S. 660, 665, 667, 676, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758; cf. Sporza v. German Savings Bank, 192 N.Y. 8, 84 N.E. 406; People ex rel. Anonymous v. La Burt, 14 A.D.2d 560, 218 N.Y.S.2d 738, mot. for lv. to app. den. 10 N.Y.2d 708, 223 N.Y.S.2d 1025, 179 N.E.2d 715, cert. den. 369 U.S. 428, 82 S.Ct. 880, 8 L.Ed.2d 7). Nor is it a trifling or ordinary illness, for the human suffering and social and economic loss caused by the disease of drug addiction are matters of grave concern to the people of the state, since crime, unemployment, poverty, loss of human dignity, loss of the ability to fill a meaningful and productive role in the community and damage to the physical and mental health of the addict himself are by-products of this spreading disease which is a threat to the peace and safety of the inhabitants of the state (Mental Hygiene Law, § 200).

Section 206 of the Mental Hygiene Law outlines an orderly procedure for the certification of a narcotic addict which is adapted to the nature of the proceeding and in which the individual has an opportunity to be heard and to defend, enforce and protect his rights, the privilege being afforded to a confined person to litigate fully the question of his drug addiction and the propriety of the proceedings leading to his confinement (Mental Hygiene Law, §§ 206(8), 426); and the constitutional requirement of due process, therefore, is satisfied (Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362, 369, 50 S.Ct. 299, 74 L.Ed. 904; Matter of Coates, 9 N.Y.2d 242, 249, 213 N.Y.S.2d 74, 79, 173 N.E.2d 797, 801, appeal dismissed sub nom. Coates v. Walters, 368 U.S. 34, 82 S.Ct. 147, 7 L.Ed.2d 91; Matter of Lyons v. Goldstein, 290 N.Y. 19, 24--25, 47 N.E.2d 425, 428; Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N.Y. 183, 191; Matter of Spadafora, 54 Misc.2d 123, 128, 281 N.Y.S.2d 923, 928; 9 N.Y.Jur., Constitutional Law, § 327). The statutes in question come within the permissible area pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in Robinson v. State of California, 370 U.S. 660, 664--665, 82 S.Ct. 1417. It is assumed that all the steps required by the statute were regularly taken (Sporza v. German Savings Bank, 192 N.Y. 8, 19, 84 N.E. 406, 410; Fisch on New York Evidence, § 1133). Here, the presumption of regularity was not overcome by the submission of any evidence of substance to the contrary.

II

Section 206--a of the Mental Hygiene Law provides, in part, that: 'The commission may retain any narcotic addict certified to its care...