People ex rel. Greer v. Hunt

• Citation: 311 Ill. 291,142 N.E. 522
• Decision Date: 19 February 1924
• Docket Number: No. 15828.,15828.
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. GREER, County Collector, v. HUNT.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

311 Ill. 291

142 N.E. 522

PEOPLE ex rel. GREER, County Collector,

v.HUNT.

No. 15828.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 19, 1924.

Proceeding by the People, on the relation of Harry W. Greer, County Collector, against Bertha B. Hunt. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Appeal from Fulton County Court; J. D. Breckenridge, Judge.

Floyd F. Putman, of Canton, for appellant.

Marvin T. Robinson, of Lewistown, for appellee.

FARMER, C. J.

This appeal is prosecuted by the appellant from a judgment of the county court sustaining objections of appellee, Bertha B. Hunt, to judgment for a delinquent personal property tax which the collector extended against real estate of appellee. The board of review assessed for taxation as the property of appellee a contract entered into June 2, 1920, between appellee and Toney Golick, by which appellee, the owner of certain land described in the contract, agreed she would convey it to Golick upon the payment of $27,000 according to the terms of the contract. A payment of $4,000 was made, and there remained in 1921 and 1922 a balance due on the contract of $23,000. The board of review in 1922 assessed the contract as appellee's property at a valuation of $13,800, and also assessed it for the previous year at the same valuation as an omitted credit taxable to appellee that year. The taxes extended amounted to $893.91. Appellee, on notice from the board of review, appeared before it and resisted the assessment. She refused to pay the tax, and it was extended against her real estate. She paid the taxes assessed against her land, and the collector extended the unpaid personal tax against her real estate. When he applied for judgment, appellee objected to judgment and order of sale for the personal property tax, and the county court sustained her objection and denied judgment.

Appellee filed eight objections, but it will not be necessary to set them all out or discuss them. The decision of the case depends upon whether for the years the property was assessed appellee was the owner of it on the 1st day of April, and also whether, in any event, it could have been taxed as a credit omitted in 1921.

The oral testimony shows the board of review investigated the liability of the contract for taxation in 1921, that appellee appeared before the board in answer to a notice, and that the board, upon a hearing, determined she was not liable to be taxed on the property and it was not assessed against her. There is no dispute of the truth of the testimony as to what the board did that year and of its decision that the property should not be taxed to appellee, but there was no record of the board of review showing what it did, other than that the tax books show the property was not assessed to appellee that year. We have held, when credits were disclosed for assessment and taxation, taxes extended and paid, and in a subsequent year the same party was assessed on omitted credits for the previous years in which credits were assessed and the taxes paid on the claim that the owner had not disclosed the true amount of his credits, the action of assessing the credits for the years they had been assessed and the taxes paid was unlawful and void. Warner v. Campbell, 238 Ill. 630, 87 N. E. 853. We have no doubt of the soundness of that decision. There must be some stability in the administration of the taxing laws by the tax authorities, and some security to the property owner in reliance on the official acts of the authorities. There might be circumstances which would justify the tax officer in disregarding the action in previous years as to assessing credits, but that could only be, if at all, under exceptional conditions. We think the general rule is, and should be, when credits are listed, assessed, and the tax paid, the property cannot for those years be again assessed in subsequent years as credits omitted. But that is not the precise question here presented. The question here is, the tax authorities having caused appellee to appear at a hearing when the object was to determine whether the contract was assessable against her as a credit, the hearing having resulted in a decision of the board of review that it was not taxable against her, whether the board's action in refusing to assess and tax the contract to appellee was in the nature of a judicial determination that year, and in effect a bar to a reconsideration of the question in a subsequent year.

We think the principle governing the question presented here is analogous in principle to the question decided in Warner v. Campbell, supra. The board of review heard and considered the facts presented on the question of the liability of appellee to be assessed on the property in 1921, and decided she was not. Appellee's claim was that she had prior to April 1, on notice to Golick, terminated and forfeited the contract. If the board of review in the following year could disregard the action and decision of the board in 1921, and on the same facts find the contract was assessable to appellee, then a new board of review in any year could disregard the previous board's action, and the taxpayer would always be in a state of uncertainty. The law presumes public officers properly perform their duties; and we think, in the interest of stability, when it does not appear that there was any concealment of the facts upon which the taxpayer bases his claim that the property should not be taxed to him, the action of the board should be a protection to the taxpayer against any action of the board in subsequent years to tax the same property against the same party which the former board had determined should not be assessed against him. That is not different in principle from the rule laid down in Warner v. Campbell, supra. Peirce v. Carlock, 224 Ill. 608, 79 N. E. 959, and Barkley v. Dale, 213 Ill. 614, 73 N. E. 325.

The only record the board of review is required to keep of its action in determining whether property shall be assessed against a party is to note what it does on the tax books. As it did nothing about taxing the property here involved, the board made no entry on the tax books, and we think oral testimony of the hearing and determination of the board was competent. Our conclusion...