People ex rel. Griffin v. City of Chicago
| Citation | 382 Ill. 500,48 N.E.2d 329 |
| Decision Date | 13 May 1943 |
| Docket Number | no. 26809.,26809. |
| Parties | PEOPLE ex rel. GRIFFIN et al. v. CITY OF CHICAGO et al. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Illinois |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Mandamus proceeding by the People, on the relation of James J. Griffin and others, against the City of Chicago and others to compel the Mayor and other city officers to certify and issue proper vouchers and checks for the difference between the amount paid the plaintiffs as city firemen during the years 1932 to 1936, inclusive, and the sums which were established in the appropriation ordinances for said years, and in the alternative to compel the city council to make appropriations for the payment of such amounts. Judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiffs appeal.
Judgment affirmed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; John Prystalski, judge.
Lawrence C. Mills and William A. Cunnea, both of Chicago, for appellants.
Barnet Hodes, Corp. Counsel, of Chicago (J. Herzl Segal, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.
On July 18, 1936, there was filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the circuit court of Cook county by twelve plaintiffs who are members of the fire department of the city of Chicago and thereafter, during the year 1936, this petition was consolidated with two other petitions for writs of mandamus filed by other members of the fire department of said city. These petitions sought to compel the mayor, the comptroller, the fire commissioner and the city treasurer to certify and issue proper vouchers and checks for the difference between the amounts paid the plaintiffs during the years 1932 to 1936, inclusive, and the sums which were established in the appropriation ordinances for said years, and, in the alternative, to compel the city council to make appropriations for the payment of said amounts.
The petitions, besides containing the jurisdictional allegations, also alleged that during the period in question the city council, by the appropriation ordinance passed in each year, fixed and determined the salaries of the appellants at certain rates, being the same rates as the salaries for the year 1931, but failed to appropriate for the full amounts thereof and that the city paid only the reduced amounts to the petitioners, though full services were rendered.
The manner of appropriating for the salaries of the appellants is best illustrated by the following portion of the appropriation ordinance for the year 1932:
‘Fire Department
+-----------------------------------------+
¦ ¦Amounts ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦ ¦Appropriated¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦Salaries and wages-continued¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦Division Fire Marshal, 12 ¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦at $4,000.00 per annum ¦$ 42,491.76 ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦Chief of Battalion, 54 at ¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦$4,000.00 per annum ¦169,967.15 ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦Chief of Battalion, 4 for ¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦6 months beginning July ¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦1, 1932, at $333.33 per ¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦month ¦6,207.65 ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦Captain, 184 at $3,200.00 ¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦per annum ¦463,317.52 ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦Lieutenant, 213 at $2,900.00¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦per annum ¦486,059.61 ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦Fireman and Probationers; ¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦first six months of ¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦service at $2,140.00; ¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦Third Class after six ¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦months'service at ¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦$2,320.00; Second Class ¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦after eighteen months' ¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦service at $2,440.00; ¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦First Class after thirty ¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦months' service at ¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦$2,500.00; (see Section 8 ¦ ¦
+----------------------------+------------¦
¦of this ordinance) ¦3,554,000.00¦
+-----------------------------------------+
The appellants content that the compensation was fixed by a figure appearing immediately after the statement of the position of each office, while the city insists the salary was fixed at the amount actually appropriated for the position.
The appellants further alleged in their petition that the deductions made were equivalent to the amount of pay which the appellants earned for 78 days in 1932, 65 days in 1933, 52 days in 1934, 52 days in 1935, and 26 days in 1936.
The answer and amended answer of the city admitted the factual allegations of the petition, but denied that the city council had fixed the salaries at the sums claimed and denied that the city had funds with which to pay the claims and charged that the appellants were guilty of laches and that the city would become insolvent and suffer undue hardship because it would be unable to make up a deficit of $22,500,000 which would accrue if mandamus were allowed. The defense of laches and undue hardship was raised in the amendment to the answer and a motion to strike the same was overruled by the court.
The matter was tried before the court and most of the evidence was stipulated but certain testimony was taken with reference to oral demands by the fire department members upon the city council for the appropriation of money sufficient to pay the full salaries due them, and testimony by the chief clerk in the comptroller's office as to the amount of taxes received by the city of Chicago during certain years. The plaintiffs tried to show, by a transcript of a speech made by former Mayor Anton J. Cermak to the firemen of the city, representations regarding their reduction in salaries. The court refused to admit this speech in evidence on the ground that it would not be binding upon the city of Chicago and on the further ground that it was made prior to the appropriation ordinance complained of.
Plaintiffs claim to have two theories, which are as follows: 1. That the city council determined their annual salaries in the appropriation ordinance for the years 1932 to 1936, inclusive, at a definite figure and that having so determined the salary of each petitioner, that said city council could not legally appropriate a lesser amount; that the liability of the city was determined by the fixing of the salaries and that if the city has difficulty in securing funds for their payment, it is not a legal excuse for nonperformance of its duty. 2. The second theory applies only to the year 1932 and is based on the idea that the appropriation ordinance for 1932 had to be passed in the first quarter of the year or before March 31, 1932, and that by the failure of the council to adopt the appropriation ordinance for 1932 until June 13, 1932, it was entirely void and the basis of pay for the petitioners was the scale for the year 1931. In this contention, the appellants assert the invalidity of an act...
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