People ex rel. Hartrich v. 2010 Harley-Davidson

• Decision Date: 16 February 2018
• Docket Number: Docket No. 121636
• Citation: 104 N.E.3d 1179,2018 IL 121636
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois EX REL. Matthew HARTRICH, State's Attorney of Crawford County, Illinois, Appellant, v. 2010 HARLEY–DAVIDSON (Petra Henderson, Appellee).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2018 IL 121636

104 N.E.3d 1179

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois EX REL. Matthew HARTRICH, State's Attorney of Crawford County, Illinois, Appellant,

v.2010 HARLEY–DAVIDSON (Petra Henderson, Appellee).

Docket No. 121636

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Opinion filed February 16, 2018

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Matthew Hartrich, State’s Attorney, of Robinson (David L. Franklin, Solicitor General, Michael M. Glick and Jason F. Krigel, Assistant Attorneys General, of Chicago, and Patrick Delfino, David J. Robinson, and Patrick D. Daly, of State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of Mt. Vernon, of counsel), for the People.

James A. Campion, of Campion, Curran, Lamb & Cunabaugh, P.C., of Crystal Lake, for appellee.

JUSTICE KILBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 The last time this court addressed the application of the excessive fines clause of the federal constitution's eighth amendment to the civil forfeiture of personal property was our decision in People ex rel. Waller v. 1989 Ford F350 Truck , 162 Ill. 2d 78, 204 Ill.Dec. 759, 642 N.E.2d 460 (1994). In this appeal, we return to that issue.

¶ 2 After the trial court ordered the forfeiture of the claimant's motorcycle based on her husband's criminal conduct while driving it, she first raised an as-applied constitutional challenge to the Illinois civil forfeiture statute ( 720 ILCS 5/36–1 (West 2012) ). She argued that the statute, as applied to the specific facts in this case, violated the excessive fines clause of the United States Constitution ( U.S. Const., amend. VIII ). Those facts showed that her husband was driving on a revoked license while under the influence of alcohol after an earlier revocation was extended due to his prior conviction for driving while his license was revoked, following multiple driving under the influence (DUI) convictions and statutory summary suspensions. The trial court rejected her claim, but the appellate court reversed. The appellate court concluded the forfeiture of the motorcycle constituted a constitutionally excessive penalty, violating the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment. 2016 IL App (5th) 150035, ¶ 41, 407 Ill.Dec. 917, 64 N.E.3d 716. We reverse the judgment of the appellate court and reinstate the trial court's forfeiture order.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 After midnight on April 26, 2014, a police officer in Robinson, Illinois, heard a motorcycle "revving" before observing a trike-style motorcycle make a "very wide" right turn, swerve, and nearly hit a telephone pole. The officer followed and turned on his car's emergency lights, but the motorcycle did not stop. The officer then activated his siren, but the motorcycle still did not stop. Instead, it continued to weave across the road for a total of about 12 blocks before turning into a driveway. The motorcycle was driven by Mark Henderson, whose wife, Petra, was a passenger on the back.

¶ 5 When Mark got off the motorcycle, the officer noted that he exhibited "a strong odor of alcohol," slurred speech, and poor balance. The officer placed him under arrest. A breath test revealed his blood alcohol concentration was 0.161, over twice the legal limit. Mark was charged with aggravated DUI ( 625 ILCS 5/11–501(d) (West 2014) ) and driving with a suspended or revoked driver's license ( 625 ILCS 5/6–303 (West 2014) ).¹ Since 1996, his license had been summarily suspended multiple times, and his license was revoked following his 2008 DUI conviction. That revocation was extended after he was convicted of driving with a revoked license in 2012; as of April 2014, Mark's license remained revoked. The police seized the motorcycle, a 2010 Harley–Davidson, and the State filed initial and amended forfeiture complaints in the circuit court of Crawford County pursuant to section 36–1 of the Criminal Code of 2012 ( 720 ILCS 5/36–1(a)(6)(A)(i) (West 2012) ).

¶ 6 At a December 2014 hearing on the State's forfeiture request, Mark's wife Petra, the claimant in this case, was shown to be the title owner of the motorcycle, although Mark took care of the maintenance on the vehicle. Mark also had the key fob with him throughout the night of his arrest. The evidence showed that the motorcycle could be started whenever its key fob was near.

¶ 7 The claimant and her husband provided similar descriptions of that evening's events. The claimant testified that Mark was a passenger as she drove the motorcycle to a number of bars in nearby towns. Prior to the couple's 12–block ride home from the Corner Place bar in Robinson, Illinois, he jumped on the motorcycle before her for the first time that night and started it. The claimant, who had not been drinking, initially objected to her husband driving. He, however, refused to get off the motorcycle. At the forfeiture hearing, the claimant admitted that she knew Mark was intoxicated and had no driver's license. That statement matched the account she gave to the police when Mark was arrested. Nonetheless, she allowed him to drive her home because he told her the only alternative was for her to walk. The claimant testified that she had purchased the motorcycle in 2010 for $35,000, but no evidence was adduced about its value at either the time of her husband's arrest or the forfeiture hearing.

¶ 8 After hearing the evidence and the parties' arguments, the trial court entered an order of civil forfeiture, expressly finding that the claimant's testimony was self-serving and not credible. The trial court concluded that the claimant consented to her husband driving the motorcycle even though she knew he was intoxicated and did not have a valid driver's license, making the motorcycle subject to civil forfeiture. In a posttrial motion, the claimant argued for the first time that the forfeiture order created an as-applied violation of the excessive fines clause of the federal constitution's eighth amendment. The trial court rejected her claim, and she filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 9 The appellate court declined to overturn the trial judge's factual findings that the claimant's testimony was not credible and that she knowingly consented to her husband driving the motorcycle that night. Nonetheless, the court reversed the forfeiture order, concluding that, in light of the claimant's limited culpability, the penalty was unconstitutionally excessive under this court's three-part test in Waller , 162 Ill. 2d at 89–90, 204 Ill.Dec. 759, 642 N.E.2d 460. We allowed the State's petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 315(a) (eff. Mar. 15, 2016).

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 This appeal addresses the constitutionality of the Illinois civil forfeiture statute ( 720 ILCS 5/36–1(a)(6)(A)(i) (West 2012) ) as applied to the court-ordered forfeiture of the claimant's 2010 Harley–Davidson motorcycle. The claimant specifically alleges that the trial court's application of the civil forfeiture statute to her motorcycle under the facts of this case violates the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment of the federal constitution ( U.S. Const., amend. VIII ). The claimant makes it clear that she is bringing only an as-applied constitutional challenge to the statute, not a facial one. The distinction is crucial.

¶ 12 While a successful facial challenge faces the heavy burden of establishing that a statute is unconstitutional under any possible set of facts, an as-applied challenge has the burden of showing that a constitutional violation arises from the application of the statute to a specific set of facts and circumstances. People v. Holman , 2017 IL 120655, ¶ 29, 418 Ill.Dec. 889, 91 N.E.3d 849. For that reason, the facts necessarily play a critical role in the resolution of an as-applied constitutional challenge. Both facial and as-applied challenges face the same considerable burden of clearly overcoming the strong judicial presumption that the statute in question is constitutional. McElwain v. Office of the Illinois Secretary of State , 2015 IL 117170, ¶ 14, 396 Ill.Dec. 1, 39 N.E.3d 550 (stating the presumption in the context of an as-applied constitutional challenge); People v. Kitch , 239 Ill. 2d 452, 466, 347 Ill.Dec. 655, 942 N.E.2d 1235 (2011) (stating the presumption in the context of a facial constitutional challenge). In fact, our courts are obliged to construe all statutes so that they comport with the applicable constitutional provisions whenever reasonably possible. People v. Minnis , 2016 IL 119563, ¶ 21, 409 Ill.Dec. 60, 67 N.E.3d 272.

¶ 13 Because the constitutionality of a statute presents a legal question, we review the present as-applied challenge to the civil forfeiture statute de novo . People v. One 1998 GMC , 2011 IL 110236, ¶ 20, 355 Ill.Dec. 900, 960 N.E.2d 1071. We will, of course, continue to give deference to the trial court's underlying credibility and factual findings, reversing them only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Kalata v. Anheuser–Busch Cos. , 144 Ill. 2d 425, 433, 163 Ill.Dec. 502, 581 N.E.2d 656 (1991).

¶ 14 We note that the focus of the claimant's arguments has changed significantly since the forfeiture proceedings began in the trial court. In that court as well as the appellate court, the claimant relied heavily on her status as an "innocent owner," insisting that she did not knowingly consent to her husband driving the motorcycle on the night of his arrest. Both courts rejected that argument, with the appellate court concluding the manifest weight of the evidence supported the trial court's factual finding that the claimant permitted her husband to drive prior to his arrest despite knowing that he was intoxicated and did not have a driver's license. The appellate court also upheld the trial court's determination that the claimant's contrary exculpatory testimony was not credible. 2016 IL App (5th) 150035, ¶ 25, 407 Ill.Dec. 917, 64 N.E.3d 716. Before this court, however, the claimant has completely abandoned her prior legal argument, now...