People ex rel. Hempen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., s. 26557-26559.

• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois
• Citation: 379 Ill. 543,42 N.E.2d 69
• Docket Number: Nos. 26557-26559.,s. 26557-26559.
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. HEMPEN, County Collector, v. BALTIMORE & O. R. CO. et al. SAME v. SOUTH RY. CO. SAME v. CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO.
• Decision Date: 13 May 1942

379 Ill. 543
42 N.E.2d 69

PEOPLE ex rel. HEMPEN, County Collector,
v.
BALTIMORE & O. R. CO. et al.
SAME
v.
SOUTH RY. CO.
SAME
v.
CHICAGO, B. & Q. R. CO.

Nos. 26557-26559.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 13, 1942.

Proceeding by the People, on the relation of Fred J. Hempen, County Collector, against the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company, consolidated with proceedings by same relator against South Railway Company and against the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company, involving validity of taxes for 1939 of various subdivisions within Clinton County. From separate judgments, the defendant in each proceeding appeals.

Judgments affirmed in part, and reversed in part and remanded, with directions.

[42 N.E.2d 72]

Appeals from Clinton County Court; William Ragen, Judge.
Hugh V. Murray, Jr., of Centralia, Kramer, Campbell, Costello & Wiechert, of East St. Louis, Andrew C. Scott and James I. Shields, both of Chicago (Morison R. Waite and William A. Eggers, both of Cincinnati, Ohio, and S. R. Prince and L. M. Abbot, both of Washington, D. C., of counsel), for appellants.

Jos. B. Schlarman, State's Atty., of Carlyle (Andrew O. Niehoff and Maurice B. Johnston, both of Carlyle, of counsel), for appellee.

GUNN, Justice.

These consolidated appeals are taken by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company (No. 26557), the Southern Railway Company (No. 26558), and the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Company (No. 26559), from separate judgments of the county court of Clinton county overruling their several objections to taxes for 1939 of various subdivisions within said county, upon the application of the county collector for judgment. There are eleven different taxes involved, and no one of the appellants is interested in all of them. Instead of considering separately each objection made by the several appellants, for brevity and convenience we will consider together the objections made by all of the appellants, and will later make reference to the effect of our holding upon each objection upon the respective appellants. The revenue is involved, giving us jurisdiction on direct appeal.

Objection No. 1 of appellants is that the Tax Commission certified the assessed value of the railroad properties in Clinton county on the basis of the equalization ratio of 56% prevailing in that county, despite the fact the State-wide average equalization ratio was 35% of the assessed valuation of the railroad property in Clinton county. This proposition was thoroughly and comprehensively discussed in Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. State Tax Comm., 374 Ill. 75, 28 N.E.2d 100, in which it was decided that the assessment of railroad property throughout the State should be uniform, and should not vary according to the equalization factor prevailing in the respective counties.

It is agreed that for the year 1939 the Tax Commission determined that the State-wide average equalization ratio was 35% of the assessed value. Appellee concedes this objection must be sustained unless we modify or change our ruling in the above case. At the time the opinion was written the former decisions of this court were reviewed, including the matters suggested in the argument of appellee, and it was held it was the legislative intent that the equalization factor for railroad purposes should be State-wide, and should not be variable in each county. The matter is one exclusively for the legislature, and the relief, if any, by the several counties must come from the legislature and not from the courts. This objection, upon authority of Mobile & Ohio Railroad Co. v. State Tax Comm., supra, must be sustained, so as to conform to the equalization rate of 35% of the assessed value.

[42 N.E.2d 73]

Objection No. 2 covers several items, one of which is to a portion of the county tax levy consisting of 13 cents per hundred dollars valuation for county highway purposes, and 25 cents per hundred dollars valuation for general corporate purposes. It is conceded that the levy for county highway purposes is one-half cent in excess of the maximum rate of 12 1/2 cents on the hundred dollars valuation permitted by statute, and therefore the objection to this extent should be sustained.

Under the general corporate purpose of the county tax levy two items are objected to on the ground that they do not come within a county purpose. These items are as follows:

Care inmates in care of County Farm, not chargeable to any township ..... $1600.00

Transient paupers, not chargeable to townships ..... 1000.00

In People ex rel. Dooley v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis Railroad Co., 371 Ill. 522, 21 N.E.2d 760, we held the validity of a county tax is governed by the law and rate authorized at the time the levy is made by the county board. At the time this levy was made there was no law in force which charged the county with the general support of paupers, and consequently no levy for such a tax could be made. People ex rel. Thies v. Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railroad Co., 356 Ill. 272, 190 N.E. 280.

It is urged by appellee that the case is controlled by Cloyd v. Vermilion County, 360 Ill. 610, 196 N.E. 802, where we held that under the law then in force (Ill.Rev.Stat.1933, chap. 107, par. 25) the county was liable for the expense of paupers, under section 24 of the Pauper act, as it then existed. In 1939 section 24 had been amended, so that as it now reads the governmental units included within it are cities and villages of 500,000 inhabitants, and counties and towns, and the municipalities excluded from it are cities and villages having a population of less than 500,000 inhabitants. The act as it existed at the time of the Cloyd case placed a duty upon a county or town, under the conditions therein named, to care for a person not falling within the definition of a pauper, but who shall fall sick or die, having no money or property to pay his board, nursing, medical aid or burial expenses. The only difference between the act as it existed at the time of the Cloyd case and at this time is that cities and villages having a population of 500,000 or more have the same obligation that a county or town had at that time, and the obligation of the county or town has not changed.

We held in the Cloyd case that the obligation cast upon a county by section 24 of the Pauper act was a county purpose, and that it could be made liable for such expenses. The statute as it existed in 1939 was not changed with respect to counties, so the only question is whether the matters set out in the levy are within the provisions of section 24. The purpose of the levy was for care of inmates in the county farm not chargeable to any township. This properly covers persons who fall sick or die, or have no property to pay the board, nursing and medical aid or expenses not chargeable to a township, and who are in the county farm to be so taken care of. The appropriation necessarily cannot specify who will fall within this class, but there is a class mentioned in the statute, for which the county is liable, and which is not chargeable to a township.

The other appropriation is for transient paupers not chargeable to townships. Section 24 designates two types of persons,-a ‘non-resident,’ or ‘any person not coming within the definition of a pauper.’ The levy in this case properly attempted to divide the purposes. A transient pauper is obviously a non-resident, and aid given a transient person in the county, not chargeable to a township, can properly come within such class of ‘non-resident’ above designated. The cases of People v. Baltimore & Ohio Southwestern Railroad Co., supra, and Cloyd v. Vermilion County, supra [356 Ill. 272,190 N.E. 282], are not inconsistent, as in the first case the levy attempted to make the county liable for the ‘support of county poor,’ which would include all poor residents of the county, when the burden had been cast upon the townships by statute. The Cloyd case points out there is a liability upon the part of the county for certain designated classes of people not coming within the technical term ‘paupers,’ being a different class from the county poor, but who may be given relief, and the expense therefor recovered from the relatives, or from the county of which he is a resident.

At the time of this levy there was no change made in the statute taking the

[42 N.E.2d 74]

burden in such cases from the county, but only a new class created, which became liable for such expenses so added. We think the levy sufficiently describes a proper purpose and subject. The objection was properly overruled.

Within the corporate purpose levy there is also an item for supplies $1500. This is objected to because it is claimed it is ambiguous, and that it might possibly be used for paying expenses of a fee office of the county. While tax laws are strictly construed in favor of the taxpayer we do not think it is necessary for us to suppose or infer that the county board will violate the law in improperly spending money from the levy when we can take judicial knowledge that supplies used in all county offices almost defy specification. In People ex rel. Holmquist v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 237 Ill. 324, 86 N.E. 724, we held that a county levy for incidentals was sufficiently specific. This objection was...