People ex rel. Hollie v. Chicago Park Dist.

Decision Date12 July 1938
Docket NumberGen. No. 39992.
Citation16 N.E.2d 161,296 Ill.App. 365
PartiesPEOPLE EX REL. HOLLIE ET AL. v. CHICAGO PARK DIST. ET AL.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Harry M. Fisher, Judge.

Mandamus suit by the People of the State of Illinois, on the relation of James W. Hollie and others, against the Chicago Park District and others to compel the defendants to pay money allegedly due the petitioners because of their employment by the South Park Commissioners, and withheld from them by an order of the commissioners, wherein John E. Adams and others intervened. From an order of mandamus, the defendants appeal.

Order reversed. Charles Center Case, Kirkland, Fleming, Green, Martin & Ellis, Martin G. Loeff, and Edward C. Caldwell, all of Chicago, for appellants.

Barasa, Rinella & Barasa and Myer N. Rosengard, all of Chicago, for appellees.

DENIS E. SULLIVAN, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court entered in a mandamus suit against the Chicago Park District, as successor of the South Park Commissioners, and against various officers and officials of the former, said order directing that a writ of mandamus issue commanding defendants to pay a total sum of $520,333.22 to 488 petitioners as due them because of their employment by the South Park Commissioners and withheld from them by an order of said commissioners. The notice of appeal was to operate as a supersedeas.

The original petition for mandamus was filed January 29, 1936, by six former police officers and directed against the Chicago Park District, its president, vice-president, secretary and treasurer, and the members of the Civil Service Board of the Chicago Park District.

Thereafter, on April 22, 1936, petitioners filed amendments to paragraphs of the petition for mandamus, adding thereto the name of E. N. Heinz, Comptroller of the Chicago Park District, as an additional party defendant. Defendants again interposed a motion on May 1, 1936, to strike the petition and the amendments thereto and to dismiss the action.

On August 5, 1936, said petitioners filed an amended petition for mandamus against said defendants and on August 25, 1936, the defendants filed a motion to strike the amended petition and dismiss the action.

On November 30, 1936, a second amended petition for mandamus was directed against the said defendants and three additional defendants were added thereto, namely, Philip S. Graver, James C. Petrillo and Stephen I. Witmanski. This last amended petition and two intervening petitions, which were subsequently filed are the basis of the petitioners' case.

The second amended petition alleges that the office of South Park Commissioners was created by statute and given power to establish a police force and to employ all persons necessary for the operation of the district; that the said Commissioners by ordinance created a police force and that the petitioners were employed thereunder and were on the force in the years 1932, 1933 and 1934; that under the Civil Service Act of June 10, 1911, Ill.Rev.Stat. 1937, c. 24 1/2, § 78 et seq. there was taken from the South Park Commissioners and vested in the Civil Service Board, all powers in connection with employment, the payment of wages and salaries, appointments, transfers and removals of all employees and that under said act the Civil Service Board was required to prescribe maximum and minimum rates of pay for the various positions; that the offices and places classified by the Board were to constitute a classified civil service and no appointments, promotions, transfers, reductions in grade or pay or removal were to be made except under the act and the rules therein provided for; that under said act the said Civil Service Board was given authority to make rules to carry out the act and was empowered to change such rules.

The said amended petition further alleges that under the act all rules of the Board shall be printed and notice of the places where the rules may be obtained given by publication in a newspaper, such publication to specify the date, not less than 10 days subsequent to the date of publication,when said rules shall go into operation.

It is then averred that under an act of the legislature, petitioners became members of the classified civil service; that the Board promulgated rules classifying positions and that petitioners respectively fell within either the class known as patrolmen receiving a minimum salary of $165.83 per month and maximum of $208.33 per month, or the class known as sergeant of police receiving a minimum salary of $220.83 per month and a maximum of $241.66 per month; that in 1932, 1933, and 1934, petitioner Hollie, as sergeant of police, received $241.65 per month and the other petitioners, as partolmen, received $208.33 per month; that each petitioner was entitled to the maximum pay for his title and grade.

Continuing the petition alleges that by the ordinances of the South Park Commissioners of April 17 and May 15, 1912, patrolmen were to receive the minimum pay for the first year, the average between the minimum and maximum for the second year and the maximum for the third year; that sergeants of police were to receive the minimum for the first six months, the average between the minimum and maximum for the second six months, and the maximum the second year.

The petitioners further charge that the ordinance of January 5, 1932, of the South Park Commissioners, reducing the pay of all employes 20%, was void and beyond the power of the Commissioners, such power being exclusively in the Civil Service Board. The rule of the Civil Service Board of January 6, 1932, reducing the minimum rate for each position by 20% is then set out as is also the notice of the change published in the Chicago Evening Post on January 7, 1932. The petition then charges that the new rule is void because it reduces the minimum rate, because the published notice, in providing that the rule be immediately effective instead of 10 days later, did not conform to the statute; that said rule arbitrarily destroys uniformity of pay, because it does not apply to petitioners who were receiving the maximum rate and because it is an abuse of discretion in that it affects only employees receiving the minimum rate; that thereafter up to September, 1932, petitioners received reduced salaries in violation of their rights.

It is further averred in the petition that by an ordinance adopted September 21, 1932, the South Park Commissioners restored the former rates of pay, to take effect October 1, 1932, but thereafter no employe was to be paid for his regular weekly day off and the commissioners were to be recompensed for vacations earned thereafter by the deduction of one day's pay each month, said latter deduction to be repaid at the time of the vacation. Said petition thereupon charges that the Park Commissioners had no power to take this action, such power being exclusively in the Civil Service Board.

It then charged in said petition that the Civil Service Board never adopted the alleged ordinance of the South Park Commissioners of September 21, 1932; portions of the rules of the Civil Service Board relating to vacation allowances and providing that an employee, obliged to work on his regular day off, shall not be paid extra, but shall be given time off on some other day.

It then charged in said petition that for several years prior to September 21, 1932, said petitioners were allowed one day a week off with full pay, and annual vacations with pay, but beginning October, 1932, and thereafter through 1934, over their objection and contrary to their rights, there was deducted from their pay, one day's pay for each weekly day off and one day's pay a month for the vacation allowance; that when they objected they were advised on numerous occasions by the Civil Service Board and the Commissioners that the deductions were temporary, that the full pay would be restored, and that they would be reimbursed.

Continuing the said petition then alleges the creation of the Chicago Park District and its succession to the South Park Commissioners and aver that the act creating the Chicago Park District required that any funds held by a superseded district for a particular purpose be applied to that purpose and required that the proceeds of taxes levied before the act took effect be applied to the purposes for which levied; that the South Park Commissioners turned over to the Chicago Park District in excess of $1,000,000; that since May 1, 1934, the Chicago Park District has collected a large amount of money from taxes levied by the South Park Commissioners in 1932, 1933, and 1934, and earlier, and that during said years there were no provisions for a budget system or appropriation ordinance system and it was the customof the South Park Commissioners to estimate annually the needs of the district without regard to any budget or definite appropriation; that in 1931, 1932, 1933, and 1934, the estimates of the South Park Commissioners were sufficient to pay all employes their salaries in full and therefore all taxes were levied without consideration of the subsequent deductions.

The petition further alleges that the South Park Commissioners and the Chicago Park District have always had sufficient moneys to pay petitioners; that in January, 1932, there was in excess of $150,000 in the South Park District corporate fund; that on October 1, 1932, the South Park District had a cash balance of $631,000; that the Chicago Park District received from the South Park District and from the latter's tax levies in excess of $1,500,000; that therefore there will be no disturbance of the public service if the sums demanded are paid.

Petitioners further aver that on many occasions in 1932, 1933 and 1934, they requested payment of the sums deducted; that the demands were made by them and all other employees; that the...

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5 cases
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    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • June 7, 1943
    ... ... II, Charter ... of Kansas City; State ex rel. Rothrum v. Darby, 345 ... Mo. 1002, 137 ... 484; 19 Am. Jur., p. 668; People v. Chicago, 292 ... Ill.App. 589, 12 N.E.2d 13; ... 101, 115 S.W.2d 574; People ex rel. Hollie v ... Chicago Park District, 296 Ill. 365, 16 ... 394; King v. Riverland Levy ... Dist., 218 Mo.App. 490, 279 S.W. 195; 1 Words & ... ...
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    ...solely with the Board.' See also People ex rel. Mulvey v. Chicago, 292 Ill.App. 589, 12 N.E.2d 13; People ex rel. Hollie v. Chicago Park District, 296 Ill.App. 365, 383, 16 N.E.2d 161. Under the authorities it is clear that plaintiffs' salaries as school clerks for the period from January 1......
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    ...for a writ of mandamus defective. See also Murphy v. City of Park Ridge, 298 Ill. 66, 131 N.E. 256; People ex rel. Hollie v. Chicago Park District, 296 Ill.App. 365, 16 N.E.2d 161. Since the amended petition in the present case fails to allege a demand and refusal or facts which indicate th......
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