People ex rel. Hoogasian v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.

• Decision Date: 20 September 1972
• Docket Number: Nos. 45199 and 45216,s. 45199 and 45216
• Citation: 287 N.E.2d 677,52 Ill.2d 301
• Parties: , 58 A.L.R.3d 1136 The PEOPLE ex rel. Jack HOOGASIAN, State's Attorney, et al., Appellants, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO., Appellee. Albert J. SMITH et al., Appellants, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO., Appellee.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 677

287 N.E.2d 677

52 Ill.2d 301, 58 A.L.R.3d 1136

The PEOPLE ex rel. Jack HOOGASIAN, State's Attorney, et al., Appellants, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO., Appellee.

Albert J. SMITH et al., Appellants, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK AND CO., Appellee.

Nos. 45199 and 45216.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 20, 1972.

Ross, Hardies, O'Keefe, Babcock & Parsons, Chicago (Frederic O. Floberg, David L. Callies, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant, Village of Northbrook.

Jack Hoogasian, State's Atty., Waukegan (Julius Abler, Asst. State's Atty., of counsel), for appellant in No. 45199.

Arnstein, Gluck, Weitzenfeld & Minow, Chicago (Burton Y. Weitzenfeld, Louis A. Lehr, Jr., and Joseph A. Ginsburg, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

KLUCZYNSKI, Justice.

In cause 45199, the People of the State of Illinois ex rel. Jack Hoogasian and Julius Abler filed suit in the circuit court of Lake County to enjoin defendant from completing construction of its building in the city of Chicago. In cause 45216, the villages of Deerfield, Skokie and Northbrook and certain officials of Deerfield and Skokie, subsequently filed a similar suit in the circuit court of Cook County, charging that when completed the building would constitute a nuisance and that distortion of television reception would depress property values in the areas involved.

Defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a cause of action was granted in the Lake County proceedings and appeal was taken. Thereafter, in the Cook County suit, a similar motion, which additionally averred that the action was now barred by Res judicata as a result of the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County, was granted. Several plaintiffs in this action have appealed. We assumed jurisdiction of both appeals under Supreme Court Rule 302(b), Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, c. 110A, § 302(b) and consolidated the causes for decision and opinion. On June 30, 1972, we entered an order affirming the judgments of the circuit courts, with an opinion to follow. We now express our views for such order.

The complaints basically alleged that defendant envisions the construction of a building in the city of Chicago which will reach a height of 110 stories or 1350 feet. At the approximate time of the filing of these actions the construction had progressed to a height of 50 stories. Plaintiffs alleged that if construction was allowed to continue the building would interfere with television reception in certain areas. This interference would occur because the broadcasting antennas of Chicago television stations are lower than the contemplated structure which would cause the signals that emanate from these antennas to abnormally reflect from defendant's building thereby allegedly producing distortions on television screens in these areas.

The principal issue in this case is whether defendant has a legal right to use the air space above its property subject only to legislative limitation, or stated conversely, whether an individual or class of individuals has the right to limit the use of such property on the basis that interference with television reception constitutes an actionable nuisance.

Plaintiffs cite Shelburne, Inc. v. Crossan Corp. (1923), 95 N.J.Eq. 188, 122 A. 749; Hansen v. Independent School District No. 1 in Nez Perce County (1939), 61 Idaho 109, 98 P.2d 959; and Belmar Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Com., 34 Ill.2d 544, 216 N.E.2d 788, to support their contention, but they contend that there is no authority involving radio or television broadcasting which discusses this precise issue. All aforementioned cases involve light transmitted from one parcel of property which caused interference with the use of another's property. In Shelburne and Hansen the transmission of light was found to be a nuisance; in Belmar the transmission was not considered as such because the plaintiff, in operating a drive-in theatre near a toll highway, had put its property to a hypersensitive use so that lights cast upon its screen from the highway plaza could not be considered a nuisance. However, we do not believe these cases are supportive of plaintiffs' contention, for, in the instant case, defendant's property is not the source of transmission, but rather the property over which a transmission passes.

Fontainebleau Hotel Corp. v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, Inc. (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1959), 114 So.2d 357, more closely parallels the issues involved in this case. There plaintiff sought to enjoin the completion of an addition to defendant's building because, when completed, the structure would have significantly interfered with the light and air on the beach in front of an adjacent hotel. The trial court granted a temporary injunction preventing further construction. The Florida district court of appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint, stating:

'No American decision has been cited, and independent research has revealed none, in which it has been held that--in the absence of some contractual or statutory obligation--a landowner has a legal right to the free flow of light and air across the adjoining land of his neighbor. * * *

'There being, then, no legal right to the free flow of light and air from the adjoining land, it is universally held that where a structure serves a useful and beneficial purpose, it does not give rise to a cause of action, either for damages or for an injunction under the maxim Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, even though it causes injury to another by cutting off the light and air and...