People ex rel. Houghland v. Leonard

• Decision Date: 20 May 1953
• Docket Number: No. 32670,32670
• Citation: People ex rel. Houghland v. Leonard, 112 N.E.2d 697, 415 Ill. 135 (Ill. 1953)
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. HOUGHLAND v. LEONARD.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 697

112 N.E.2d 697

415 Ill. 135

PEOPLE ex rel. HOUGHLAND v. LEONARD.

No. 32670.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 20, 1953.

Robert M. Bell and Burton H. Stone, both of Rock Island, for petitioner.

Latham Castle, Atty. Gen., (William C. Wines, John T. Coburn and Edward M. White, Chicago, of counsel), for respondent.

SCHAEFER, Chief Justice.

This original petition for habeas corpus raises broad questions concerning the validity of the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act which deal with jurisdiction over proceedings arising under that statute, as well as narrower jurisdictional questions arising from circumstances peculiar to this case.

The petition is prosecuted by the mother and next friend of Kenneth Moskaloff, a minor, who is held in custody by the superintendent of the Illinois Training School for Boys under a warrant of commitment issued by the county court of Rock Island County. Kenneth's parents were divorced in 1944 by a decree of the circuit court of Rock Island County. The divorce decree awarded custody of Kenneth to his mother. In 1945, the county court of Rock Island County declared him a 'dependent' under the Juvenile Court Act, and appointed a guardian of his person. After vicissitudes not necessary to detail, the county court in 1951 found Kenneth to be a 'delinquent' and ordered him placed in the Illinois Training School for Boys at St. Charles. Respondent, Charles N. Leonard, the superintendent of that school, was appointed guardian of Kenneth's person.

Petitioner first attacks the validity of section 2 of the Juvenile Court Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 23, par. 191,) by which circuit anc county courts are given 'original jurisdiction in all cases coming within the terms of' that act. It is argued that this statutory grant of jurisdiction is invalid because of section 20 of article VI of the constitution, S.H.A., exclusive jurisdiction over the 'appointment of guardians' is vested in probate courts in counties in which such courts exist. Section 18 of article VI of the constitution provides that county courts shall have original jurisdiction in all probate matters, the settlement of estates of deceased persons, the appointment of guardians and conservators and settlement of their accounts, and in all matters relating to apprentices. By section 20 of article VI the General Assembly is authorized to establish probate courts and it is provided that such courts when established shall have jurisdiction over the matters enumerated above. A probate court had been established in Rock Island County, pursuant to statute.

Petitioner contends that by sections 18 and 20 of article VI, exclusive jurisdiction over all matters of guardianship is placed in the probate courts in counties in which such courts have been established, and in county courts in all other counties. On this basis it is argued that the Juvenile Court Act is invalid insofar as it attempts to vest jurisdiction over proceedings under the act in circuit courts, and that since there is a probate court in Rock Island County, only that court can have jurisdiction to appoint a guardian over the person of petitioner's son.

The argument thus made is based upon decisions holding that 'upon the establishment of a probate court in a particular county, the county court of such county is at once, by operation of law, deprived of its jurisdiction in matters of probate, and in all other matters over which probate courts are given jurisdiction, * * *.' Klokke v. Dodge, 103 Ill. 125, 135; Meserve v. Delaney, 105 Ill. 53; Snyder v. Snyder, 142 Ill. 60, 31 N.E. 303; Bley v. Luebeck, 377 Ill. 50, 35 N.E.2d 334. Because the constitution grants probate courts jurisdiction over 'the appointment of guardians', and because the Juvenile Court Act provides for the appointment of guardians, it is argued that jurisdiction of proceedings under the act can be vested only in probate courts, or in county courts in those counties in which there is no probate court.

The Juvenile Court Act is a codification of the ancient equitable jurisdiction over infants under the doctrine of parens partriae. People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 411 Ill. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769. Historically, courts of chancery, representing the government, have exercised jurisdiction over the person and property of infants to insure that they were not abused, defrauded, or neglected. Witter v. Cook County Com'rs, 256 Ill. 616, 100 N.E. 148; Cowles v. Cowles, 3 Gilman 435. As has been pointed out, one method by which this general equity power over infants was exercised has been the appointment of guardians. Thomas v. Thomas, 250 Ill. 354, 364, 95 N.E. 345, 35 L.R.A., N.S., 1158; Hohenadel v. Steele, 237 Ill. 229, 86 N.E. 717. But the broad objectives of the Juvenile Court Act can be narrowed to an identity with the appointment of a guardian only by mistaking method for purpose.

The very title of the act suggests that it encompasses a subject far more pervasive than the simple appointment of a guardian. That title is: 'An Act relating to children who are now or may hereafter become dependent, neglected or delinquent, to define these terms, and to provide for the treatment, control, maintenance, adoption and guardianship of the persons of such children, and to give to the courts having jurisdiction of cases coming within this Act, jurisdiction to proceed with the prosecution and punishment of the persons contributing to the dependency, neglect or delinquency of children.' Nor is the fact that the power authorized by the act is far more pervasive than is contemplated by the customary appointment of a guardian of a minor contradicted by petitioner's assertion that the act 'basically functions through the instrumentality of a 'guardianship of the person's of defendant, neglected, and delinquent children.' That observation simply underscores the mistaken identification of method with purpose which characterizes petitioner's argument.

The argument which identifies 'the appointment of a guardian' with proceedings under the Juvenile Court Act entirely overlooks the concern of that act for the delinquent child as well as the child who is dependent. Concern with juvenile delinquency largely motivated the establishment of juvenile courts. 'It was believed that if children were separated from adult offenders and the judge dealt with the problems of 'erring children' as a 'wise and kind father'-as the statute creating the juvenile courts sometimes directed-wayward tendencies would be checked and delinquency and crime prevented or reduced. Under these laws the child offender was regarded not as a criminal but as a delinquent, 'as misdirected and misguided and needing aid, encouragement, help and assistance. " Abbott, The Child and the State, vol. 2, pp. 331-332, University of Chicago Press, 1938. This court expressed the same thought when it said that the purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is 'to extend a protecting hand to unfortunate boys and girls who, by reason of their own conduct, evil tendencies, or improper environment, have proven that the best interests of society, the welfare of the state, and their own good demand that the guardianship of the state be substituted for that of natural parents.' Lindsay v. Lindsay, 257 Ill. 328, 340, 100 N.E. 892, 897, 45 L.R.A.,N.S., 908.

To demonstrate the difference between an ordinary proceeding for the appointment of a guardian by a probate court and the deeper thrust of the jurisdiction exercised under the Juvenile Court Act, it is necessary to enumerate only a few of the points of difference between the two proceedings. The statutory provisions of the Probate Act with respect to guardians establish no means for effective supervision of the conduct of the guardians. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 3, pars. 283-298a.) The Juvenile Court Act, on the other hand, provides for probation officers, for the placing of children in homes, and for other appropriate alteratives to the simple custodianship of a guardian. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 23, pars. 195, 196, 198.) The interest of the State in the entire proceeding is made explicit in section 9 of the Juvenile Court Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 23, par. 198.) By way of contrast, in a guardianship proceeding in the probate court a minor has the right to nominate his guardian. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 3, par. 288.) And, finally, section 9a of the Juvenile Court Act gives that court discretion to permit the child to be proceeded against 'in accordance with the laws that may be in force in this State governing the commission of crimes or violations of city, village, or town ordinance.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1951, chap. 23, par. 199.) Where this is done, the petition under the Juvenile Court Act is dismissed. There is no comparable authority in the probate court to make a preliminary determination as to whether the conduct of the minor is to be treated as of a criminal character or whether the petition should be entertained.

Further differences could be pointed out. Those enumerated, however, are, in our opinion, sufficient to refute the argument advanced by petitioner that the entire future development of the doctrine of parens patriae was intended to be committed irrevocably and exclusively to county or probate courts by the constitutional references to 'the appointment of a guardian.'

Petitioner next contends that the continuing jurisdiction of the circuit court over the custody of the minor child under the decree of divorce entered in February of 1944 precluded the subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the county court of the proceeding brought under the Juvenile Court Act. It is well settled that while the circuit court initially awarded custody of the child to the petitioner, the jurisdiction of that court continued for the purpose of making, from time to time, such orders relating to the child's care, custody, and support as reason and justice might require. Jarrett v. Boggess, Ill.Sup., 112 N.E.2d 694; Nye v....