People ex rel. Hutchcraft v. Louisville & N.R. Co.

Decision Date19 March 1947
Docket NumberNo. 29932.,29932.
Citation396 Ill. 502,72 N.E.2d 194
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
PartiesPEOPLE ex rel. HUTCHCRAFT, County Collector, v. LOUISVILLE & N. R. CO.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from Hamilton County Court; George W. Hogan, Judge.

Proceeding by the People, on the relation of Charles Hutchcraft, County Collector, to recover delinquent taxes.From a judgment overruling its objections to portions of the rate extended and taxes produced thereby for building purposes in specified school districts, Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company appeals.

Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions.

Harold Baltz, of Belleville, for appellant.

John M. Eckley, State's Atty., of McLeansboro, for appellee.

THOMPSON, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Hamilton county overruling objections Nos. 18, 21, 25 and 28, as filed by appellant to the taxes or portions thereof extended for building purposes in school districts Nos. 5, 58, 85 and 180, which were levied and extended against its property for the year 1944.The litigants present their case as an agreed case under Rule 48 of this court, Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, c. 110, s 259.48, setting forth both facts and law reduced to writing signed by the attorneys for the respective parties and accompanied by the necessary affidavit.

The county clerk levied and extended taxes against the property of the appellant for the year 1944 in the respective taxing districts, for the purposes, and in the rates and for the amounts produced thereby as follows:

+---------------------------------------------------------+
                ¦                ¦   ¦            ¦Equalized¦    ¦Tax     ¦
                +----------------+---+------------+---------+----+--------¦
                ¦District        ¦   ¦Purpose     ¦Valuation¦Rate¦Extended¦
                +----------------+---+------------+---------+----+--------¦
                ¦School Dist. No.¦5  ¦Building    ¦$ 56,976 ¦.30 ¦$ 170.93¦
                +----------------+---+------------+---------+----+--------¦
                ¦School Dist. No.¦5  ¦Bonds & Int.¦56,976   ¦.32 ¦182.32  ¦
                +----------------+---+------------+---------+----+--------¦
                ¦School Dist. No.¦58 ¦Building    ¦371,670  ¦.38 ¦1,412.35¦
                +----------------+---+------------+---------+----+--------¦
                ¦School Dist. No.¦58 ¦Bonds & Int.¦371,670  ¦.12 ¦446.00  ¦
                +----------------+---+------------+---------+----+--------¦
                ¦School Dist. No.¦85 ¦Building    ¦72,602   ¦.38 ¦275.89  ¦
                +----------------+---+------------+---------+----+--------¦
                ¦School Dist. No.¦85 ¦Bonds & Int.¦72,602   ¦.60 ¦435.61  ¦
                +----------------+---+------------+---------+----+--------¦
                ¦School Dist. No.¦180¦Building    ¦22,838   ¦.18 ¦41.11   ¦
                +----------------+---+------------+---------+----+--------¦
                ¦School Dist. No.¦180¦Bonds & Int.¦22,838   ¦.35 ¦79.93   ¦
                +---------------------------------------------------------+
                

In each of said districts the total maximum authorized rate for building purposes for all of the pertinent time involved herein is 37.5 cents.The objector paid under written protest 100 per cent of the above taxes in the manner provided in the Revenue Act, and paid all other taxes levied and extended against its property in said county for the year 1944.

The appellant, prior to the time fixed by law, in the proceedings for judgment for delinquent taxes by said collector for unpaid taxes extended for the year 1944, filed its written objections to portions of the rate extended and taxes produced thereby for building purposes in each of the above four districts, which are as follows:

‘18.Of the rate of 30 cents levied and extended against its property in School DistrictNo. 5 for ‘Building Purposes,’ 17.5 cents thereof and the tax of $99.71 produced thereby is illegal, excessive and void in that inasmuch as the Building Bonds and Interest in said School District for said year required the extension of a rate of 32 cents, the maximum statutory rate that could have been legally extended for building purposes in said District for said year was 12.5 cents, as provided by the provisions of Chapter 122, Section 212, paragraph ‘b’ of the Illinois Revised Statutes.'

‘21.As an alternative objection to 12.5 cents of said rate of 38 cents levied and extended against its property in High School DistrictNo. 58 for ‘Building Purposes' and the tax of $464.59 produced thereby, said rate and tax are illegal, excessive and void for the reason that a rate of 12 cents being required to be extended for Building Bonds and Interest in said District for said year, the maximum rate that could have been legally extended for Building purposes was 25.5 cents, as provided by Chapter 122, Section 212, paragraph ‘b’ of the Illinois Revised Statutes.'

‘25.Of the rate of 38 cents levied and extended against its property in School DistrictNo. 85 for ‘Building Purposes' 25.5 cents thereof, and the tax of $185.14 produced thereby, is illegal, excessive and void, inasmuch as the rate required for extension for Bonds and Interest is 60 cents, the statutory maximum rate that could have been extended for Building Purposes was 12.5 cents, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 122, Section 212, paragraph ‘b’ of the Illinois Revised Statutes.'

‘28.Of the rate of 18 cents levied and extended against its property in High School DistrictNo. 180 for ‘Building Purposes,’ 5.5 cents thereof, and the tax of $12.56 produced thereby is illegal, excessive and void in that a rate of 35 cents was levied and extended for Bonds and Interest in said District, making the total maximum rate that could have been legally extended for Building Purposes 12.5 cents.'

To be specific, the objection made by appellant to that portion of the building taxes as above set out is made in each case upon the proposition that having extended the rates as shown for building bonds and interest, no rates in excess of 12.5 cents could have been legally extended in districts 5, 85 and 180, and 25.5 cents in district 58, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph B, section 189 of the School Law (Ill.Rev.Stat.1943, chap. 122, par. 212), which read as follows:

‘B.When the county clerk determines the amount of taxes to be extended upon all the taxable property in any school district having a population of less than 200,000 inhabitants, he shall determine from the certified copies of bond resolutions filed in his office the amount necessary to pay the maturing principal of and interest on any bonds of such district and shall extend a separate tax sufficient to pay all principal and interest thereon which matures prior to the first delinquent date of taxes to be realized from the next succeeding tax extension or all interest and sinking fund requirements for the payment of principal which must be extended prior to said date.Said separate tax shall be extended without limitation as to rate or amount.If the rate for the amount levied and certified by the proper authorities of any such district for building purposes when added to the rate necessary to pay the maturing principal or sinking fund requirements of and interest on any such bonds, equals or exceeds the maximum rate for building purposes which such district may levy under the provisions of paragraph (A) of this section, then the same shall be extended notwithstanding the fact that it does exceed the building rate; provided, however, that if the bond and interest requirements equal...

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6 cases
  • People ex rel. Nelson v. Olympic Hotel Bldg. Corp.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • March 22, 1950
    ...so as to give effect to the main intent and purpose of the legislature as therein expressed. People ex rel. Hutchcraft v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co., 396 Ill. 502, 72 N.E.2d 194; People ex rel. Curren v. Schommer, 392 Ill. 17, 63 N.E.2d 744, 167 A.L.R. 1347; People ex rel. Rice v......
  • People ex rel. Ruchty v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co.
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • January 18, 1951
    ...of Sections 17-2 to 17-4, inclusive.' We considered this same section of the School Code in People ex rel. Hutchcraft v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 396 Ill. 502, 72 N.E.2d 194, when it contained substantially the same language, except the minimum rate allowable was .125 per cent, ......
  • People ex rel. Krapf v. Hayes
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • January 24, 1958
    ...purposes regardless of the tax rate extended to pay any bonded indebtedness for school buildings. People ex rel. Hutchcraft v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 396 Ill. 502, 72 N.E.2d 194. In 1945, the legislature enacted the School Code and the provisions of former section 189B of the ......
  • People ex rel. Smail v. Board of Ed. of Community Unit School Dist. No. 202 of Fayette County
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • May 23, 1951
    ...sentence, or section thereof. Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Ames, 364 Ill. 362, 4 N.E.2d 494; People ex rel. Hutchcraft v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 396 Ill. 502, 520, 72 N.E.2d 194. In looking at other sections of the Act, we find in Section 8-9 that provision is made that upon receipt of ......
  • Get Started for Free

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