People ex rel. J.O.

Decision Date16 June 2022
Docket NumberCourt of Appeals No. 20CA1539
Citation517 P.3d 1259,2022 COA 65 M
Parties The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee, IN the INTEREST OF J.O., Juvenile-Appellant.
CourtColorado Court of Appeals

517 P.3d 1259
2022 COA 65 M

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee,

IN the INTEREST OF J.O., Juvenile-Appellant.

Court of Appeals No. 20CA1539

Colorado Court of Appeals, Division IV.

Announced June 16, 2022
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing August 4, 2022


Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Brenna A. Brackett, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Mark Evans, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant

Opinion by JUDGE BROWN

517 P.3d 1261

¶ 1 J.O. appeals his juvenile delinquency adjudication for the offense of unlawful sexual contact, contending that the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted for the purposes of sexual gratification or sexual abuse. Because we agree, we vacate J.O.’s delinquency adjudication.

¶ 2 In resolving this appeal, we hold as a matter of first impression that the trier of fact must consider the juvenile's age and maturity before it can infer the requisite intent that the juvenile acted with a sexual purpose. And we clarify that it may not—and often will not—be appropriate for a fact finder to ascribe the same intent to a juvenile's act that one could reasonably ascribe to the same act if performed by an adult.

I. Background

¶ 3 The prosecution presented the following evidence during a one-day bench trial.

¶ 4 In May 2019, at the end of the school day, eleven-year-olds J.O. and M.L. were working on a writing project. J.O. sat next to M.L. and asked her why they were not friends anymore. When M.L. responded that she did not want to be friends anymore, J.O. "slapped [her] on [her] boob" with "the back of his hand."

¶ 5 After class ended, a teacher noticed that M.L. and J.O. were "running around their lockers" and "chasing each other." The teacher testified that J.O. and M.L. were both laughing at first during the encounter, but then M.L. began to look "visibly upset." The teacher testified that M.L. yelled at J.O. to stop and leave her alone. After J.O. left, the teacher went over to M.L. and M.L. told her that J.O. had "touched her sexually" and said "sexual things." M.L. did not explain further—either then or at trial—what "sexual things" J.O. said. The teacher reported the incident to the principal.

¶ 6 Three days later, during a forensic interview, M.L. said that when she and J.O. were at the lockers, J.O. started to "move his hands" all over her body. She said that J.O. then touched her genitals with his "butt or something," which felt "weird and disturbing." J.O. touched her genitals with his hand, his "front private" touched her butt, and "his butt touched [her] butt" as he was "spinning around her."

¶ 7 M.L. said that J.O. never touched her under her clothes. At one point during the encounter, M.L. told J.O. to stop and go away. J.O. then went to his locker, grabbed his things, and left for the day.

¶ 8 M.L. testified at trial that J.O. did not say anything to her when he was trying to touch her by her locker.

¶ 9 At the close of trial, the court entered its findings:

[J.O.] is charged with unlawful sexual contact. The elements of that include that he unlawfully and knowingly subjected [M.L.] to sexual contact, that he knew the victim did not consent. And the Court will note that the definition of sexual contact is contact, among other things, for the purpose of sexual gratification.

....

The Court finds that clearly there was contact, that it was unlawfully and knowingly done. ... It was clear [M.L.] did not consent.

... And the Court finds that it was for the purpose of sexual gratification. The Court notes the touching was not pulling her hair, touching her head, twisting an arm. It was contact in sexual parts of [M.L.]’s body. Her breast, her genital area, and her butt.

So the Court finds that the People have proven all the elements of [unlawful sexual contact] beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 10 The court adjudicated J.O. delinquent and sentenced him to one year of probation.

517 P.3d 1262

II. Sufficiency of Evidence

¶ 11 J.O. argues that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with the statutorily required sexual purpose. We agree.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 12 The prosecution must prove every element of a charged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Snyder , 874 P.2d 1076, 1080 (Colo. 1994). "We review the record de novo to determine whether the evidence presented was sufficient in both quantity and quality to sustain a defendant's conviction." McCoy v. People , 2019 CO 44, ¶ 63, 442 P.3d 379 ; see also People in Interest of J.R. , 216 P.3d 1220, 1221 (Colo. App. 2009) ("When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting an adjudication of juvenile delinquency, the standards are the same as those used in a criminal case."). We must determine whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, was both substantial and sufficient to support the conclusion by a reasonable mind that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Griego , 2018 CO 5, ¶ 24, 409 P.3d 338.1

¶ 13 We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. People v. Diaz , 2015 CO 28, ¶ 9, 347 P.3d 621. Our primary task is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. People v. Lovato , 2014 COA 113, ¶ 21, 357 P.3d 212. We look first to the language of the statute itself, giving the words their commonly accepted meaning and avoiding a strained or forced interpretation. Id.

B. Unlawful Sexual Contact

¶ 14 Section 18-3-404(1)(a), C.R.S. 2021, provides that "[a]ny actor who knowingly subjects a victim to any sexual contact commits unlawful sexual contact if ... [t]he actor knows that the victim does not consent." As relevant here, sexual contact includes "the knowing touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's or actor's intimate parts if that sexual contact is for the purposes of sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse." § 18-3- 401(4)(a), C.R.S. 2021. "Intimate parts" include genitalia, buttocks, and breasts. § 18-3-401(2).

¶ 15 On appeal, J.O. does not contend that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he knowingly touched M.L.’s clothing covering her intimate parts or that such contact was without M.L.’s consent. Instead, J.O. contends that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he acted for the purposes of sexual gratification or sexual abuse.

C. Sexual Gratification

1. Sexual Purpose May Not Be Inferred Solely from...

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