People ex rel. Jaworski v. Jenkins

• Citation: 14 Ill.Dec. 602,372 N.E.2d 881,56 Ill.App.3d 1028
• Decision Date: 10 January 1978
• Docket Number: No. 76-1276,76-1276
• Parties: , 14 Ill.Dec. 602 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois on the relation of William JAWORSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harry P. JENKINS and Charles Zettek, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 881

372 N.E.2d 881

56 Ill.App.3d 1028, 14 Ill.Dec. 602

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois on the relation of

William JAWORSKI, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Harry P. JENKINS and Charles Zettek, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 76-1276.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Second Division.

Jan. 10, 1978.

Samuels & Weininger, Elliot M. Samuels, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Samelson & Knickerbocker, Des Plaines, for defendants-appellees; George B. Knickerbocker, Des Plaines, of counsel.

PUSATERI, Justice.

Plaintiff-appellant William Jaworski, a police officer employed by the Village of Elk Grove Village, investigated a traffic accident in the Village on April 5, 1975. During the course of the investigation, he fired his pistol and wounded Timothy Engelson, the driver of one of the vehicles involved in the accident.

In 1975, Engelson commenced a separate suit for damages against Officer Jaworski, the Village, and the Police and Fire Commission of the Village. At the time of this appeal, the conduct of plaintiff and of the other persons involved in the accident and the shooting were under investigation by the appropriate officials of the Village.

On April 5, 1975, subsequent to the shooting incident, the defendant-appellee, Harry P. Jenkins, Chief of Police of Elk Grove Village, requested that Officer Jaworski surrender his weapon and badge pending final disposition of the investigation, and placed Officer Jaworski on inactive duty. Officer Jaworski has received his full salary as a police officer of the Village, and at no time was he suspended without pay.

On March 23, 1976, Officer Jaworski filed a complaint in mandamus against Chief Jenkins and Charles Zettek, President of the Board of Trustees of Elk Grove Village, praying that the defendants reinstate him to active duty as a patrolman of Elk Grove Village. After defendants filed their answer, both plaintiff and defendants moved for summary judgment and submitted memorandum and affidavits in support of their respective motions. On June 23, 1976, the trial court entered an order placing plaintiff on active duty with badge and uniform, but without gun, to perform duties that do not require a weapon, such as clerical duties, and the court further ordered that within thirty days of the completion of the lawsuit filed by Timothy Engelson or at such earlier time as decided by Chief Jenkins, plaintiff shall be returned to full duty or charged before the Police and Fire Commission for conduct in connection with the shooting incident.

Plaintiff returned to active duty on June 28, 1976, in compliance with the trial court's order. On July 16, 1976, he filed his notice of appeal, requesting that the order of the trial court as it pertains to his use of his service revolver and the provisions respecting a hearing before the Police and Fire Commission, be vacated.

As a general principle of law, it can be stated that the writ of mandamus is not a writ of right, and is to be awarded only in rare instances where none of the ordinary remedies is available or adequate. Hughes v. Kiley (1977), 67 Ill.2d 261, 266, 10 Ill.Dec. 247, 367 N.E.2d 700. It is to be awarded or refused in the exercise of judicial discretion, and such discretion must be exercised according to legal principles. The mere presence of a petitioner's right may not furnish a basis for its issuance. People ex rel. Harrison v. Kelly (1945), 391 Ill. 136, 138, 62 N.E.2d 705. Our supreme court, in its consideration of the issue of discretion, has stated that:

" * * * In the exercise of its discretion, the court looks to existing facts and views the whole case with due regard to the consequences of its action. (Citation.) In People ex rel. Stettauer v. Olsen, 215 Ill. 620, 74 N.E. 785, it was said: ' * * * Courts, in the exercise of the discretion with which they are vested, may, in view of the consequences attendant on the issuing of a writ of mandamus, refuse the writ, though the petitioner has a clear legal right for which mandamus is a proper remedy.' (Citations.)" People ex rel. Harrison, at 138-9, 62 N.E.2d at 706.

"Mandamus will lie to command performance of an official act which is ministerial." (People ex rel. Richter v. Telford (4th Dist. 1968), 103 Ill.App.2d 132, 134, 242 N.E.2d 464, 466. See People ex rel. City of Urbana v. Paley (1977), 68 Ill.2d 62, 78, 11 Ill.Dec. 307, 368 N.E.2d 915.) " * * * where performance of an official duty or act invokes the exercise of judgment or discretion, the officer's action is not subject to review or control by mandamus. (Citation.)" (People ex rel. Rappaport v. Drazek (1st Dist. 1975), 30 Ill.App.3d 310, 314, 332 N.E.2d 532, 535.) However, the writ may issue to prevent a discretionary power from being exercised with manifest injustice or to prevent an abuse of discretion. People ex rel. Rothmund v. Conlisk (1st Dist. 1975), 34 Ill.App.3d 76, 78, 339 N.E.2d 290; People ex rel. Shell Oil Co. v. City of Chicago (1st Dist. 1972), 9 Ill.App.3d 242, 245-6, 292 N.E.2d 84; Lenert v. Wilson (1st Dist. 1965), 56 Ill.App.2d 325, 332-3, 206 N.E.2d 294.

In the instant case, the trial court considered the affidavits submitted by plaintiff and defendant Chief Jenkins in support of their respective motions for summary judgment. The affidavit of plaintiff's counsel states that the Elk Grove Village Police Department's investigation of the incident had been completed by April 9, 1975, yet plaintiff had not received a notice of charges nor a response to letters sent February 17 and March 3, 1976, which letters requested reinstatement or hearing. Plaintiff's affidavit states that since his removal from active duty, he has suffered from severe depression and anxiety, for which he was required to see his physician who has prescribed medication for him. Defendant Chief Jenkins' affidavit states that an incomplete investigation has been frustrated by the Engelson litigation. Further, he denies knowledge of plaintiff's severe depression and receipt of medical care for same and states that plaintiff has refused to discuss the matter. Considering all of these circumstances, we believe it would have been manifestly unjust and an abuse of Chief Jenkins' discretion to continue plaintiff's inactive duty status. We fail to see how the continuation of that status would promote the discipline and efficiency of the Elk Grove Village Police Department. (Humbles v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (2nd Dist. 1977), 53 Ill.App.3d 731, 11 Ill.Dec. 441, 368 N.E.2d 1049.) The trial court did not act improperly in ordering plaintiff's reinstatement to active duty.

It has been uniformly held that a court, in its sound discretion, may scrutinize the equities of the parties and condition the issuance of its writ. (Clark Oil & Refining Corp. v. Village of Tinley Park (1st Dist. 1969), 110 Ill.App.2d 61, 249 N.E.2d 140; Hagemann v. Chicago Great Western Ry. Co. (2d Dist. 1954), 2 Ill.App.2d 401, 119 N.E.2d 523, leave to appeal denied, 3 Ill.2d 627.) Thus, in the case at bar, the trial court, while ordering the plaintiff's reinstatement to active duty, properly imposed reasonable conditions on said reinstatement. The trial court properly took into consideration that the plaintiff was suffering from severe depression and anxiety, and being cognizant of the potential consequences of a person in such condition occupying the position of a police officer, the trial court correctly conditioned his access to a lethal weapon and to being placed in the position of day-to-day contact with residents of the Village. The court properly required that the reinstatement be confined to duties which do not require a weapon, such as clerical duties, and in this manner the plaintiff was able to return to work in uniform with his badge to perform an assignment at full pay and compensation. We note further that defendant Chief Jenkins did not prosecute a cross-appeal, thus accepting the trial court's order of reinstatement and the conditions therein as being compatible with any restrictions he himself in his discretion may have imposed.

Plaintiff-appellant also contends that the portion of the trial court's order pertaining to the filing...