People ex rel. Jerome v. Court of Gen. Sessions of the Peace

• Decision Date: 21 June 1906
• Citation: 78 N.E. 149,185 N.Y. 504
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. JEROME, Dist. Atty., v. COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS OF THE PEACE et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

185 N.Y. 504

78 N.E. 149

PEOPLE ex rel. JEROME, Dist. Atty.,

v.COURT OF GENERAL SESSIONS OF THE PEACE et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 21, 1906.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

Application by the people, on the relation of William Travers Jerome, district attorney, for a writ of prohibition against the Court of General Sessions and others. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (98 N. Y. Supp. 557), granting a motion for an absolute writ, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

James W. Osborne, for appellants.

Wm. Travers Jerome, Dist. Atty. (Robert C. Taylor of counsel), for respondent.

GRAY, J.

This appeal is from an order of the Appellate Division, in the First Department, granting a motion for the issuance of an absolute writ of prohibition, after reversing an order of the Special Term, which had denied such an application and had vacated an alternative writ, commanding the Court of General Sessions of the Peace in and for the county of New York, the recorder of the city of New York, as judge of the said court, and one John Blake, to refrain from any further proceedings upon a motion for a new trial made by, or on behalf of, the said Blake. It appears, from the answer made to the alternative writ, that the said John Blake had been indicted for the commission of the offense of selling an article of merchandise, falsely described upon the label on the vessel containing the same. He was tried at the General Sessions, the recorder presiding at the trial, upon his plea of not guilty to the charge, and was found guilty by the verdict of a jury. After the rendition of the verdict and before sentence, he moved that the verdict be set aside upon all the grounds specified in the Code of Criminal Procedure; that a new trial be had upon the minutes, upon all the statutory grounds, and for an arrest of judgment. The motions were denied by the recorder and the defendant was sentenced to three months in the penitentiary. Thereafter, a motion was made, and was entertained by the recorder, for a new trial and for an arrest of judgment on all the grounds stated in the Code of Criminal Procedure for such applications and, especially, upon the ground that, it affirmatively appearing upon the face of the indictment and by the testimony upon the trial that a period of more than two years had elapsed after the commission of the alleged offense and before the indictment was found, therefore, all prosecution for the offense had been barred by the statute of limitations. Pending the hearing upon the motion before the recorder, the district attorney applied to the Special Term of the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition against any further proceedings in the matter of the motion for a new trial. The alternative writ was issued and, upon the return thereto, the application of the district attorney was denied, whereupon, an appeal being taken by the people, the order was made by the Appellate Division from which the appeal is now taken.

The question presented is whether the Court of General Sessions, a court of limited jurisdiction (Code Cr. Proc. §§ 51, 52), in which the trial of the defendant Blake was had, had the power to entertain the motion for a new trial after the judgment. We think that it did not possess that power and that the appropriate remedy was availed of by the district attorney, in behalf of the people. Code Civ. Proc. § 2092; Quimbo Appo v. People, 20 N. Y. 531, 540. The grievance of the people, if the trial court was about to exceed its powers, was one which could not be redressed by an appeal (Code Cr. Proc. § 518), and, therefore, a writ of prohibition properly issued (People ex rel. Hummel v. Trial Term, 184 N. Y. 30, 76 N. E. 732). The jurisdiction and procedure of the criminal court were governed by the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. People v. Hovey, 92 N. Y. 558;People v. Glen, 173 N. Y. 395, 66 N. E. 112.

The trial court possessed no inherent power to grant a new trial and its authority in that respect was derived from sections 463, 465 [185 N.Y. 507]and 466 of that Code. Section 463 provides that ‘a new trial can be granted by the court in which the former trial was had, only, in the cases provided in section 465.’ Section 465...