People ex rel. Johns v. Thompson

• Decision Date: 25 October 1930
• Docket Number: No. 20265.,20265.
• Parties: PEOPLE ex rel. JOHNS v. THOMPSON, Mayor, et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

341 Ill. 166

173 N.E. 137

PEOPLE ex rel. JOHNS

v.THOMPSON, Mayor, et al.

No. 20265.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 25, 1930.

Mandamus proceedings by the People, on the relation of Wesley Johns, against William Hale Thompson, as Mayor of the City of Chicago, and others. Judgment dismissing petition was entered, and petitioner prayed and was allowed an appeal.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, Cook County; Hugo Pam, Judge.

Henry M. Seligman, of Chicago, for appellant.

Samuel A. Ettelson, Corporation Counsel, Carl J. Appell, and Benjamin J. Kanne, all of Chicago, for appellees.

FARMER, J.

Wesley Johns, as relator, filed a petition for mandamus in the superior court of Cook county against the mayor of the city of Chicago and the members of the public vehicle license commission of said city to compel the issuance to him of a taxicab vehicle license in the city of Chicago. A demurrer was interposed by the defendants to the petitionand was sustained. The petitioner elected to abide by his petition and it was dismissed. An appeal from the judgment dismissing the petition was prayed and allowed, and the trial court made a certificate that the validity of a municipal ordinance was involved and that the public interest required the appeal to be taken direct to this court.

The relator was the owner of an automobile and applied for a license to operate it as a taxicab in the city of Chicago. Some years previously the city had passed an ordinance creating the public vehicle license commission, whose duty it was to pass on the applications for vehicle licenses. September 25, 1929, the city council of Chicago passed an amendatory ordinance, which provided that no taxicab license as provided therein should be issued unless the public vehicle license commission should declare that public convenience and necessity required the proposed taxicab service. The amendatory ordinance required that upon filing application for a license the public vehicle license commission should cause notice of the filing of such application to be published in one of the leading daily newspapers of Chicago, which notice was to be paid for by the applicant, and that a public meeting thereon would be held at a public place designated therein, not less than five or more than fifteen days from the date of the first publication. The amendatory ordinance also provided that thereafter the holders of existing taxicab licenses were entitled to file complaints and protests, and that at all of such public hearings the burden of proof was upon the applicant to establish by clear and convincing evidence that public convenience and necessity required the operation of the vehicle for the use applied for. The relator refused to comply with the amendatory ordinance or to pay for the publication of the notice of the public meeting, none was held, and the commission refused to recommend the issuance of the license.

Appellant contends that the ordinance as amended is unconstitutional and void because it is special legislation, is discriminatory, and creates a judicial body to hear the application. It is also contended the Public Utilities Act of the state (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1929, c. 111 2/3) took away from cities and villages all power theretofore exercised by them with reference to public utilities; that a taxicab is a public utility, but, if it is not, then the ordinance is void as imposing unnecessary burdens on one class of persons operating privately conducted vehicles. It is further contended the ordinance delegates to a subordinate body unregulated discretion.

[2] The sole limitation upon a city council with reference to the passage of local or special laws is that an ordinance should be reasonable. Dillon on Mun. Corp. § 589. The power to pass the ordinance in question is authorized under sections 1, 7, 9, 42, 66, and 102 of article 5 of the Cities and Villages Act (Smith-Hurd Rev. St. 1920, c. 24, §§ 65, 65.6, 65.8, 65.41, 65.65, 65.101).

[4][8] The Public Utilities Act does not take from cities and villages the previously conferred power to regulate taxicabs. The taxicab business, as a general rule, does not include the operation of a conveyance or vehicle over specified routes, under a regular schedule as to time or between definite points, and hence, within the meaning of the Public Utilities Act, a taxicab is not ordinarily a public utility. Newcomb v. Yellow Cab Co., P. U. R. 1916B, 983; Southern Illinois Light & Power Co. v. Norton, P. U. R. 1916B, 987; Austin Bros. Transfer Co. v. Bloom, 316 Ill. 435, 147 N. E. 387. The right to regulate includes the right to impose reasonable conditions and restrictions. Westgate v. Adrian Township, 161 Mich. 333, 126 N. W. 422;McWethy v. Aurora Electric Light & Power Co.,...