People ex rel. Johnson v. Pate

• Decision Date: 04 December 1970
• Docket Number: No. 42249,42249
• Citation: 265 N.E.2d 144,47 Ill.2d 172
• Parties: The PEOPLE ex rel. Earl JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Frank J. PATE, Warden, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 144

265 N.E.2d 144

47 Ill.2d 172

The PEOPLE ex rel. Earl JOHNSON, Appellant, v. Frank J. PATE, Warden, et al., Appellees.

No. 42249.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 4, 1970.

Gerald W. Getty, Public Defender, Chicago (James N. Gramenos, Asst. Public Defender, of counsel), for appellant.

William J. Scott, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Edward V. Hanrahan, State's Atty., Chicago (James B. Zagel, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Robert A. Novelle, and James Veldman, Asst. State's Attys., of counsel), for the People.

UNDERWOOD, Chief Justice.

The circuit court of Cook County dismissed Earl Johnson's petition for a writ of Habeas corpus and he appeals from that judgment directly to this court. Supreme Court Rule 302(a), Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 110A, § 302(a), 43 Ill.2d R. 302(a).

In both a Pro se petition and an amended petition filed after appointment of counsel, Johnson stated that he was sentenced in 1956 to a term of 99 years imprisonment, and paroled in 1964. While still on parole in January, 1968, he was arrested and indicted for robbery, armed robbery and attempted murder. Bond was set at $10,000 on each charge. Thereafter, a warden's warrant was issued and relator was returned to the Illinois State Penitentiary from the Cook County jail, for determination of his status as a parole violator. Less than a month later, he was returned to the Cook County jail for proceedings upon the Habeas corpus petition. A series of hearings ensued, at which relator argued that he should be released on bond from imprisonment under the warden's warrant, pending a hearing on his parole status by the Parole and Pardon Board. The circuit court ultimately held that there is no right to bail on a warden's warrant.

Relator does not contest his 1956 conviction and sentencing; his sole challenge is to the authority of the respondents to imprison him, without benefit of bail, pending a hearing to determine whether his parole should be revoked. He contends that the Parole and Pardon Board does not intend to hold such hearing until after trial of the pending indictments, and argues that the warden's warrant was actually issued for the purpose of detaining him until trial; and that its effect is to deny him bail on those charges. While relator has vigorously presented these contentions in the court below as well as on appeal, it is clear that he proceeds under a misapprehension as to the law governing Habeas corpus relief in Illinois, and fails to recognize the altered status of a prisoner admitted to parole.

It is also clear that Johnson was not denied bail on the pending indictments; bail has been set on those charges long before the institution of Habeas corpus proceedings. While he remained in the Cook County jail pending trial due to his failure to make bail, he was served with the warden's warrant and removed to the penitentiary. The authority for the imprisonment in the penitentiary thus derived from the 1956 conviction and sentence, rather than the 1968 indictments.

Admission to parole does not, of course, entitle a prisoner to his discharge. It is simply an alternative method by which he may serve his sentence; a part of the rehabilitative process applicable to those whose history, conduct and prognosis, in the judgment of the Parole and Pardon Board, justify such action. Although not confined in prison, a parolee remains at all times in the custody of the Department of Public Safety, and subject to the authority of the Parole and Pardon Board until expiration of the sentence. (People ex rel. Scott v. Jones, 44 Ill.2d 343, 347, 255 N.E.2d 397; People ex rel. Richardson v. Ragen, 400 Ill. 191, 195, 79 N.E.2d 479; Ill.Rev.Stat. 1967, ch. 108, par. 204(f) and (g); Ill.Rev.Stat. 1967, ch. 38, par. 123--1(a).) We have accordingly held a warden's warrant is proper authority for the reincarceration of a parolee, pending a hearing on his status as a parole violator, and in no way deprives a free citizen of his right to liberty. (People ex rel. Jefferson v. Brantley, 44 Ill.2d 31, 34, 253 N.E.2d 378.) As to relator's contention that he was entitled to bail on the warrant, it should suffice to say there is neither statutory nor constitutional authority supporting this proposition, and no rule or regulation of the Parole and Pardon Board makes provision for such bail. Johnson was retaken in the status of a convicted prisoner under authority of a lawful conviction and sentence which remained unserved. The constitutional right to bail, accorded persons standing in the status of an accused, is scarcely applicable to proceedings on the warden's warrant for Johnson, who owed many years service on a lawful sentence. See Aguilera v. California Dept. of Corrections, 247 Cal.App.2d 150, 55 Cal.Rptr. 292; In re Hardy v. Warden of Queens House of Detention for Men, 56 Misc.2d 332, 288 N.Y.S.2d 541; January v. Porter, 75 Wash.2d 768, 453 P.2d 876; Gaertner v. State, 35 Wis.2d 159, 150 N.W.2d 370; see also, In re Whitney (1st Cir., 1970), 421 F.2d 337; Ex parte Cantrell, 172 Tex.Cr.R. 646, 362 S.W.2d 115.

By virtue of the judgment of conviction and sentence imposed in 1956, relator was thereafter, whether actually on parole or in prison, properly in the legal custody of the prison authorities, subject to the provisions of the act relating to parole and the regulations issued thereunder. This being true, the conclusion must follow that the Habeas Corpus Act is expressly inapplicable to relator. Habeas corpus proceedings are appropriately brought by a person under sentence of...