People ex rel. Jones v. Adams

• Decision Date: 09 July 1976
• Docket Number: No. 75--109,75--109
• Citation: 40 Ill.App.3d 189,350 N.E.2d 767
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois ex rel. Danny R. JONES, County Treasurer, etc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralph ADAMS et al., Defendants-Objectors-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 767

350 N.E.2d 767

40 Ill.App.3d 189

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois ex rel. Danny R. JONES County Treasurer, etc., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralph ADAMS et al., Defendants-Objectors-Appellants.

No. 75--109.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fifth District.

July 9, 1976.

Robert S. Hill, Benton, for defendants-objectors-appellants.

William F. Meehan, Cairo, for plaintiff-appellee.

GEORGE J. MORAN, Justice.

The defendants, landowners in Franklin County, Illinois, appeal from a judgment of the circuit court of Franklin County which overruled their objections to taxes levied upon their lands for the years 1971 and 1972.

The principal questions in this appeal are whether farmers, as a class, are denied equal protection of the laws by the levying of burdensome real estate taxes upon their farms, and whether the parents of school-aged children who reside in poor school districts are denied equal protection of the laws by Illinois' method of financing public education, in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, section 2, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution.

The defendants, of whom there are about 228, all own land in Franklin County, Illinois. Some are farmers and some are parents of school-aged children who live in Franklin County. The record does not show which defendants fit within either or both of these categories.

Two hundred and five of the defendants paid their real estate taxes for 1971 under protest, in accordance with section 194 of the Revenue Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 120, par. 675). Pursuant to sections 232 and 235 of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 120, pars. 713, 716), the treasurer of Franklin County, as the ex-officio tax collector, made a list of the lands on which taxes had been paid under protest, and applied to the circuit court of Franklin County for a judgment for the amount of the taxes. The defendants filed written objections to the taxes as required by section 235 of the Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 120, par. 716). The defendants did not attach to the written objections original or duplicate tax collectors' receipts showing that the taxes had been paid.

One hundred and twenty-one of the defendants paid their 1972 real estate taxes under protest. The county treasurer, as the ex-officio collector, again applied to the circuit court for a judgment for the taxes. The defendants filed their written objections but did not attach collectors' receipts to the objections.

The proceeding on the first application was delayed. The two applications were consolidated and heard together.

On April 25, 1974, the People (hereinafter called the 'collector') moved to dismiss the defendants' objections. The motion was denied. The collector later moved to sever the objections of the defendants and to require the defendants to object individually in separate actions. This motion was also denied.

On September 23, 1974, a hearing was held on the applications and objections. The defendants called as a witness an agricultural economist who testified that Illinois' system of real property taxation places a heavy burden on the state's farmers. He said that real estate taxes consume about 2% Of the average Illinois citizen's gross income, but about 21% Of the gross income of most farmers. The economist testified also that real estate taxes were onerous because of their inflexibility; that is, the usual amount of real estate tax accrues for a farmer even though bad weather may have ruined his crops.

An employee of the Illinois Department of Local Government Affairs testified that the governor of Illinois had ordered the department to issue to all counties in Illinois property tax multipliers for 1972 which were identical to the multipliers issued for 1971, in apparent disregard of section 130 of the Revenue Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 120, par. 611).

No witness testified for the defendants concerning the alleged inequities of Illinois' manner of financing public schools. The defendants introduced several exhibits in evidence, however, which contained information relevant to this subject. One exhibit, the Illinois Statistical Report for 1972, published by the state of Illinois, showed in a table that Franklin County was able to raise only $462 in real estate taxes per student enrolled in the county's public schools, far below the state average of $627 in real estate taxes per enrolled student, even though the tax rate in Franklin County was $2,68 per $100 of equalized assessed valuation, slightly above the state average of $2.64 per $100 of equalized assessed valuation. The defendants introduced in evidence tax collectors' receipts which showed that the defendants had paid their real estate taxes for 1971 and 1972 under protest.

On October 24, 1974, the circuit court entered a judgment in favor of the collector for the amount of the defendants' real estate taxes for 1971 and 1972, and overruled the objections to the taxes.

The defendants appeal. The collector attempts to cross-appeal from the order of the circuit court denying his motion to dismiss the objections.

The defendants and the collector advance the same arguments on appeal as at trial. The arguments are lengthy, but they must be set forth in order to facilitate an understanding of this case.

The defendants first contend that Article IX, section 4(b), of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, which allows counties with a population of more than 200,000 to classify real property for the purposes of taxation, violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. The defendants assert that such a division of counties on the basis of population arbitrarily discriminates against landowners in counties having 200,000 people or less, who would probably receive a low classification for their land if their counties were allowed to classify real property.

The defendants argue, second, that the fixing of the 1972 property tax multipliers at the level of the 1971 multipliers was a violation of the equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions because it forced landowners in Franklin County to pay a higher rate of real estate tax for 1972 than landowners in other counties paid.

Third, the defendants assert that Illinois' present scheme of real estate taxation arbitrarily discriminates against farmers by requiring them to pay nine or ten times more of their gross income in real estate taxes than the average citizen of Illinois must pay. Such discrimination, the defendants argue, amounts to a violation of the equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution and the 1970 Illinois Constitution.

The defendants argue, fourth, that Illinois' method of financing public schools, which depends to a large extent on the revenue that school districts can raise from local real estate taxes, invidiously discriminates against school-aged children and their parents who live in poor school districts, in contravention of the equal protection clauses of the state and federal constitutions.

In response, the collector argues that a circuit court has only limited jurisdiction in a proceeding under section 235 of the Revenue Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 120, par. 716), which will not allow it to decide constitutional questions such as those the defendants raise. The collector also asserts that the defendants' failure to attach tax collectors' receipts to their written objections precluded the circuit court from entertaining their objections under section 235. The collector argues finally that the circuit court erred in not severing the objections for a trial of each defendant's objections separately.

The question whether this court has appellate jurisdiction over this case will first be considered. Formerly, under section 237 of the Revenue Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 120, par. 718), old Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1969, ch. 110A, par. 302(a)), and Article VI, section 5, of the 1870 Illinois Constitution, an appeal from a judgment of a circuit court in a tax case had to be taken directly to the Illinois Supreme Court. This has been changed, however, by Article VI, section 4(a) of the 1970 Illinois Constitution and new Illinois Supreme Court Rule 302(a) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 110A, par. 302(a)). Now an appeal from a judgment of a circuit court in a proceeding under section 235 of the Revenue Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1971, ch. 120, par. 716) must be taken to the Illinois Appellate Court. 6 Nichols, Illinois Civil Practice § 6703 (1975). The court, therefore, has appellate jurisdiction over this case.

The arguments advanced by the collector will next be considered. No part of the final judgment of the circuit court was adverse to the collector, so the collector could not make a cross appeal from that judgment. People v. Bradford, 372 Ill. 63, 22 N.E.2d 691; Bullman v. Cooper, 362 Ill. 469, 200 N.E. 173. Despite the inappropriateness of his attempt to make a cross appeal, the collector can still urge his arguments upon this court because they tend to support the judgment below on grounds revealed by the record. That the circuit court based its decision on other grounds revealed by the record does not hinder the collector from making these arguments. People v. Bradford, supra; Bullman v. Cooper, supra.

The collector's assertion that taxpayers cannot challenge the constitutionality of the Revenue Act and other statutes in a proceeding under section 235 of the Revenue Act is erroneous. There are basically only two ways in which a taxpayer can attack a real estate tax levied upon his land. He may, in a few cases, seek declaratory or injunctive relief before he pays the tax, or he may pay the tax under protest and then object in a proceeding held in accordance with section 235 of the Revenue Act. The availability to the taxpayer of declaratory or injunctive relief is severely restricted, however, and his usual remedy is to pay the tax under...